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 Abstract 
This thesis consists of four papers which are related to critical natural resource issues from a developing and 
emerging country perspective. All four papers demonstrate the importance of financial incentives in driving 
behaviour and investments. Two of the papers apply cost-benefit analysis to complex decisions in the energy 
and land use sector and two papers model the behaviour of agricultural households. 
Determining an optimal strategy for energy investment in Kazakhstan 
We analyse energy policy options facing the Kazakhstan government which is seeking to diversify and 
deliver sustainable development. We use cost-benefit analysis informed by expert testimony to support 
critical decision-making over the necessary $67 billion in electricity investments to 2050 that can 
simultaneously contribute to a sustainable economy. The results indicate that for commercial, economic and 
sustainability reasons policymakers should switch from further investments in coal-based electricity 
generation to a focus on investments that harness gas and hydropower.  
Fuelwood scarcity, energy substitution, and rural livelihoods in Namibia 
We seek to improve understanding of the impact of rural energy demand on standing forests. Specifically, 
we analyse the energy profile of rural households in Namibia, with a focus on fuelwood demand from open-
access forests and energy alternatives such as cow dung and open-market fuelwood purchases. The results 
show that households are largely inelastic in their fuelwood demand, and respond to fuelwood scarcity by 
reducing energy consumption just slightly more than by increasing labour input to collection, with limited 
shift to available substitutes. Policy-makers in semi-arid countries should be alert to the potential for 
predicted population growth to increase fuelwood collection, even in the face of apparent scarcity and 
substitutes, which in turn risks degrading the integrity and extent of the forest. 
Economic Efficiency and Incentives for Change within Namibia’s Community Wildlife Use Initiatives  
We appraise the economic and financial viability of five community wildlife conservation and utilization 
initiatives, or conservancies, on communal land in Namibia. For each conservancy, we examine financial 
profitability, returns on investment and economic efficiency, as well as private returns to project investment 
made by all stakeholders – community, donor and government. The results illustrate that conservancies are 
economically efficient, profitable and able to contribute positively to national income and the development 
process. Crucially, conservancies provide decent financial returns for communities, including income from 
wildlife use. Conservancies also provide a channel for the capture of international donor grants (reflecting 
global wildlife non-use values) as income, further strengthening financial returns for communities. 
Formal microlending and adverse (or non-existent) selection: a case study of shrimp farmers in 
Bangladesh 
We study the commercial activities and incentives for shrimp farmers in Bangladesh. Shrimp farmers are 
rural, poor, work entirely in the informal economy, and practice a form of mono-culture. The limited credit 
access of these farmers is rightly seen as a weakness. The results show that all farmers over-utilise labour to 
reduce the need for working capital and that informal lenders – with their closer ties to the individual farmers 
– remain more successful than formal lenders in identifying those smallholder farmers most likely to use the 
borrowed funds successfully. Informal lenders have an information advantage that formal microlenders lack: 
the latter need to find routes to access this information for formal microcredit schemes to succeed. 
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     Sammanfattning 
Denna avhandling består av fyra papers som behandlar avgörande naturresursfrågor utifrån ett utvecklings- 
och transitionslandsperspektiv. Samtliga fyra papers visar betydelsen av ekonomiska incitament för att 
påverka beteenden och stimulera investeringar. Två av dessa papers använder sig av kostnads-nyttoanalys 
vid komplexa beslut inom energi och markanvändning, medan två papers beskriver beteendet hos 
jordbrukarhushåll. 
Att fastställa en optimal strategi för energiinvesteringar i Kazakstan 
Vi analyserar de energipolitiska alternativ som Kazakstans regering – vilken strävar efter diversifiering och 
att skapa en hållbar utveckling – har att ta ställning till. Vi använder oss av en kostnads-nyttoanalys som 
utnyttjar expertutlåtanden i syfte att understödja avgörande beslut kring de nödvändiga 
elektricitetsinvesteringarna på 67 miljarder dollar fram till 2050, som samtidigt kan bidra till en hållbar 
ekonomi. Resultatet indikeran att beslutsfattare, av kommersiella, ekonomiska och hållbarhetsskäl, bör växla 
om från ytterligare investeringar i kolkraft till att fokusera på investeringar inriktade på gas och vattenkraft.  
Brist på brännved, energisubstitution, och försörjningsmöjligheter på landsbygden i Namibia 
Vi strävar efter att öka förståelsen av hur energiefterfrågan på landsbygden påverkar skogarna. Specifikt 
analyserar vi energiprofilen hos hushåll på landsbygden i Namibia, med fokus på efterfrågan på brännved 
från allmänt tillgängliga skogar och energialternativ såsom kospillning och brännved köpt på den öppna 
marknaden. Resultaten visar att hushållen har en i stort sett oelastisk efterfrågan på brännved och reagerar på 
brist på densamma genom att minska energiförbrukningen endast något mer än man ökar arbetsinsatsen för 
insamlingen, och att övergången till tillgängliga substitut är begränsad. Beslutsfattare i semiarida länder bör 
vara uppmärksamma på att den förväntade framtida befolkningstillväxten kan leda till ökad 
brännvedsinsamling, även i händelse av uppenbar brist och substitut, vilket i sin tur riskerar att försämra 
skogens skick och minska dess omfattning. 
Ekonomisk effektivitet och incitament för förändring inom viltvårdsinitiativ i Namibia 
Vi bedömer den ekonomiska och finansiella bärkraften hos fem viltvårds- och användningsinitiativ som drivs 
av byasamfälleigheter i Namibia. För vart och ett av dessa viltvårdsprojekt undersöker vi privatekonomisk 
lönsamhet, avkastning på investeringar och samhällsekonomisk effektivitet, samt privatekonomisk 
avkastning på de projektinvesteringar som gjorts av alla intressenter – lokalsamhället, biståndsgivarna och 
regeringen. Resultatet visar att viltvård är ekonomiskt effektivt, lönsamt och kan bidra positivt till 
nationalinkomsten och utvecklingsprocessen. Framför allt ger viltvård god privatekonomisk avkastning för 
lokalsamhällen, inklusive intäkter från viltanvändning. Viltvårdsprojekt gör även att man öppnar upp en 
kanal för att fånga upp internationellt bistånd (som återspeglar globala icke-användarvärden förknippade 
med viltet), vilket ytterligare stärker den privatekonomiska avkastningen för lokalsamhällena. 
Formella mikrolån och negativt (eller obefintligt) urval: en fallstudie av räkodlare i Bangladesh 
Vi studerar kommersiell verksamhet och incitament för räkodlare i Bangladesh. Räkodlare bor på 
landsbygden, är fattiga, arbetar uteslutande inom den informella ekonomin och utövar en form av 
monokultur. Dessa räkodlares begränsade kreditillgång ses med rätta som en nackdel för dem. Resultaten 
visar att samtliga odlare överutnyttjar arbetskraft för att minska behovet av rörelsekapital, och att informella 
långivare – med sina närmare band till de enskilda odlarna – i större utsträckning än formella långivare 
lyckas identifiera vilka av dessa småskaliga odlare som har störst chans att använda de lånade medlen på ett 
framgångsrikt sätt. De informella långivarna har ett informationsövertag i förhållande till de formella 
mikrolångivarna: de senare behöver hitta vägar fram till denna information för att de formella 
mikrokreditprogrammen ska kunna lyckas. 
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Introduction	
	
This	thesis	focuses	on	the	challenges	individuals	and	policymakers	face	in	developing	and	emerging	countries	
when	making	decisions	on	energy,	land	use	and	natural	resources	which	aim	to	be	simultaneously	economically	
sound	and	sustainable.	The	four	papers	in	this	thesis	highlight	the	market	failures	driving	a	disconnect	between	
achieving	sustainability	goals	and	stakeholders’	short-	and	long-term	financial	incentives.	The	implication	of	this	
study	is	that,	by	identifying	and	addressing	these	market	failures,	the	sustainability	goals	and	financial	incentives	
can	be	realigned	to	result	in	more	efficient	behaviour	and	allocation	of	resources.	
The	reason	for	this	misalignment	of	incentives	is	that,	when	markets	function	poorly,	prices	may	fail	to	provide	
useful	signals	and	may	also	vary	among	agents.	In	addition,	some	markets,	such	as	those	for	key	environmental	
services	and	benefits,	do	not	function	at	all.	These	market	failures	lead	to	poor	decisions	being	taken	owing	to	
misaligned	incentives	facing	not	only	individuals	and	households	in	the	short	term,	but	also	policymakers	making	
decisions	on	investments	for	the	long	term.	
Sustainability	goals	and	concerns	risk	being	sidelined	when	markets	fail.	Therefore,	when	dual	environment–
development	goals	are	sought,	identifying	potential	and	actual	market	failures	is	vital.	Indeed,	evidence	from	
developing	and	emerging	countries	now	shows	that	it	is	possible	to	identify	multiple	overlapping	market	failures	
(Borot	et	al.,	2009;	Groom	and	Palmer,	2014).	The	papers	in	this	thesis	illustrate	how	these	failures	happen.	For	
example,	subsistence	households	face	inelastic	demand	curves	for	energy	without	recourse	to	fuelwood	markets	
(which	imperils	local	forests);	community	conservancies	face	missing	markets	for	non-use	values	for	wildlife	
(which	risks	leading	to	biodiversity	loss);	microcredit	agencies	miss	vital	economic	performance	data	on	their	
customers	(which	results	in	selection	biased	in	favour	of	higher-risk	farmers);	and	policymakers	maintain	low	
prices	for	energy	for	political	reasons	(which	reduces	incentives	to	seek	sustainable	alternatives).	Furthermore,	
we	find	common	concerns	which	have	emanated	from	across	the	wide	range	of	agents,	business	models	and	
economic	sectors	regarding	how	failed	markets	impact	sustainability.	
The	economic	and	sustainability	benefit	to	incorporating	an	environmental	economics	approach	when	making	
critical	decisions	over	investment	and	policy	is	both	long-term	and	well-established	(Bromley,	1995;	Pearce	et	al.,	
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1989).	For	policymakers,	considerable	help	is	at	hand	to	support	diagnosis	of	the	relevant	issues,	analysis	of	
underlying	causes	and	implementation	of	remedial	action,	as	well	as	integration	of	such	insights	into	policy	and	
investment	decisions	(e.g.	HMT,	2003;	Smith,	2011;	and	several	valuation	databases,	e.g.	DEFRA,	2015;	
Environment	Canada,	2015).	Yet	in	developing	and	emerging	countries,	relevant	data	to	make	decisions	are	often	
unavailable.	The	papers	collected	here	seek	to	contribute	to	the	literature	on	addressing	market	failures	in	
developing	and	emerging	economies	to	enable	better	decisions	with	respect	to	the	energy	sector	(Papers	1	and	2)	
and	land	use	(Papers	3	and	4).	
Access	to	affordable,	clean	and	reliable	energy	is	enshrined	in	the	United	Nations’	Sustainable	Development	Goals	
(specifically	SDG7)	for	2030,	and	has	long	been	a	policy	goal	for	most	countries.	Despite	this,	half	of	the	world’s	
population	remains	without	access	to	electricity	and	many	with	access	suffer	an	unreliable	and	costly	supply	
(MacGregor,	2017).	Hence,	Papers	1	and	2	seek	to	identify	and	quantify	some	of	the	market	failures	that	burden	
energy	sectors	in	developing	and	emerging	countries	when	prices	fail	to	signal	outcomes	that	are	simultaneously	
uneconomical	and	unsustainable.	Incentives	facing	all	stakeholders	are	further	complicated	by	financial	and	
labour	market	failures,	which	result	in	decisions	being	taken	individually	and	collectively	that	are	economically	
inefficient,	financially	costlier	and	less	environmentally	sustainable.	As	the	studies	reported	in	these	two	papers	
show,	the	identified	failures	in	the	energy	markets	require	realigning	to	incentivise	households,	the	private	sector	
and	policymakers	to	take	social	and	environmental	externalities	into	account	in	their	decision-making.	
In	terms	of	land,	decisions	regarding	its	use	customarily	weigh	short-	and	long-term	investment	risks	against	their	
alternatives.	However,	in	developing	countries,	imperfect	markets	for	capital,	labour	and	environmental	
resources	may	bias	land	use	decisions	against	long-term	investments	(Barbier,	1997)	without	due	consideration	
for	environment-oriented	development	goals.	Other	challenges	in	developing	countries	frustrating	the	
identification	of	market	failure	and	efforts	to	realign	incentives	include	multiple	overlapping	market	failures,	
incomplete	data	on	economic	activity,	missing	markets	and	the	wide	variation	in	prices	facing	different	agents.	
Clearly,	it	is	important	to	identify	and	address	these	market	failures	and	to	support	decision-making	to	be	
simultaneously	economic	and	sustainable	(Mertz,	2008).	This	thesis	exposes	the	misalignment	of	incentives	
among	stakeholders,	namely	donors,	conservancy	managers	and	conservancy	households	(Paper	3),	and	farmers,	
informal	lenders	and	formal	microcredit	scheme	managers	(Paper	4).	
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Two	approaches	are	presented	across	the	four	papers.	Two	of	the	papers	apply	cost–benefit	analysis	(CBA)	to	
complex	decisions	in	the	energy	and	land	use	sectors	(Papers	1	and	3),	while	the	remaining	two	model	the	
behaviour	of	agricultural	households	(Papers	2	and	4).	
	
Summary	of	papers	
	
Paper	1,	Determining	an	optimal	strategy	for	energy	investment	in	Kazakhstan	(published	in	2017	in	Energy	
Policy),	analyses	the	energy	policy	options	facing	the	Kazakhstan	Government	which	is	seeking	to	diversify	its	
economy	and	deliver	sustainable	development.	Kazakhstan	has	expansive	coal	reserves,	and	this	natural	resource	
asset	continues	to	influence	energy	decision-making.	A	looming	electricity	generation	shortfall	coupled	with	
ageing	infrastructure	has	made	decisions	over	energy	investments	a	political	and	economic	priority.	The	analysis	
employs	a	broad	CBA	approach	to	support	decisions	on	future	electricity	generation	investments.	
From	a	relatively	low	starting	point,	the	Government	of	Kazakhstan	is	seeking	to	accelerate	the	integration	of	
sustainability	concerns	into	its	governance	policies	by	adopting	a	bold	Vision	and	making	strategic	investments	to	
achieve	it	(GoK,	2012;	Ospanova,	2014).	In	the	energy	sector,	a	key	policy	constraint	is	the	desire	to	maintain	
artificially	low	prices	for	electricity,	owing	to	protests	over	tariff	escalation	across	Asia.	Compounding	this,	
markets	for	credit	are	weak	and	several	environmental	values	remain	unpriced	at	present.		For	the	energy	sector,	
these	market	and	policy	imperfections	incentivise	short-term	household	behaviours	and	long-term	policy	
decisions	that	are	misaligned	with	sustainability	goals.	
Following	Hammond	et	al.	(1999),	Howard	(1966)	and	Spetzler	et	al.	(2016),	we	apply	structured	decision-making,	
using	the	collective	expertise	of	an	interdisciplinary	group	of	stakeholders	to	identify	policy	options.	Following	
Creedy	et	al.	(2009)	and	Kass	et	al.	(2011),	these	policy	options	were	compared	quantitatively	using	CBA,	which	
integrated	official	government	and	private	sector	data	together	with	estimates	elicited	from	the	group	of	
stakeholders.	
The	results	of	the	analysis	indicate	that,	for	electricity	generation,	Kazakhstan	should	begin	to	switch	from	coal	
and	focus	on	harnessing	the	commercial	and	economic	advantages	of	gas	and	hydropower.	Compared	with	the	
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current	production	mix,	these	options	would	not	only	be	cheaper,	but	also	have	considerably	lower	emissions	and	
water	usage.	Given	the	market	and	policy	imperfections,	therefore,	public	investments	should	be	focused	on	
generating	incentives	to	develop	this	sector’s	transformation	from	business-as-usual.	Further	challenges	persist,	
however,	both	in	ensuring	energy	access	to	remote	communities	and	in	guaranteeing	affordability	throughout	the	
energy	network.	
In	Paper	2,	Fuelwood	scarcity,	energy	substitution,	and	rural	livelihoods	in	Namibia	(co-authored	with	Charles	
Palmer	and	published	in	2009	in	Environment	and	Development	Economics),	we	aim	to	enhance	understanding	of	
the	profile	of	energy	demand,	substitution	and	costs.	Specifically,	we	analyse	energy	use	by	rural	households,	
with	a	specific	focus	on	demand	for	fuelwood	from	open-access	forests	and	demand	for	energy	alternatives	such	
as	cow	dung	and	fuelwood	purchases	on	the	open	market.	
We	use	survey	data	collected	with	Namibia’s	Ministry	of	Environment	and	Tourism	throughout	northern	Namibia	
from	in-person	interviews	about	trends	in	household	use	of	forest	resources	(Barnes	et	al.,	2005;	MacGregor	et	
al.,	2007).	We	also	use	data	from	work	on	compiling	forest	resource	accounts	for	Namibia	(Barnes	et	al.,	2010)	as	
a	guide	to	relative	scarcity.	We	find,	in	common	with	most	studies	in	developing	countries,	that	rural	agricultural	
households	in	this	region	rely	on	forests	for	energy,	shelter	and	livestock	grazing	(Blackmore	and	MacGregor,	
2011;	Clay	et	al.,	2005;	Kanji	et	al.,	2005;	Vorley	et	al.,	2008,	2009).	
We	then	model	households	as	engaged	in	agricultural	production,	off-farm	work	and	energy	collection.	A	
household’s	primary	input	to	fuelwood	collection	is	labour,	so	its	shadow	price	is	defined	by	the	opportunity	cost	
of	collection	time.	It	follows	that	heterogeneous	households	face	different	market	or	shadow	prices	for	fuelwood	
collection;	hence,	each	household	would	be	making	non-separable	production	and	consumption	decisions.	We	
follow	Sadoulet	and	De	Janvry	(1995)	and	analyse	the	price	band	facing	rural	households	for	fuelwood	–	that	is,	
the	difference	between	the	prices	for	market	purchases	and	sales	–	to	ascertain	incentives	for	consumption,	
production	and	vending.	A	market	can	be	considered	at	risk	of	failing	for	a	particular	household	if	that	household	
faces	a	‘price	band’	with	a	wide	margin,	with	incentives	to	choose	self-sufficiency	if	its	shadow	price	for	fuelwood	
collection	falls	within	that	margin.	
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A	household	model	for	domestic	energy	supply	and	demand	is	estimated	using	these	data.	Heckman	two-step	
estimates	(Heckman,	1976,	1979)	show	that	households	respond	to	economic	scarcity,	as	measured	by	the	
opportunity	costs	of	collecting	fuelwood:	their	response	is	to	reduce	their	energy	consumption	by	slightly	more	
than	the	degree	to	which	they	would	increase	labour	input	to	collection.	
Furthermore,	we	find	limited	substitution	of	cow	dung	for	fuelwood	as	an	energy	source.	These	findings	are	in	
line	with	similar	studies	(Cooke	et	al.,	2008;	Jeuland	and	Pattanayak,	2012;	Mekonnen,	1999)	in	that	increased	
opportunity	costs	of	collecting	fuelwood	due	to	increased	scarcity	do	not	appear	to	correlated	either	with	
substitution	to	apparent	alternatives	such	as	cow	dung,	or	with	increased	market	purchases	of	fuelwood.	
Furthermore,	our	interpretation	is	in	line	with	Hyde	and	Köhlin	(2000),	indicating	that	the	poorest	households	
may	be	more	responsive	than	other	groups	to	this	fuelwood	(economic)	scarcity.	
Our	findings	are	relevant	not	only	for	Namibia,	but	also	for	policy	concerning	forest	management	in	communal	
lands	in	other	semi-arid	countries.	Since	this	paper	was	published,	similar	studies	have	been	conducted	in	a	large	
number	of	developing	countries	in	Africa	and	Asia	(Akther	et	al.,	2010;	Guta,	2014;	Makungwa	et	al.,	2013).	Some	
have	analysed	the	shifting	market	dynamics	of	agricultural	supply	chains	(Borot	et	al.,	2008;	Graffham	et	al.,	2006,	
2008;	Groom	and	MacGregor,	2007;	Kleih	et	al.,	2007;	Legge	et	al.,	2008;	MacGregor,	2010a,	2010b,	2010c;	
MacGregor	et	al.,	2009,	2014),	while	others	have	focused	on	short-	and	long-term	incentives	for	environmental	
investment	(Chambwera	and	MacGregor,	2009;	Huq	and	MacGregor,	2009;	MacGregor,	2006a,	2009;	MacGregor	
and	Vorley,	2006).	As	predicted	in	our	paper,	growing	populations	in	developing	countries	have	been	increasing	
the	pressure	on	forests	and	their	products	(Gwavuya	et	al.,	2012;	Nepal	et	al.,	2010;	Prinsloo	et	al.,	2016;	
Schaafsma	et	al.,	2012).	
In	Paper	3,	Economic	efficiency	and	incentives	for	change	within	Namibia’s	community	wildlife	use	initiatives	(co-
authored	with	Jonathan	Barnes	and	Chris	Weaver,	and	published	in	2002	in	World	Development),	we	appraise	the	
economic	and	financial	value	of	five	community	wildlife	conservation	and	utilisation	initiatives,	or	conservancies,	
on	communal	land	in	Namibia.	
Conservancies	aim	to	provide,	simultaneously,	positive	incentives	for	conservation	of	natural	resources	and	
improved	livelihood	opportunities	(Naidoo	et	al.,	2011).	A	critical	part	of	any	conservancy’s	success	is	ensuring	
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clear	incentives	are	given	to	members	for	conservation	of	the	natural	resources	within	its	boundaries.	Non-use	
values	are	not	reflected	in	conservancy	members’	incentives	and	are	causing	the	market	to	fail	(Humavindu	and	
Stage,	2015;	MacGregor	and	Hesse,	2013).		With	the	help	of	donor	funding,	these	values	can	be	captured,	but	this	
carries	the	risk	that	the	incentives	based	on	such	values	are	not	integrated	or	sustainable,	and	that	the	
community	could	become	dependent	on	donor	funding.	
For	each	conservancy,	we	examine	financial	profitability,	returns	on	investment,	economic	efficiency,	and	private	
returns	to	project	investment	made	by	all	stakeholders	–	community,	donors	and	government.	Namibia’s	policy	
and	legislation	allows	community-based	natural	resource	management	(CBNRM)	on	communal	land.	Much	of	the	
initial	focus	of	CBNRM	has	been	on	wildlife	(Barnes,	1995;	Barrett	and	Arcese,	1995;	Gibson	and	Marks,	1995;	
Lewis	et	al.,	1990;	Meissner,	1982),	which	is	threatened	with	displacement	by	growing	rural	human	populations	
and	illegal	use	(Barbier,	1992).	The	CBNRM	approach	devolves	rights	over	wildlife	to	local	communities	and	aims	
to	make	wildlife	conservation	part	of	the	rural	development	process	(Barnes	et	al.,	2012;	Bond,	2001;	Infield,	
2001)	alongside	traditional	agriculture	and	livestock	rearing	(Hesse	and	MacGregor,	2006;	Letara	et	al.,	2006).	In	
this	context,	CBNRM	initiatives	need	to	be	financially	attractive	for	the	community,	economically	efficient	for	the	
country,	reasonably	financially	viable	for	donors	and	the	government	and,	in	the	long	term,	commercially	feasible	
to	the	private	sector.	Without	these	incentives,	conservancies	and	the	CBNRM	programmes	they	run	will	not	be	
sustainable,	and	will	not	result	in	development	or	conservation.	
Following	Emerton	(2001)	and	Pearce	and	Turner	(1990),	we	analyse	the	financial	and	economic	viability	of	each	
conservancy	using	dynamic	cost–benefit	models	that	employ	survey	data	from	in-person	interviews	with	
conservancy	leaders	and	wildlife	use	enterprises,	coupled	with	information	from	individual	conservancy	
management	plans.	Following	Barnes	(1994),	CEAS	(1989),	Gittinger	(1982),	Matambo	(1988),	and	Ministry	of	
Finance	and	Development	Planning	(1986),	we	employ	shadow	pricing	in	the	economic	analyses	to	account	for	
the	range	of	data	challenges	in	rural	areas.	
We	find	conservancies	are	economically	efficient,	profitable	and	able	to	contribute	positively	to	national	income	
and	the	development	process.	Crucially,	conservancies	generally	attract	financial	returns	for	communities,	
including	income	from	wildlife	use.	They	also	provide	a	channel	for	the	capture	of	international	donor	grants	
(reflecting	global	wildlife	non-use	values)	as	income,	and	generate	attractive	financial	returns	for	communities.	
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Donor	grants	are	fertile	catalysts	for	land	use	change	in	conservancies.	Yet	for	long-term	sustainability	
conservancies	need	to	prove	attractive	to	the	private	sector	and	to	ensure	there	is	an	exit	strategy	to	avoid	
dependency	witnessed	in	other	economic	development	programmes.	Our	results	demonstrate	that	the	ability	to	
generate	income	from	tourism	is	important	for	overall	financial	viability	for	all	conservancies.	Thus,	policy	that	
enables	genuine	engagement	with	the	private	sector	is	most	likely	to	yield	sustainable	development	outcomes	
that	do	not	require	persistent	government	and	donor	investment.	
Since	this	paper	was	written,	the	Namibian	CBNRM	Programme	has	continued	to	develop	and	expand	successfully	
(Hoole	and	Berkes,	2010;	Naidoo	et	al.,	2011).	The	CBA	approach	used	in	this	paper	has	been	applied	to	
conservation	questions	in	Namibia	and	increasingly	across	southern	Africa	in	the	donor,	government	and	business	
investment	arena	(Barnes	et	al.,	2008;	Chaminuka	et	al.,	2012;	Emerton	et	al.,	2005;	MacGregor	and	Hesse,	2013;	
Reed	et	al.,	2015).	The	environmental	economic	approach,	using	CBA	coupled	with	an	understanding	of	
stakeholder	views,	has	proved	important	in	ensuring	communities	are	both	investors	and	partners	in	the	
economic	development	of	conservancies,	and	not	mere	bystanders	(Bandyopadhyay	et	al.,	2009;	Kanapaux	and	
Child,	2011;	Pienaar	et	al.,	2013;	MacGregor,	2006b;	MacGregor	et	al.,	2004;	Reid	et	al.,	2007,	2008).	
In	Paper	4,	Formal	microlending	and	adverse	(or	non-existent)	selection:	A	case	study	of	shrimp	farmers	in	
Bangladesh	(co-authored	with	Camilla	Andersson,	Erik	Holmgren	and	Jesper	Stage,	published	in	2011	in	Applied	
Economics),	we	study	the	commercial	activities	and	incentives	for	shrimp	farmers	in	the	informal	economy	in	
Bangladesh.	Shrimp	farmers	are	rural	and	poor;	they	work	entirely	in	the	informal	economy;	and	they	practise	a	
form	of	monoculture.	These	farmers’	limited	access	to	credit	is	justifiably	seen	as	a	weakness.	Formal	microcredit	
is	considered	an	effective	intervention	by	public	agencies	and	international	donors,	but	the	informal	private	
sector	provides	a	greater	variety	and	volume	of	loans	–	albeit	at	higher	apparent	costs	to	the	borrower.	
It	has	long	been	noted	that	limited	access	to	credit	is	an	important	constraint	on	progress	in	rural	areas	in	many	
developing	countries	(Hermes	and	Lensink,	2007;	Hoff	and	Stiglitz,	1993).	Our	study	found	that	the	credit	markets	
available	to	shrimp	farmers	were	failing	to	allocate	credit	efficiently	in	ways	that	maximise	farmers’	financial	and	
economic	growth.	In	our	survey,	it	is	significant	that	all	farmers	considered	themselves	to	be	credit-constrained.	
Furthermore,	microcredit	scheme	managers	struggled	to	identify	those	most	likely	to	repay	loans	successfully.	As	
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a	result	of	these	market	conditions,	short-	and	long-term	incentives	for	donors	and	farmers	are	misaligned	not	
only	with	their	need	for	working	capital,	but	also	with	the	need	for	formal	microcredit	schemes	to	be	profitable.	
Using	data	from	an	in-person	survey,	we	compare	how	borrowers	in	a	rural	shrimp	farming	district	in	Bangladesh	
are	selected	by	formal	microcredit	schemes	on	the	one	hand,	and	traditional	informal	credit	sources	on	the	other.	
We	estimate	the	shadow	prices	that	farmers	are	willing	to	pay	for	additional	credit.	In	doing	so	we	rely	on	an	
approach	originally	developed	by	Lau	and	Yotopoulos	(1971),	which	has	not	been	used	to	compare	these	two	
forms	of	credit	before.	Following	Bhattacharyya	et	al.	(1994),	Kumbhakar	and	Bhattacharyya	(1992),	Stefanou	and	
Saxena	(1988)	and	Wang	et	al.	(1996),	we	analyse	the	data	for	differences	among	farmers	who	obtain	formal	
loans	and	those	who	obtain	informal	credit.	
In	light	of	our	findings,	it	is	clear	that	neither	formal	nor	informal	credit	schemes	have	succeeded	completely,	wth	
all	farmers	reporting	they	remain	credit-constrained.	All	farmers	also	overutilised	labour	to	reduce	the	need	for	
working	capital.	Furthermore,	our	results	indicate	that	borrowers	who	made	exclusive	use	of	formal	loans	have	
higher	shadow	prices	for	additional	credit,	and	are	perceived	as	worse	credit	risks	than	the	farmers	who	also	
borrowed	informally.	This	suggests	that	the	farmers	who	only	borrowed	formally	were	a	worse	group	of	
borrowers,	on	average,	than	the	informal	borrowers.	This	further	entails	that	informal	lenders	–	with	their	closer	
ties	to	the	individual	farmers	–	remain	more	successful	in	identifying	smallholder	farmers	that	are	most	likely	to	
put	the	borrowed	funds	to	optimal	use.	
We	find	in	our	data	that	the	informal	lenders	had	an	information	advantage	that	formal	microlenders	lacked.	For	
formal	microcredit	schemes	to	succeed,	therefore,	they	need	to	find	routes	to	access	such	information.	Our	
findings	underline	the	importance	to	assess	and,	where	possible,	build	on	existing	economic	conditions	that	are	
conducive	to	meeting	a	stated	objective,	and	to	exercise	due	diligence	and	restraint	when	considering,	as	here,	
supplanting	one	credit	system	with	another.	
Our	paper	raised	and	predicted	several	key	issues	which	continue	to	hamper	the	scaling	of	microcredit	and	
microfinance	in	the	agricultural	sector	of	developing	countries.	Indeed,	since	the	paper’s	publication	in	2011,	
microcredit	has	continued	to	face	challenges	to	its	theoretical	underpinnings,	to	its	success	in	practical	
implementation	(Gueyie	et	al.,	2013;	Janda	and	Zetek,	2014)	and	to	its	applicability	to	agriculture	(Meyer,	2013;	
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Vishwanatha	and	Eularie,	2017).	Furthermore,	since	informal	moneylenders	not	only	remain	a	dominant	financial	
institution	(Ali	et	al.,	2016;	Chambwera	et	al.,	2012;	Jordan,	2014),	but	have	also	not	yet	been	incorporated	or	
integrated	into	the	management	plans	for	donor-	and	government-sanctioned	microcredit	enterprises,	credit	
markets	remain	weak	for	the	majority	of	the	poor	(Haldar	and	Stiglitz,	2016;	MacGregor	et	al.,	2016;	Rai	et	al.,	
2015;	Soanes	et	al.,	2017;	Véron	and	Majumdar,	2011).	
	
Concluding	remarks	
	
Our	findings	across	these	four	papers	should	guide	decision-making	over	land,	energy	and	natural	resources	so	
that	they	may	be	more	sustainable	and	profitable	for	all	stakeholders.	We	show	how	market	failure	stalks	the	
best	intentions	of	individuals,	households,	communities	and	policymakers	who	strive	to	comply	with	demands	for	
sustainability	while	maximising	economic	opportunities.		Nonetheless,	our	findings	highlight	the	potential	benefit	
of	identifying	these	market	failures	and	of	realigning	stakeholders’	short-	and	long-term	financial	incentives	
through	better	policy	that	is	informed	by	evidence.			
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A B S T R A C T
The economy of Kazakhstan is locked into reliance on fossil fuel energy sources. Its government is seeking to
diversify and deliver sustainable development. We develop an approach to decision-making to support critical
decisions over the necessary $67 billion in electricity investments to 2050 that can simultaneously contribute to
a sustainable economy. We apply structured decision-making and cost-benefit analysis, align politically by
incorporating the collective expertise of an interdisciplinary group of stakeholders to identify Policy Options,
commercial assumptions and externalities, and fill data gaps using technical, economic and environmental data
from global sources. Our approach quantifies net present value of these identified Policy Options, explores
sensitivities, and suggests alternative investment pathway. Our results indicate policymakers should switch
from coal and focus on harnessing the commercial and economic advantages of gas and hydropower for
electricity generation. These options would be cheaper and have considerably lower emissions and water usage
than the current production mix.
1. Introduction
The Government of Kazakhstan (GoK) is seeking to change its
growth trajectory to realise economic growth, energy security and
sustainable development, but the country faces three challenges in
delivering these three simultaneously. The first is developing an
effective strategy to ensure energy security, as the population and
economy grow (ADB, 2013). Second, looming domestic electricity
generation shortfall from the early 2020s onwards coupled with ageing
infrastructure reaching the end of its lifespan and being decommis-
sioned entailing large government investments. Third, is implementing
its strategy in light of demand realities and making better decisions. An
example is Kazakhstan's electricity generation is based on its abundant
reserves of coal and other fossil fuels, rather than on expanding
existing and developing new renewable energy sources.
Politically, Kazakhstan has embraced a vision to become one of the
world's most environmentally healthy countries, with sustainable energy
at its foundation and broad economic development as a key objective. As
stated in the Kazakhstan Strategy 2050, the Government's long-term goals
include making the country a middle-income nation by 2030; generating
half of Kazakhstan's electricity from non-hydrocarbon sources by 2050;
increasing the use of alternative fuels; and entering the ranks of the
world's top 30 most developed nations by 2050 (GoK, 2012).
Furthermore, Kazakhstan's Intended Nationally Determined
Contribution commits to an economy-wide target of 15–25% reduction
in GHG emissions by 2030 compared with 1990 (GoK, 2015a, 2015b).
The Paris Agreement signed by Kazakhstan on 3 August 2016 further
commits the nation to larger reductions (UN, 2016). Other recent
developments include the Government's Green Energy Concept in 2013
which introduced feed-in tariffs for wind and solar energy, with a target of
achieving 3% of energy generation by 2020; the Energy Efficiency 2030
programme which aims to reduce the economy's energy intensity by 25%
by 2030; and the Wind Power Development programme which defines
such development as a priority direction for the country (IEA, 2014).
Although Kazakhstan has a poor record on some environmental
indicators, in respect of others – such as the exploitation of its large oil
reserves, high national carbon dioxide emissions, and its high per-
capita carbon dioxide emissions (GoK, 2016) – there is a discernible
political move towards promoting sustainable policy and investments.
To date, political action includes developing carbon taxation as part of
a policy shift towards a more sustainable economy (Ospanova, 2014;
GoK, 2012), and an Emissions Trading Scheme developed under the
Kyoto Protocol (GoK, 2013), although the Scheme was temporarily
suspended until 2018 (ICAP, 2016). However, whether these policies
will be enough to allow Kazakhstan to meet its growing electricity
demand simultaneous with sustainable development, and whether they
will represent the cheapest and best economic options for doing so,
remain to be explored more fully.
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Looming electricity supply shortfall coupled with ageing infrastruc-
ture makes decisions over investment in electricity generation a
priority and presents an opportunity to integrate the sustainable
development vision in major public investment, attendant policy,
incentive mechanisms and public consultation. For public investment
purposes, Kazakhstan has solid government finances. Indeed, the
political focus on domestic economic indicators, and at this time, the
importance of foreign debt sustainability and foreign exchange earn-
ings are secondary to domestic political concerns. Some evidence of
this robust fiscus is provided by the country's relatively swift return to
economic prosperity compared to other Former Soviet Union countries
(NBK, 2016; SWFI, 2016). Lower global prices for Kazakhstan's main
exports since 2014 – particularly crude oil, industrial metals and wheat
– temporarily imperilled the domestic economy and reduced its
international trade with the Eurasian Economic Union by 21% and
all countries by 19.9% (NBK, 2016; NBK, 2017; MNE, 2016; MNE,
2017b). However, since late 2016, there are positive indications of
prosperity returning, including industrial growth at 3% and inflation
stabilised at 6–8%, alongside public sector measures during 2015
including a 5.6% growth in state budget spending to KZT 8.2 trillion
and transition to a free-floating exchange rate regime (NBK, 2016;
MNE, 2017a).
Tellingly the political will around the Kazakh Government's energy
security and sustainable development goals has persisted despite the
commodity price crash in 2014 (EBRD, 2016), and even sharpened its
focus on the domestic beneficiation of its natural resources and on
small- and medium-scale enterprises (Euronews, 2016; Reuters, 2016).
To deliver on its vision and satisfy indicators of a sustainable
economy, the GoK will need to make informed decisions that explicitly
trade-off economic and the environment. Yet, in Kazakhstan, decision-
making over energy policy and investment would improve if there was
better information, data and evidence, coupled with an appropriately
structured decision framework (ADB, 2013). Furthermore, major
investment decisions – such as over electricity generation infrastruc-
ture and technologies – are becoming more complicated in light of
these fresh political commitments to economic growth, energy security
and sustainable development. Clearly there is a need to corral data,
evidence and stakeholder views in advance of making the considerable
financial investments that are required. It is the fundamental premise
of this paper that in order to meet these sustainable development goals
and ensure energy security, the investment decisions of the
Government of Kazakhstan will require cost-benefit analyses that are
both structured and identify, consider and integrate all relevant
components.
This paper contributes to the identification and analysis of
Kazakhstan's electricity options. This paper adds to the small literature
that deals with Kazakhstan's energy security (Miglio et al., 2014),
domestic demand management (Sarbassov et al., 2013) and comple-
ments the literature on electricity and energy security among Central
Asian countries in general (Miglio et al., 2014).
2. Kazakhstan's electricity sector
Kazakhstan gained its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991,
at the same time as its Central Asian neighbours – Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Independence transformed
the former Soviet Union (FSU) power monopoly system, and handed
responsibility for electricity generation and the national power balance
to new national monopolies. Independence triggered recession and a
50% drop in electricity production, which in turn resulted in a lack of
funds for operations and maintenance across the power management
system, and a critical under-investment in new assets – which persists.
Since Independence, the Central Asian economies have focused on
isolating and growing their energy systems in a bid to enhance their
domestic energy security (IEA, 2014; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013;
Acemoglu and Yared, 2010) with a sharp eye on potentially profitable
exports to its neighbours which harbour equally low electricity tariffs
(Inogate, 2015). Yet, trade in electricity does occur with its neighbours
both owing to seasonal variations and as part of several high-level
political cooperation, trade promotion and long-term contracts
(Kadrzhanova, 2013). For instance, the Supreme Interstate Council
of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan facilitates the trade of 86% of
Kyrgyzstan's total annual electricity exports to Kazakhstan alongside
most of its dairy and agri-food exports (GoK, 2015a, 2015b).
Undoubted efficiency gains could be made from a more integrated
and market-based regional electricity network if there were greater
coordination between electricity-producing units in the various Central
Asian countries (via markets or through joint ownership of multiple
units), and if overall production shifted to those parts of the region with
the greatest comparative advantages in electricity production.
However, such an integrated regional electricity market is unlikely
for the near future since it entails the loss of national political control
over electricity pricing and electricity availability.
Electricity tariff increases in Kazakhstan have been proposed but
shelved after being met with protests from small- and medium-scale
enterprises as well as the general population (RFE/RL, 2016a, 2016b).
Electricity pricing across Asia is a political hot potato. Several countries
have experienced widespread protests over their governments’ attempts to
increase electricity prices (The Guardian, 2015; RFE/RL, 2016a, 2016b;
Paul, 2017). Thus, for the near future, a key political goal for the electricity
sectors across Central Asia would be to avoid policies that risk leading to
higher electricity prices or to increased uncertainty in supply. Since
Independence, residential consumers in Kazakhstan have paid almost
double the rates of their industrial counterparts (ANMR, 2010). Yet even
for these residential customers, Kazakhstan has some of the lowest
electricity prices in the world, owing to subsidies of approximately 60%,
and tariffs set and regulated by the ANMR (EBRD, 2010; Nugumanova,
2013). Low prices for electricity explain the concomitantly subdued level
of reinvestment by electricity generation companies, the reliance of many
manufacturing firms on own electricity production, and the restrained
level of access to electricity in remote and rural areas owing to the expense
of extending supply networks.
Today, Kazakhstan's electricity sector is split between those ele-
ments regarded as a natural monopoly and a liberalised competitive
wholesale sector, albeit with retail tariffs still regulated by the
Government. Governance is provided by the Agency of Natural
Monopolies Regulation (ANMR) which holds authority to determine
tariffs and their calculation methodology, but is not empowered to
authorise new capacity (GoK, 2005). The other type of entity in
Kazakhstan's electricity sector is the Unified Power System, which
consists of a deregulated and competitive wholesale market and retail
markets.
The main electricity market participants are the national power grid
company (the Kazakhstan Electricity Grid Operating Company
(KEGOC), which is a joint stock company or JSC), which is responsible
for the 24,644-km transmission network; electricity producers with a
range of ownership structures, which operate 66 power plants;
electricity distribution companies, which operate 29 distribution
networking centres; the JSC Kazakhstan Operator of Electric Power
and Capacity Market (KOREM), which operates the centralised trading
of electrical energy; and the consumers of electricity themselves
(EBRD, 2010; KEGOC, 2016a; KOREM, 2016).
Kazakhstan's domestic electricity generation infrastructure has a
capacity of 19,200 MW, with an available capacity of 15,765 MW. Over
90 billion kWh of electricity was generated annually since 2013, rising
by an average of 4.5% since 2001. Over this period, the significance of
exports has shrunk from 8% of total annual electricity generation to
less than 5% and imports halved to 3% (Table 1).
Kazakhstan has 3.6% of global coal deposits and one of the largest
proven natural gas reserves, at 1900 bcm (Parkhomchik, 2016; IEA,
2011; Rowland, 2016). Coal dominates as an electricity power source
accounting for 81.6% of domestic electricity generation (Table 2) and
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serves as fuel input for all but two of the largest ten Thermal Power
Plants (Table 3). Hydropower generated from six large-scale hydro-
power plants (LHPPs) constitutes 10.2% of Kazakhstan's total elec-
tricity production (Tables 2 and 4), with lower output from small- and
medium-scale hydropower plants (SMHPPs) (Table 5).
The national power system faces challenges, with low operating
efficiency, estimated transmission losses of 5–20% owing to poor
maintenance (KEGOC, 2011; MINT, 2011; Soros Foundation, 2015),
and ageing assets: the average age of TPPs is 45 years; 70% of LHPPs
are over 30 years old; and only 5% of SMHPPs currently operate
(Domnin, 2016; Liu et al., 2013; MEP RK, 2009). The impact of these
inefficiencies is felt most in remote areas: a considerable proportion of
the rural population remains unserved, and the degree of reliability in
the electricity supply is low even for those who are connected.
Kazakhstan has one of the highest energy use per unit of gross domestic
product (GDP) across continental Eurasia (World Bank, 2013) and
12% higher than that for the Russian economy (GoK, 2013).
Addressing these is critical in order to develop the country towards
sustainable development with efficient markets, institutions and policy,
but this analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.
Currently, the IEA estimates the level of penetration for energy-
efficient technologies is only 50%, providing considerable opportunities
for investment in the near future. The paper is limited by the lack of
official or published data on the efficiency within the electricity markets
and system (IEA, 2016). We expect the efficiency to increase over time,
with new investment and in line with the aspirations of Strategy 2050
and Vision 2030.
The Coady et al. (2015) estimates that electricity subsidies cost
about $148 billion in 2015. In line with most resource-rich countries
and most non-OECD countries, Kazakhstan provides high subsidies on
fossil fuels to end consumers. For example, for coal there is a 60%
subsidy, which comprises 3% of GDP (Nugumanova, 2013; IEA Energy
Subsidy Database, 2016). Indeed, In light of global research that shows
the benefits to nations of removing these subsidies, there is compelling
evidence this would be potentially beneficial to Kazakhstan's economy,
energy market efficiency and climate change compliance
(Nugumanova, 2013; Coady et al., 2015).
Table 6 shows that investment in new electricity generation assets
by 2020 should bring the total generation capacity to over 130 billion
kWh, with planned coal, hydropower, nuclear and wind projects.
Abundant coal reserves result in a competitive cost for inputs to
electricity generation, sees coal dominate electricity generation. The
future of coal as the dominant fuel source for electricity generation has
been challenged by GoK strategies on sustainable development,
including to generate half of electricity from non-hydrocarbon sources
by 2050 in Kazakhstan Strategy 2050.
Despite considerable reserves, natural gas development is not
deemed a priority in Kazakhstan. Partially this may be due to it being
‘associated gas’ produced alongside readily commercialisable crude oil,
and primarily used for reinjection to maintain wellhead pressure.
Current investments underline this, being focused on powering in-
dustry at the Aktobemunaygas complex, the Kumkol oilfield, and the
Tengiz oil-to-gas complex. Compounding this is a lack of infrastructure,
entailing expense associated not only with building new infrastructure,
but also with connecting the widely dispersed population to production
centres in the northwest of the country. Further investment is required
to replace ageing turbines, storage and processing industry develop-
ment.
Kazakhstan's total electricity generation capacity from hydropower
was officially estimated at 2581 MW in 2015 (KEGOC, 2016a). Only 4%
of this comes from SMHPPs, however. The importance of SMHPPs is
magnified in rural off-grid locations across Kazakhstan, particularly
those areas with sizeable populations or industry. Their importance is
also reflected in current projects to revive such plants, including
building the medium-sized Kerbulack SMHPP (50 MW in total) on
Table 1
Electricity system by components (billion kWh), 2001–2015.
Sources: ARKS (2014a), BP (2016), IEA (2014), KEGOC (2011, 2016a), KOREM (2016) and MINT (2011)
Components 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Generation 53.85 60.47 64.17 72.41 74.33 81.79 91.90 90.80
Consumption 49.18 52.79 57.09 65.30 67.19 76.21 82.78 81.75
Imports 3.44 3.51 3.52 3.38 1.71 2.60 2.10 0.64
Exports 1.64 4.98 3.65 3.31 2.38 1.81 4.40 2.92
Distribution losses 6.47 6.21 6.95 7.19 6.47 6.37 6.82 6.77
Table 2
Electricity generation (billion kWh) by power source, Kazakhstan, 2015.
Source: KOREM (2016).
Power source Electricity generation (%) Billion kWh
Coal 81.6 74.09
Hydropower 10.2 9.25
Gas 8.0 7.28
Renewable 0.2 0.18
Total 100 90.8
Table 3
Ten largest thermal power plants by output (billion kWh), Kazakhstan.
Sources: Adapted from ATFBank Research (2011) and WorleyParsons and Acclimatise (2013).
No. Power plant Owner Gene-ration (billion
kWh/ year)
Capacity
(MW)
Type of
fuel
Province Year commis-
sioned
National produc-
tion (%)
1 Aksu Eurasian Resources Group 13.47 2100 Coal Pavlodar 1968 14.83%
2 Ekibastuz-1 Kazakhmys 10.32 4000 Coal Pavlodar 1980 11.37%
3 Karaganda-2 Kazakhmys 4.48 2120 Coal Karaganda 1967 4.93%
4 Ekibastuz-2 Samruk-Energy JSC/
InterRAO UES
4.48 4000 Coal Pavlodar 1983 4.93%
5 Maek 2–3 Kazatomprom 4.02 630 Gas Mangystau 1990 4.43%
6 Temirtau JSC Arcelor Mittal Temirtau 3.00 435 Coal Karagandy 1934 3.30%
7 Petro-pavlovsk Access Energo 2.38 336 Coal North 1961 2.62%
8 Astana TPP Astana Energy 2.35 400 Coal Astana 1961 2.59%
9 Karaganda Karaganda-ElectroCenter 2.25 395 Coal Karaganda 1967 2.48%
10 Zhambyl SamrukEnergo 1.35 1230 Fuel oil Taraz 1968 1.49%
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the Ily River, and other SMHPPs on mountainous rivers with a planned
combined power of 100–200 MW (MEP RK, 2009).
Wind potential in Kazakhstan is estimated at 929 billion kWh a
year, or 354 GW of installed capacity (UNDP-GEF, 2011), and would
need to cover 2% of the country's land (MEP RK, 2009). The
commercial viability of wind power generation was demonstrated in
a recent study conducted by the United Nations Development
Programme and the Global Environment Facility. The study investi-
gated the feasibility of 15 wind farms, wind power generation under the
Kazakhstan Wind Power Development Programme, and several joint
ventures with local government (EBRD, 2009).
In respect of solar energy production, Kazakhstan's climatic condi-
tions are suitable. Production amounts to 1300–1800 kWh/m2 a year,
while the annual duration of sunlight totals 2200–3000 h (MEP RK,
2009; Obozov, 2008). Despite these apparently favourable conditions
and the political will behind this energy source, the use of solar energy
is not widespread in Kazakhstan, due to inbuilt inertia in the national
energy system, uncertainty over economic returns and lack of regula-
tory incentives for private sector investment.
Kazakhstan is the world's largest producer of uranium, at 22,500 t
from 17 mines (World Nuclear Association, 2016). Kazakhstan is
aiming to construct a nuclear power plant to become operational by
the early-2020s, with a 300–1200 MW capacity (WNN, 2014).
Of the total electricity generated, domestic industry consumes
54.2%, households 19.1% (8.4% rural, 7.6% urban, 3.1% suburban),
power plants 10.5%, transportation sector 5.4%, agriculture 2.2%,
construction sector 1.3% and the remaining 7.3% is lost in distribution
(ATFBank Research, 2011; ARKS, 2014b; Soros Foundation, 2015;
KEGOC, 2011; MINT, 2011). Households and SMEs are supplied by
179 energy supply organisations with jurisdiction provided by geogra-
phy, whereas large industrial consumers are supplied directly from the
grid (Soros Foundation, 2015; KEGOC, 2016b). Consumption and
generation are closely correlated owing to the horizontal and vertical
integration of energy-intensive industrial sectors and electricity gen-
eration. Thus, approximately 50% of the total electricity generated is
supplied directly to the large industrial companies who own the 66
power plants (ATFBank Research, 2011).
3. Methodology
The Kazakh energy sector has followed business-as-usual since
Independence, is inefficient, and marked by great potential for change
though its natural resources. Yet change under these conditions is
challenging, with particularly the evidence base and political appetite
for introducing new technologies untested. In light of these challenges,
our methodology to support decision-making over electricity genera-
tion is developed using structured decision-making based on active
local participation coupled with cost-benefit analysis, which is com-
monly used to make project investment decisions. Both structured
decision-making and cost–benefit analyses offer processes that align
compellingly with published frameworks for energy-related decision-
making. Our CBA uses technical engineering data to drive the
commercial premise underlying investment potential, and environ-
mental and social data to drive the wider economic benefits.
Decision analysis methodology has evolved since its origins in the
1960s (Howard, 1966). Today, it is widely used across both academic
and corporate arenas (Hammond et al., 1999). For example, Spetzler
et al. (2016) suggest that, to maximise the quality of a decision, one
requires linked inputs: framing, alternatives, appropriate focused data,
Table 4
Large-scale hydropower plants ( > 100 MW) by generation (billion kWh/year), 2012.
(Sources: Adapted from ATFBank Research (2011), MEP RK (2009), KEGOC (2016a) and WorleyParsons and Acclimatise (2013)).
No. Power plant Owner Generation (billion
kWh/year)
Capacity
(MW)
No. of tur-
bines
River Year commissioned National
production (%)
1 Bukhtarma Kazakhstan Electricity Grid
Operating Company
2.77 675 9 Irtysh 1960 3.26%
2 Shulbinsk AES Corporation 1.66 702 6 Irtysh 1987 1.95%
3 Ust-Kamen-
ogorsk
AES Corporation 1.58 339 4 Irtysh 1952 1.86%
4 Moinak Kazakhstan Electricity Grid
Operating Company
1.27 300 2 Sharyn 2011 1.49%
5 Kapchagay JSC Almaty Power Plants 0.97 364 4 Illy 1970 1.14%
6 Shardara JSC Shardarin-skaya 0.42 100 2 Syr Darya 1965 0.49%
Total 8.67 2480 27 10.20%
Table 5
Small hydropower plants ( < 100 MW) by region, Kazakhstan.
Sources: Domnin (2016), Liu et al. (2013) and KEGOC (2016a).
No. Region No. of plants Operational Capacity (MW)
1 Southern Kazakhstan 112 0 0
2 East Kazakhstan 68 1 13.8
3 Zhambyl 72 3 14.9
4 Almaty 8 8 72.1
Total 260 12 100.8
Table 6
Existing and planned electricity generation assets by capacity (billion kWh), 2015–2050.
Source: adapted from KOREM (2016); KEGOC (2016a).
Year Existing assets Planned assets (first on-stream date only) Total existing and planned assets
Total Gas Oil Coal Hy-dro Wind Total Gas Coal Hydro Nuc-lear Wind Planned Existing Total
2015 97.67 8.80 3.88 73.25 8.71 3.03 3.68 – – 1.58 – 2.10 3.68 97.67 101.35
2020 88.29 7.93 3.50 65.99 7.84 3.03 44.32 – 31.57 0.65 7.88 0.53 44.32 88.29 132.61
2025 86.08 7.70 3.40 64.09 7.62 3.27 44.32 – – – – – 44.32 86.08 130.39
2030 83.86 7.50 3.30 62.38 7.41 3.27 46.07 – – – – 1.75 46.07 83.86 129.93
2035 74.62 6.64 2.93 55.22 6.56 3.27 46.07 – – – – – 46.07 74.62 120.69
2040 63.62 5.61 2.47 46.71 5.55 3.27 46.07 – – – – – 46.07 63.62 109.69
2045 38.16 3.25 1.43 27.00 3.21 3.27 46.07 – – – – – 46.07 38.16 84.23
2050 9.08 0.54 0.24 4.50 0.54 3.27 46.07 – – – – – 46.07 9.08 55.15
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clear trade-offs, logic, and commitment to implementation. Our
methodology is aligned with Spetzler et al.’s (2016) principles of
structured decision-making, and followed three basic steps. In the
first, we analysed current consumption and production, and population
estimates coupled with official forecasts, to estimate the future
electricity balance against the lifespan and generation profile of existing
assets and future production assets whose construction was already
under way. The second step entailed convening a Framing Workshop
with key stakeholders in Kazakhstan, to elicit their perceptions on the
challenges facing the domestic electricity sector, to discern Policy
Options that the country could consider in delivering energy security,
and identify the key sustainability, technical and financial risks they
wish integrated to the investment decisions across all Policy Options.
In the third step, we modelled the dominant Policy Options from the
Framing Workshop for their technological and economic viability in
meeting the forecast supply shortfall. The modelling aimed to aid
decision-making and, as such, our intention was not to reveal absolutes
in monetary terms, but to indicate broad decision pathways for
policymakers.
A critical political challenge to making effective decisions is that
choosing among policies using traditional cost–benefit analysis is
hampered by incomplete information, data and evidence on the options
available. When these gaps are primarily handled by having external
experts make educated guesses about what the available options are
and what parameters should be used to assess them, the resulting
estimates frequently lack credence in the eyes of local stakeholders,
who may then proceed to ignore the results of the analysis.
Our novel approach sought to minimise some traditional challenges
faced with employing Cost-Benefit Analysis for policy development in
emerging economies. By using collective expert testimony, we sought to
reduce the risk of political rejection of the findings, as identified by
Lempert (2014). We used engineering data from similar project builds
and operations in Central Asia to ensure our data were realistic and not
over-optimistic, as identified by Flyvberg (2005). By using sensitivity
analysis based around globally evidenced data points, we sought to
reduce risks associated with aggregating attributes of concern by
assigning agreed-upon values, as identified by Weyant (2014) and
Lempert (2014).
Expert-led framing workshops, stakeholder-led analyses and struc-
tured decision-making are increasingly being used to develop policies
that can be compared quantitatively (Kass et al., 2011; Creedy et al.,
2009). The economic benefits of incorporating the views of multiple
disciplines and stakeholders in decisions have been demonstrated
extensively (Bessette et al., 2014; Hardisty, 2010). Further, structured
decision-making approaches help to deal with multiple challenges,
including decision-maker bias (Bond et al., 2008), ambiguity in both
stakeholders’ risk perceptions and trade-offs (Harclerode et al., 2015),
and the integration of environmental and social factors (Hardisty,
2010).
Our methodology brings a mix of challenges and opportunities.
Clearly, it is positive that following this approach will ensure that the
Policy Options proposed will be ones that are both politically feasible
and within the scope of options that policymakers are seriously
considering. Yet analogously, we risk that only those Policy Options
that are perceived to being contemplated by policymakers will be
included. Options were excluded owing to stakeholders’ perceptions of
technological, financial or political infeasibility. This can lead to a
narrower range of Policy Options. For instance, politically in
Kazakhstan, price increases sufficiently high to have a discernible
impact on energy efficiency are out of the question. Moreover, although
future technological improvements in renewable energy technologies
are widely anticipated by observers elsewhere, these future improve-
ments cannot be incorporated into the planning process if policy-
makers do not believe (or at least are not willing to base policy on the
assumption that) those improvements will materialise. In summary,
this leads to scenarios that are pessimistic in their efficiency and
technology assumptions, but on the other hand – significantly – leads
to scenarios that policymakers see as realistic options.
In seeking to use CBA to integrate those elements of environmental
sustainability and green economy enshrined in national strategies by
GoK into energy investment decisions, we risk omitting or under-
stating key ethical standpoints such as intergenerational equity
(Toman, 2014) as well as making poor choices about how technological
and efficiency gains will change in the future. In particular the lack of
information on the distributional issues of energy facing both the off-
grid population and those facing energy poverty reduces our ability to
represent these risks accurately in our CBA (Woolf et al., 2014).
3.1. Future electricity balance
Continued electricity provision at current prices is a political given,
even if it leads to apparently inefficient outcomes; hence, it is assumed
that some investment in electricity generation will be subsidised to the
extent needed to make it financially viable. The point of this study,
therefore, is to identify financially and economically attractive options
relative to the current electricity generation mix. Given current trends
and prices, the current and predicted supply and demand of electricity
have been determined based on data provided by Government minis-
tries and other official sources, including current and planned elec-
tricity generation assets (Tables 6 and 7, Fig. 1). Demand forecasts
based on anticipated economic growth and population increase from
KEGOC and KOREM extend to 2020, while those for Southern Grid
extend to 2035. We extrapolated to the year 2050 by assuming the
Southern Grid demand forecasts to 2035 held for the entire country.
This is a reasonable assumption, given the Southern Grid economy's
representativeness of the national economy. Our forecasts used are 4%
annual demand growth to 2020, 3% from 2021 to 2025, 2.4% from
2026 to 2030, and 1.5% from 2031 to 2035. In the absence of better
data, a 1.5% annual demand growth rate has been extrapolated from
2036 to 2050 for the entire country (KEGOC, 2011, 2013; KOREM,
2009).
Fig. 1 illustrates Kazakhstan's electricity generation shortfall.
Around 2020, the existing electricity generation assets begin to
approach the end of their intended lifespan and, as they are decom-
missioned, the total electricity generated begins to decline. By 2022, at
current prices, demand is greater than supply and this generation
shortfall grows continuously to 2050.
In principle, permitting the electricity price to rise would encourage
consumers to reduce demand. Therefore, with an own price demand
elasticity of about −0.3,1 continuous price increases of some 5% a year
from 2020 onward would be enough to close the supply shortfall – even
if no new capacity is brought online. Obviously, even a few years of
annual 5% price increases would be enough to make investments in
new capacity more attractive. However, as noted earlier, because
Table 7
Forecasts of electricity generation and consumption (billion kWh/ year), 2015–2050.
(Sources: KEGOC (2011, 2013); KOREM (2009); author's calculations.)
Factor 2015 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050
Existing electricity
generation capacity
(billion kWh/year)
101.35 132.61 130.39 129.93 109.69 55.15
Estimated electricity
consumption
(billion kWh /year)
101.00 124.50 144.05 160.76 186.57 216.52
Shortage/surplus 0.35 8.11 −13.66 −30.83 −76.88 −161.37
1 There appear to be no published academic estimates of own price demand elasticities
for electricity for the region, but most studies in other parts of Asia (as well as in other
parts of the world) have found price elasticities ranging from −0.1 to −0.5, making −0.3 a
reasonable approximation.
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electricity pricing is politically sensitive, it is highly unlikely that the
Kazakh Government would permit price increases of 5% a year, or that
it would stay in power for long if it did so. Realistically, therefore, the
supply shortfall would need to be closed at unchanged real electricity
prices, making planning for new investment necessary years before the
supply shortfall materialises.
3.2. Framing workshop
3.2.1. Approach
In order to access the collective expert knowledge of local stake-
holders and experts, we convened a Framing Workshop with them on
17 June 2011, following an analysis of potential participants identified
by their peers and a screening of the membership of key associations,
as well as through academic research. Participants included represen-
tatives from key government ministries, the private sector, interna-
tional and local non-governmental organisations, and international
financial institutions. The focus was to develop a list of Policy Options
that local stakeholders regarded as realistic potential alternatives to
meet the future generation shortfall.
3.2.2. Policy option development
A facilitated session was held during the Framing Workshop to
elicit from the participants a long-list of Policy Options. The session
produced a range of innovative Policy Options, including some unseen
in Kazakhstan. In total 30 were identified. Subsequently this list was
reduced to seven owing to some duplication, technical and financial
infeasibility, and lack of alignment with stated government policy.
None of the Policy Options completely removes the need for
additional “traditional” generation assets to be constructed to fill the
forecast generation shortfall. Therefore non-BAU Policy Options are
modelled on the business-as-usual (BAU) scenario. The five scenarios
and the seven Policy Options they encompass are as follows:
The BAU scenario – Policy Option 1: Investments are made to
ensure a continuation of the current mix of electricity generation
with no change in energy policy to 2050 – 81.6% coal, 10.2%
hydropower, 8% gas, < 1% renewable (see Table 2).
The natural gas scenario – Policy Options 2 and 3: Expanding
natural gas utilisation using considerable domestic reserves.
Costings include infrastructure upgrades to accommodate expanded
natural gas utilisation. Assets will use Combined Cycle Gas
Technology, with two Policy Options for the scale of investment.
Policy Option 2 entails achieving the lower 15% target by 2050, and
Policy Option 3, the higher 30% target by 2050. In both cases, the
substitution of coal delivers positive sustainability impacts.
The renewable energy scenario – Policy Options 4 and 5: For the
purposes of this analysis, we make a distinction between hydropower
and non-hydropower renewable energy (herein “renewable energy”).
This scenario entails establishing and expanding new renewable
electricity sources excluding hydropower. Owing to the outcomes
from the Framing Workshop, which indicated that the political,
technical and financial viability for scalable technology lay with wind
(Table 8), priority was given to wind rather than solar technology
with a maximum generation limit of 20% of baseline demand
assumed. The capacity factor used is 30% in line with findings by
ESMAP (1997) for Kazakhstan and REN21 (2017) for Eurasia. The
potential of the full range of renewable energy sources was discussed
at the Framing Workshop – including concentrated solar, PV solar
and biomass. In discussion with stakeholders, the renewable energy
option with two targets was agreed to reflect the most likely pathway
for Kazakhstan. Policy Option 4, the lower target, would achieve 15%
of electricity generation by 2030 in this scenario, while Policy Option
5, the higher target, would achieve 30% of electricity generation by
2050.
The hydropower scenario – Policy Option 6: This entails prioritising
both small- and large-scale hydropower investments to a level of
20% of all electricity generation by 2050. The stakeholders at the
Framing Workshop support this Policy Option owing to previous
hydropower installations, widespread perceived social benefits from
the dispersed nature of electricity generation potential (particularly
from small-scale hydropower plants which are typically in more
rural areas), the relative availability of technology, and the climate
and other environmental benefits. However, the integration of the
full range of social benefits to our analysis was not deemed critical by
the experts. Indeed, there was insufficient data on the extent and
distribution of energy poverty in Kazakhstan to develop meaningful
estimates for modelling purposes.
The nuclear scenario – Policy Option 7: This entails building the first
nuclear facility in Kazakhstan to utilise domestic uranium deposits.
This scenario includes the cost of garnering international support for
building the capacity to implement a new regulatory regime around
Fig. 1. Electricity supply shortfall – Existing and projected baseline power supply trajectory by generation type, 2010–2050 (millions kWh).
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nuclear power, where it could meet a target of 20% of all electricity
generated by 2030. The costs and benefits of locally available
uranium deposits are reflected, in particular investments in refining.
The additional cooling water requirements of nuclear power are
accounted for, with costs of material waste disposal incorporated
into the operating costs. This is among the costliest solutions, with a
considerable capital expenditure requirement (US$5 billion). We
expect the greenhouse gas emissions associated with this Policy
Option to be lower than for current electricity generation, providing
benefit through the shadow pricing of environmental factors dis-
cussed below.
3.2.3. Externalities
In order to ensure our methodology integrated the reality of
delivering complex projects in Kazakhstan we elicited a list of monetary
rate assumptions and technical data prices (Table 8). Further to
integrate the reality of sustainable development for Kazakhstan into
the decision-making support process, we elicited a list of externalities
to quantify for each Policy Option, ensuring that the local definition
would prevail. For instance, water and carbon dioxide emissions were
seen as critical, whereas biodiversity was not (Table 8).
We cross-referenced the participants’ assumptions and variable
estimates with the literature, as indicated in Table 8. The value of using
data, assumptions and estimates that resonate with stakeholders is
evidenced in enhanced perception of outcomes, broader participation,
and a greater willingness to engage in the process of change (Hardisty,
2010).
Considering the dominance of energy generation in the national
level of greenhouse gas emissions, at 85% (UNFCCC, 2014) coupled
with political developments around an ETS, it is no surprise that
participants ranked carbon dioxide emissions highly when constructing
a list of the environmental factors they considered critical for basing
decisions among Policy Options. Other greenhouse gas emissions were
considered at the Framing Workshop – including methane, perfluor-
ocarbons, hydrofluorocarbons, sulphur dioxide and nitrous oxide.
Methane accounts for an estimated 17% of Kazakhstan's GHG emis-
sions but was not considered critical by stakeholders owing to the
political drive behind carbon dioxide emissions reduction, and further
perfluorocarbons and hydrofluorocarbons account for less than 1% of
greenhouse gas emissions in Kazakhstan and data were considered
insignificant (UNFCCC, 2014).
By taking our methodological lead from the experts in Kazakhstan,
clearly this approach limits the analysis of costs and benefits somewhat.
Specifically, the wider social and economic benefits of renewable
energy option and hydropower in serving rural areas and reducing
energy poverty. It is clear that energy investments may stimulate retail
markets, manufacturing and innovation, but these are typically difficult
to measure accurately (Woolf et al., 2014) and therefore only direct
benefits are used. Further, the full indirect and induced benefits of
developing new energy technology supply chains in Kazakhstan are not
reflected in this analysis owing to difficulty in developing these data
and the perceived lack of acceptance of these data by the experts.
3.3. Modelling
3.3.1. Policy option modelling at base case
A cost–benefit analysis of the seven identified Policy Options was
developed to meet the anticipated generation shortfall (Table 7) using
electricity generation profiles incorporating technical, financial and
environmental data (Table 9) and base case shadow prices for the
environmental factors (Table 10). Also included are enhanced interna-
tional sales of coal from the substitution of fuel sources for electricity
generation.
Our analysis compares among Policy Options using financial and
Table 8
Assumptions and variable estimates for this study, elicited from the Framing Workshop and cross-referenced with other sources.
Factor Description Framing Workshop outcome Other sources
Growth rates in
electricity demand
Extrapolated from predicted annual demand
growth rates in the Southern Grid to 2035: 3.0%
(2021–2025), 2.4% (2026–2030), and 1.5%
(2031–2050)
Use official data KEGOC (2011); KOREM (2009); MEP RK (2009)
Power plant Capacity, build time, capacity factors, capital
expenditure
Use international benchmarks and
locally appropriate data where missing
from the former Soviet Union (FSU)
Using benchmarked data for other power plants across
FSU countries, coupled with expert estimations by
WorleyParsons engineers from facility experience in
Uzbekistan (WorleyParsons and Acclimatise, 2013)
Industry benchmarks consulted include IEA (2011);
Merrow (2014); and WEC (2009)
Renewable energy
targets
Policy Options 3.1 and 3.2 – Low: 15% through
2050; High: 30% through 2050
Develop policy options on low and high
targets, with a focus on wind power
IRENA (2015)
Hydropower Policy Option 4 – Hydropower to 20% of
generation through 2050
Develop policy option on hydropower to
reflect the need for reliable rural supply
of electricity
ATFBank Research (2011)
Electricity tariffs (c/
kWh)
International used 15c/kWh: owing to reported
global range (10c–20.5c/kWh)
Use prevailing prices World Bank (2010)
Discount rate –
Financial
8% Use local rate of 7.5–10% in line with
National Bank of Kazakhstan
ADB (2015); EW (2015); NBK (2016)
Discount rate –
Economic
3.5% Use local rate of 3–4% as used to guide
policy development
ADB (2015); HM Treasury (2003)
Water US$1/m3 (high: US$0/m3; low: US$3.5/m3) Use HM Treasury data from the United
Kingdom
HM Treasury (2003)
Sulphur dioxide
emission shadow
price
US$630/t Use global data Burtraw and Szambelan (2009); Chan et al. (2012)
Carbon dioxide
emission shadow
price
US$22/t Use European Trading Scheme data EU (2012)
Sensitivity – Shadow
prices
Carbon dioxide, sulphur dioxide, nitrogen and
water – varied between low–base–high
Build in sensitivity to shadow prices
and use global benchmarks
(See Table 10)
Sensitivity – Resource
prices
Coal, gas, nuclear – varied between low–base–
high
Build in sensitivity to resource prices,
using trends in global prices over the
past 20 years
(See Table 12)
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economic net present values to proxy for the desired returns on
investments of decision-makers in both commercial and government.
Framing Workshop participants provided the discount rates that are
used within Kazakhstan to make investment decisions at 3.5% and 8%
respectively for economic and financial discount rates. The financial
discount rate is in line with the Central Bank of Kazakhstan base
discount rates of 7.5–10% during 2001–2015 (EW, 2015; NBK, 2016),
and the economic discount rate is in line with those used in the
literature (ADB, 2015; HM Treasury, 2003; Woolf et al., 2014).
Although the difference is unusually large and potentially drives large
part of the gap between financial and economic outcomes of our
analysis, one distinct advantage of these discount rates is their
acceptance by stakeholders within Kazakhstan.
Table 11 illustrates the different electricity generation, capital costs
and externalities incurred by the Policy Options relative to Policy
Option 1 (BAU). Total electricity generation among the six alternative
options aims to fulfil the domestic needs and contracted export
requirements, and as such is marginally more efficient than BAU at
supply equalling demand. All options use less coal, which is under-
standable given the significance of divesture from coal, both politically
and environmentally.
3.3.2. Sensitivity analysis
Framing Workshop participants were keen for risk to be built into
both the cost of resource inputs (Table 12) and a range of shadow prices
for environmental factors (Table 10). The shadow price ranges in Table 10
are built on international benchmarks and incorporate benefits transfer
from FSU case studies, where possible. Base sulphur dioxide (SO2)
emissions values are from the US Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), with
values used in the sensitivity analysis ranging from the current financial
cost of emissions in Kazakhstan (zero) to the highest price paid on the
secondary spot market of the ETS in 2010. Carbon dioxide emissions
values used in the sensitivity analysis range from the current financial cost
of emissions in Kazakhstan (zero) to the social cost of carbon reported in
the Stern Review. The base case is the average carbon dioxide (CO2) price
on the EU ETS in 2010. Water values range from the current financial cost
of water in Kazakhstan to users (zero) to the highest willingness-to-pay
figure from international watersheds.
Volatility in resource prices transpires as a risk for resource-rich
nations like Kazakhstan. Using a range of values to ascertain through our
CBA how robust differences are between our Policy Options, will enable
decision-makers to comprehend the risks to the analysis and their
decisions. The ranges are based on historical and published data as well
as private data used to inform commercial investment decisions.
4. Results
Net present values (NPVs) were calculated to 2050 to enable
comparison and decision ranking among Policy Options. In line with
typical project appraisal analysis using CBA, we derive the financial Net
Present Value (FNPV) and the Economic Net Present Value (ENPV) of
each Policy Option to 2050. In order to provide practical support for
decision-making over electricity investments in Kazakhstan, we com-
pare each Policy Option with the BAU Option 1.
4.1. Policy options at base case
The investment in electricity generation to ensure energy security to
2050 in Kazakhstan is estimated at $67 billion for BAU. The Policy
Options cost between US$ 56.8–107.8 billion, with two cheaper than
BAU, saving up to 15% and four more expensive by 15–59% (Table 13).
To fill the looming electricity supply shortfall, Options 2 and 3 will be
cheaper than Policy Option 1 (BAU) and Option 5 will cost less in
operation. The simple interpretation is that gas is relatively cheaper per
unit of energy to operate and build than coal whereas renewable
energy, hydropower and nuclear are more expensive to build although
hydropower is cheaper to operate.2
The financial analysis indicates that investments in gas should be
Table 9
Summary of technological, environmental and financial profile of new electricity generation assets.
Source: WorleyParsons and Acclimatise (2013).
Generation
type
Typical
installed
capacity
Build time Capital
expenditure
Operating
expenditure –
Non-energy
Generation Carbon
dioxide
emissions
Water use Power
during
project
lifespan
Capital
expenditure
MW Months Million US
$/billion kWh
US$/MWh Billion kWh/
year
t CO2-e/
MWh
‘000 t/h ‘000 billion
kWh
Million US$
Gas 400 36 4.24 3.8 2.93 0.39 20 113 480
Coal 400 48 8.34 4.8 2.97 0.90 50 110 920
Nuclear 1000 60 17.62 6.0 7.88 0 200 284 5000
Small-scale
hydropower
10 18 12.68 5.1 0.04 0 0 2 20
Large-scale
hydropower
150 60 25.37 2.2 0.66 0 0 24 600
Wind 50 24 23.41 10.9 0.11 0 0 4 100
Solar 20 18 30.05 12 0.32 0 0 13 384
Table 10
Shadow price sensitivity ranges for environmental factors (US$), 2013.
Environmental factor Units Sensitivity Sources
Low Base High
CO2 US$/t CO2−e 0 22 85 EEA (2016); EU (2012); Hardisty (2010); IPCC (2015); Stern (2006)
SOx US$/t 0 630 1160 Burtraw and Szambelan (2009); Chan et al. (2012); Hardisty (2010)
NOx US$/t 0 770 3377 Hardisty (2010); IPCC (2015)
Water US$/m3 0 1.00 3.50 Hardisty (2010); HM Treasury (2003)
2 The reinvestments and new investments needed to maintain the electricity genera-
tion mix associated with each Policy Option (1–7) are described in Appendix A.
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considered more favourably, with both gas Policy Options returning a
financial net present value (FNPV) in excess of BAU (Table 14). The
Policy Options for hydropower, nuclear and renewable energy all
return an FNPV below BAU, and are not commercially viable alter-
natives to BAU at current prices. These results show the relative
expense of new technology development for a resource-rich country
like Kazakhstan, even when compared with a relatively inefficient
power system.
Fig. 2 demonstrates the broad categories of marginal economic cost
and benefit for the Policy Options over BAU. Capex, Opex, carbon
dioxide emissions and international sales are key components driving
the NPV for these Policy Options.
Furthermore, Figs. 3 and 4 illustrate the differences in the sequen-
cing of costs for capital and operations respectively across the seven
Policy Options, and the financial investments necessary to ensure
electricity generation self-sufficiency. Nuclear and both renewable
energy policy options are costly to build and operate.
The economic analysis indicates both gas and hydropower Policy
Options returning an economic net present value (ENPV) in excess of
BAU (Table 14, Fig. 2). The Policy Options for nuclear and renewable
energy all return an ENPV below BAU, and thus do not bring
sustainable value to Kazakhstan.
A significant change is noticed across Policy Options relative to
BAU, with all alternative Policy Options producing lower emissions
than BAU and all except Policy Option 7 (Nuclear) leading to lower
water usage than BAU, see Table 15.
4.2. Policy options under sensitivity
Our sensitivity analysis considers decisions under fluctuating costs
and allows analysis of the changes in ranking among Policy Options for
indications of the scale of the risks for decision-makers.
Under sensitivity to fluctuating resource costs (Tables 16 and 17),
the rankings for Policy Options remain largely unaffected, indicating
that, within expected and historical parameters, changes in prices do
not affect our policy decisions. Indeed, across resource costs, we find
only at the highest sensitivities to input prices, do Policy Options
rankings change – i.e. when coal costs over US$1.72/GJ and gas over
US$3.30/GJ, which are both considerably higher prices than expected
for these resources. Notably, both markets are depressed: coal prices
have fallen since 2009, while gas prices in Kazakhstan and the FSU
have remained stagnant since 2011.
The sensitivity analysis of the seven Policy Options to fluctuating
values of non-technical environmental variables highlights some
sensitivity of the ENPV to carbon dioxide emissions costs, but no
Policy Option ranking changes for the other variables analysed here
(Tables 17 and 18).
The scale of the challenge to promote renewable energy and deliver
on the Government of Kazakhstan's Visions of a Green Economy and a
Sustainable Future is illustrated by Table 18. The Table shows that only
at a shadow price for carbon dioxide approaching the social cost
estimated by Stern (2006) do our rankings of the seven Policy Options
change. Also, only at that point does BAU become a least-favourable
option, while renewable energy scenarios other than hydropower
become economically attractive. Indeed, at a shadow price exceeding
US$50/t, the renewable energy scenario Policy Options outstrip the
BAU scenario, but still perform worse than the gas scenarios.
5. Conclusions and policy options
We have sought to support decision-makers wishing to develop a
sustainable energy economy in fossil-fuel-based carbon-intensive
Kazakhstan, at a time when multi-billion dollar investments are being
considered to ensure energy security to 2050. Our methodology
focused on identifying robust outcomes that could inform policy-
makers’ decisions when it came to electricity generation policy and
investments in the context of key challenges, namely weak data,
uncertain stakeholder views, and the Kazakh Government's unassimi-
lated goals of energy security and sustainable development. By taking a
structured approach to decision-making coupled with Cost-Benefit
Analysis which draws on local expertise to produce outcomes that both
expand current thinking and merit serious consideration.
Our findings are that the government should turn from BAU, create
incentives to enable less coal and more gas and hydropower for
electricity generation. In particular, gas is cheaper and commercially
viable, indicating strong existing incentives for innovative institutional
and financial mechanisms to develop this sector – particularly PPPs,
and even privatisation.
The BAU scenario is currently based on using abundant coal
resources, but this is not the primary policy: we find gas and hydro-
power to have greater feasibility. Aligned with the Kazakh
Government's Green Growth goals, our findings further demonstrate
the dwindling significance of coal politically, financially and economic-
ally. Indeed, at higher shadow prices close to the social cost of carbon,
the BAU scenario is the worst performer.
Gas is a dominant policy, both financially and economically, but it
Table 12
Sensitivity ranges for resource costs (US$), 2013.
Category Units Sensitivity Key sources
Low Base High
Coal US$/GJ 0.66 0.73 2.42 ADB (2012); ANMR (2010); ECS (2010); USCS (2013); WorleyParsons and Acclimatise (2013)
Gas US$/GJ 1.07 1.26 4.94 ANMR (2010); ICLG (2016); NRC (2015); WorleyParsons and Acclimatise (2013); Yenikeyeff (2008)
Nuclear US$/MWh 9.41 9.9 10.89 Black and Veatch (2012); World Nuclear Association (2016); WorleyParsons and Acclimatise (2013)
Table 13
Costs of Policy Options, relative to BAU, 2010–2050 (US$ million, 2010).
Policy Option Capital Expenditure Operating Expenditure Capital Expenditure Operating Expenditure
Total (US$ million) Total (US$ million) Annualised (US$ million) Annualised (US$ million)
BAU 0 0 0 0
GAs15 − 1120 − 285 − 28 − 7
GAs30 − 9340 − 789 − 234 − 20
RE15 13,300 3724 333 93
RE30 34,040 5729 851 143
Hydropower 11,400 − 1103 285 − 28
Nuclear 13,360 850 334 21
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is currently underserved. We suggest considering a Gas Masterplan for
Kazakhstan to support delivery of the goals of sustainable economic
growth and energy security, particularly in light of necessary environ-
mental safeguards that would be needed to ensure that natural gas
leaks from gas wells and pipelines do not diminish the environmental
benefits from replacing coal in the electricity generation mix. The
existence of long-term natural gas contracts between Russia and its
neighbours Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, hints further at commercial
potential. Indeed, the role of natural gas is promoted increasingly in
the FSU and, in Kazakhstan, natural gas is being recognised through
investments by the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (announced in October 2016) with €245 million is going
towards upgrading underground storage and maintaining pipelines to
reduce losses, increase energy efficiency and support energy security
(EBRD, 2016).
The hydropower scenario is an economic option under base case
conditions, and its economic feasibility increases under future scenar-
ios where the environment is valued more highly. Nonetheless, there
are concerns raised by hydropower's lack of financial viability. In order
to avoid the Government being saddled with the full costs of invest-
Table 14
Capital costs and Net Present Value (economic and financial) of policy options at base case (marginal to business-as-usual), to 2050 (billion US$).
Policy Option
No.
Policy option
description
Capital cost (capital expenditure and
operating cost)
Capital cost marginal
to BAU
Net present value compared to base case
Financial NPV Economic NPV
1 Business-as-usual 66.95 0 0 0
2 Gas 15% 65.55 −2% 464 1738
3 Gas 30% 56.83 −15% 1109 7842
4 Renewable energy 15% 83.98 25% −1556 −3317
5 Renewable energy 30% 106.72 59% −1912 −8336
6 Hydropower 20% 77.25 15% −1340 423
7 Nuclear 20% 81.16 21% −689 −5414
Fig. 2. Economic net present value of policy options by component cost and benefit factors, relative to BAU, at base case, 2010–2050 (US$ billion).
Fig. 3. Cumulative capital cost for each Policy Option ensuring electricity self-suffi-
ciency, 5-year intervals, 2020–2050 (US$ billion).
Fig. 4. Operating cost for each Policy Option ensuring electricity self-sufficiency, 5-year
intervals, 2020–2050 (US$ billion).
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ment, there is a need for new policies to make this form of energy more
attractive and allow it to garner commercial interest. One way to
achieve such policy aims would be to institute an incentive-based tariff
that would force grid operators to buy electricity from small-scale
hydropower plants at a fixed rate in excess of the tariffs applicable to
thermal power plants. Such policy approaches have proved successful
in providing incentives for expanding renewable investment in India,
the Philippines and South Africa (KPMG, 2015). In Kazakhstan, such a
policy, coupled with, for example, government-backed soft loans and a
lowering of current initial and operating capital requirements, could
assist in bridging the missing finance, and enhance economic viability,
although it could conceivably delay development of innovative finan-
cing structures such as PPPs. Regardless of the exact setup chosen, the
results presented here suggest that supportive policies that encourage
hydropower development could be socially beneficial.
Renewable energy is often considered a clear win for energy
security and global environmental and social values, but our findings
provide little support for this in Kazakhstan's case. Both financially and
economically, we find limited evidence on which to base a recommen-
dation to pursue renewable energy. This finding gives some concern
that we have not sufficiently integrated all the positive spillovers from
renewable energy including cleaner electricity production and the
inclusive benefits from distributed energy resources. Clearly this is an
option that requires further analysis once new data and insights are
available; notably, the anticipated future cost reductions for these
technologies, which are not included here as they were not seen as
realistic by local stakeholders, could change the picture substantially if
they materialise. However, we find that the Government of Kazakhstan
could achieve its goals of a Green Economy and energy security, by
switching from coal to natural gas and hydropower as renewable energy
sources.
The nuclear scenario is attractive in respect of ample domestic
uranium deposits, but it is expensive considering the cost of new
technology development, necessary capacity-building, development of
associated input and ancillary industries, and the development of a
social licence to operate make it unviable alternative to BAU or against
the alternative Policy Options.
Furthermore, the Kazakh Government wishes to maintain the
affordability of electricity, deliver it continuously and increase the
reliability of supply for both residents and industry, with an emphasis
on the currently unserved. This typically means maintaining artificially
low prices, which may further undermine investment incentives, delay
development of enabling structures such as PPPs, and even destabilise
the energy system. A desired synergy of decentralised provision and
reliability is conceivably possible with appropriate deployment of
renewable technologies in mountainous areas that are currently off-
grid. Yet such solutions to rural energy poverty are not currently part of
the political discourse.
In practice, the scale of the necessary financial investments
required in electricity generation, coupled with its criticality for the
nation, typically means consortiums of developers with complementary
skill sets are required to establish and develop the energy investments.
Our findings suggest that the Vision for Kazakhstan is best served by
opening discussions over future investments with potential consortium
members in the natural gas and hydropower industries. Furthermore,
these two industries have separate groups of stakeholders and inves-
tors, which should avoid the cross-subsidisation of one form of
electricity generation by another, and with the right investment
regimes developed, hydropower and gas could be potent complements
to one another. Hydropower and gas are complementary generation
options in several ways, specifically financially with natural gas having
relatively low capital costs and variable fuel costs, while hydropower
Table 15
Externalities of Policy Options, relative to BAU, 2010–2050.
Policy Option Carbon
Emissions
NOx
Emissions
Sox
Emissions
Water use
(ton CO2-e) (ton) (ton) (kL)
BAU 0 0 0 0
GAs15 − 68,890,392 −35,304 −56,827 − 175,948,980
GAs30 −
328,726,008
− 165,296 − 264,833 − 836,707,020
RE15 −
378,227,016
− 108,564 − 141,530 − 888,605,640
RE30 −
622,336,680
− 178,528 − 232,667 − 1,400,071,380
Hydropower −
449,529,912
− 128,556 − 167,263 − 1,055,693,880
Nuclear −
283,960,656
−81,452 − 106,148 968,054,460
Table 16
Sensitivity of policy option rankings to prices (US$, 2013) of resource inputs, 2010–2050.
Resource input Sensi-tivity Value (US$) Description of changes to policy option rankings
Coal US$/GJ Low 0.66 No change in rankings among policy options. Lower price increases the viability of BAU scenario only slightly.
Base 0.73 Global coal prices have been falling since 2012. Production in Kazakhstan has increased and is expected to increase further,
coupled with expectations that demand will persist, increasing 0.4% annually to 2040. These conditions indicate that our
base value remains a good indicator (Rowland, 2016; Bauerova and Carr, 2016). Coal is likely to remain the most
affordable fuel for power generation in many developing and industrialised countries for decades (Speight, 2012) and
recent events do not alter this likelihood.
High 2.42 Viability of the BAU scenario diminished with higher prices for its main input coal (79%) even when local production
potential is taken into account. Hydropower becomes the third most viable option behind Policy Options 3 & 2 overtaking
Policy Option 2 at US$1.72/GJ, while Policy Option 5 (Renewable Energy +15%) exceeds Policy Option 1 at US$2.42/GJ.
Gas US$/GJ Low 1.07 No change to policy option rankings.
Base 1.26 Since 2012, prices for gas have not increased in Kazakhstan although supply has risen, indicating that the base case
remains a strong indicator of current and future pricing. Prices charged to Kazakhstan's neighbours through gas
distribution networks have risen (Kosolapova, 2016; Levit, 2016).
High 4.94 The gas-heavy Policy Options 2 and 3 lose their economic edge, and are ranked lower than the hydropower and BAU
scenarios. At US$3.30 Policy Option 2 is lower than Policy Option 1, and at US$3.73 Policy Option 3 is lower than Policy
Option 1.
Nuclear US$/MWh Low 9.41 No change to policy option rankings. Small increase in the viability of Policy Option 7.
Base 9.90 Since 2012, the supply of uranium to the market has grown considerably, mostly owing to Kazakhstan exceeding its self-
imposed production limit by 10% in 2013 (World Nuclear Association, 2016). This indicates the base case is a reasonable
approximation of prices.
High 10.89 No change to policy option rankings. Small reduction in the viability of Policy Option 7.
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has higher capital costs but virtually nil fuel costs (Lee et al., 2012).
In the analysis presented here, several assumptions have been
made that should be re-examined as better data and improved
technological solutions become available. The key assumptions are
our estimated costs of generation assets in US$ per GWh, which we
find is an appropriate measure. However, improvements could be made
to decision-making and economic efficiency if we ensure that all prices
are reflected as shadow prices. Moreover, to adequately distinguish
between Policy Options, our shadow price values should ideally be
extended in order to account for the true economic value of power,
including its positive and negative externalities. Our research and
insights would benefit from a greater level of detail not only on the
Policy Options considered, their full environmental costs and benefits,
and also on the sequencing of the costs of their implementation. The
growing body of evidence on risks and uncertainty associated with
environmental and social factors will provide a basis for future research
and decision-making processes which can review this paper's findings
and refine the analysis. Equally, the body of information and data on
the maturity and scaling of renewable energies – wind and solar in
particular – coupled with significant advancements expected in the
coming years in off-grid energy options, provide a further avenue for
enhancing the analysis presented here, potentially driving down the
capital costs of the two renewable energy policy options, which could
unlock a greater suite of complementary energy generation options.
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Table 17
Sensitivity of policy option rankings to shadow prices of emissions (US$, 2013), 2010–2050.
Emission category Sensi-tivity Value (US$) Description of policy changes
Carbon dioxide (US$/t
CO2e)
Low 0 Change to policy option rankings (see Table 13)
Base 30 Carbon dioxide taxation and shadow pricing have grown in acceptance globally. Kazakhstan has investigated
legislating for the establishment of a financial incentive system to reduce domestic emissions. The global price of
carbon dioxide emissions has fallen rather than risen over the period 2012–2016, with the European Union's
Emissions Trading Scheme spot price being €3.91/ US$4.29, but the carbon taxes – both planned and operational
– are seeking US$30 as a reference base case. The social cost of carbon has been re-estimated at US$220, but this
is a long-term goal.
High 85 Change to policy option rankings (see Table 13)
Sulphur dioxide US$/t Low 0 No change in rankings
Base 630 The establishment and enforcement of SOx emissions targets remain a distant objective, but the relevance of the
base case remains.
High 1160 No change to policy option rankings
Nitrogen oxide, US$/t Low 0 No change to policy option rankings
Base 770 The establishment and enforcement of NOx emissions targets remain a distant objective, but the relevance of the
base case remains.
High 3377 No change to policy option rankings
Water US$/m3 Low 0 A zero value on water has an impact on the viability of Policy Option 6 alone, pushing it to lower than Policy
Option 1 (at less than US$0.11/m3). At almost any rate placed on water in the decision-making process,
hydropower is preferable to Policy Option 1. This is borne out with hydropower being a variable that has some –
albeit not unfettered – support from policymakers. When other factors that SMHPPs enable are taken into
account, such as serving the unserved with power in rural areas and the water jobs multiplier, the case for
hydropower as a mainstay for Kazakhstan is secured.
Base 1.0 Global use of economic water values remains at the core of the promotion of environmental stewardship. It also
continues to be a core part of decision-making in some countries, notably the UK, where the value of US$1/m3 is
still the reference base-case for calculating policy relevance.
High 3.5 No policy option ranking changes for higher values of water. Indeed, Policy Option 6 only becomes more viable
than Policy Option 2 at values greater than US$4.19/m3, which are considerably higher than values used for policy
advice or estimated elsewhere.
Table 18
Sensitivity to differences in the shadow price of carbon dioxide, ranked by economic net present value (billion US$), to 2050.
Policy options US$0/t US$22/t US$85/t
No. Scenario Net present value (bn US$) Ranking Net present value (bn US$) Ranking Net present value (bn US$) Ranking
1 Business as usual 0 3 0 4 0 7
2 Gas 15% 904 2 1738 2 4131 5
3 Gas 30% 4595 1 7842 1 17,161 1
4 Renewable energy 15% −7312 5 −3317 5 8140 3
5 Renewable energy 30% −14,740 7 −8336 7 7703 4
6 Hydropower −428 4 423 3 13,921 2
7 Nuclear −7781 6 −5414 6 1189 6
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Appendix A. Supporting information
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in the
online version at doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2017.04.039.
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ABSTRACT. In Namibia, as in many parts of Africa, households are highly dependent
on forest resources for their livelihoods, including energy needs. Using data originally
collected for Namibia’s forest resource accounts and insights from a non-separable
household model, this paper estimates household fuelwood demand. Specifically, the
factors underlying the substitution between fuelwood collected from open access forest
resources, cow dung, and fuelwood purchased from the market are analysed. Heckman
two-step estimates show that households respond to economic scarcity, as measured by the
opportunity costs of collecting fuelwood, by reducing energy consumption slightly more
than by increasing labour input to collection. There is limited evidence for substitution
from fuelwood to other energy sources, particularly with declining availability of forest
stocks. Market participants may be more sensitive to price changes than non-participants.
All estimated elasticities are low, similar to those observed in previous studies.
1. Introduction
According to FAOStat data (2007), more than half of global wood pro-
duction is classified as non-industrial roundwood, mostly used as fuelwood
for energy production. Wood and charcoal are the dominant energy
sources for cooking and heating for over two billion people, mainly rural
households in developing countries. Fuelwood collection in rural areas can
potentially contribute to deforestation and forest degradation, although the
extent to which this occurs depends on sources of supply and demand,
the nature of fuelwood and charcoal markets and household behaviour
(Arnold et al., 2003). There is a two-way relationship between fuelwood
∗ Both authors thank Bill Hyde, Jon Barnes, Elena Irwin, Ben Groom, and the two
referees, for numerous useful comments and ideas, which helped to improve this
paper. Funding for this research was provided by the Ministry of Environment and
Tourism, Namibia. Further financial support was also provided by the Swedish
International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida).
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collection and forest degradation. Fuelwood demand can cause degradation
to the extent that collection exceeds sustainable yield, while degradation
can lead to a situation of physical, fuelwood scarcity (Heltberg et al., 2000).
Dependence on forests for energy implies that physical scarcity can impact
on household welfare.
Fuelwood, while ‘free’ financially, incurs opportunity costs in the form
of collection labour time (Amacher et al., 1993). Higher opportunity costs
or shadow prices imply increasing economic scarcity. Economic scarcity is
household-specific and dependent on a wide range of factors including
physical scarcity, household endowments, and institutions for natural
resource management (Heltberg et al., 2000). It is perhaps a better measure
of ‘scarcity’ than purely physical measures of resource stocks due to being
a better predictor of household behaviour and, hence, pressure on resource
stocks (Amacher et al., 1996). Potential impacts of increasing economic
scarcity include constraints on resource degradation, inducements to
improved energy efficiency, and substitution to alternatives such as crop
residues or animal dung.1
Empirical evidence about the consumption and production of fuelwood
in rural households has shown that fuelwood consumption tends to be
own-price inelastic (Cooke et al., 2008). While its consumption declines with
increases in its price (market or shadow), household expenditures increase,
often in the form of increased labour allocated to collection (Kumar and
Hotchkiss, 1988; Cooke, 1998a,b). With higher incomes households may
switch to marketed energy sources such as kerosene or coal (Hyde and
Ko¨hlin, 2000; Chen et al., 2006).
In 2004, data on household forest use were collected by Namibia’s
Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET), in collaboration with the
Institute for Environment and Development (IIED).2 Similar to much of
Africa, Namibia remains mired in poverty, with up to 90 per cent of a rising
population dependent on fuelwood and other biomass for their energy
needs (FAO, 1997, 2007). The study’s objective was to develop Namibia’s
physical and economic forest resource accounts (see Barnes et al., 2005;
Nhuleipo et al., 2005). Forest stocks were addressed by the former, while
the latter measured the economic value of direct forest uses, including non-
marketed goods such as fuelwood and poles (for buildings). Variation in
levels of forest stocks was observed, ranging from relative physical resource
abundance to scarcity. The raw data also permitted the estimation of the
household demand for fuelwood in Namibia, which is the focus of this
paper.
As is usual in much of the developing world, many Namibian households
collect fuelwood for internal consumption. A household’s primary input
to fuelwood collection is labour so its shadow price is defined by the
opportunity cost of the time spent collecting. Since livelihoods in Namibia
are mainly farm-based, the opportunity cost of labour can be measured
1 Note that crop residues and dung are also important farm inputs in many poor
households in Asia and Africa. Using these for fuel instead of manure can impact
on soil fertility (Amacher et al., 1999; Heltberg et al., 2000).
2 See: www.met.gov. na/; www.iied.org/.
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as the marginal product of agricultural labour. A household is better-off
choosing self-sufficiency in fuelwood if its subjective price falls inside
a ‘price band’ for fuelwood, i.e. between market purchase and sales
prices. Wide price bands for factors of production and produced goods
reveal market failures (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995). Missing markets for
fuelwood suggests the use of a non-separable or non-recursive household
model, where all production, consumption, and labour time decisions are
decided simultaneously (Hyde and Ko¨hlin, 2000).
Additional to fuelwood collectors, the Namibian sample contains a
number of collectors that also purchase fuelwood from the market. This
implies that households sometimes switch to buying fuelwood when its
shadow price exceeds the purchase price, i.e. households are sometimes
better-off participating in the market instead of collecting fuelwood, and
vice versa. Guided by the model, we empirically estimate household
demand for fuelwood and the factors underlying substitution between
collected and purchased fuelwood, and cattle dung. In order to deal with
potential selectivity bias in the sample due to the presence of different
price regimes among households, we derive the model parameters using
maximum likelihood estimates (MLE) of the Heckman two-step estimator.
Furthermore, to estimate fuelwood collection and consumption, we use a
novel three-stage approach in order to control both for sample selection
bias and endogeneity problems.
We find that with higher collection times, Namibian households reduce
fuelwood consumption just slightly more than by increasing their labour
allocation to fuelwood collection, although the difference is negligible.
There is limited evidence for substitution to dung, particularly where
there is a lower availability of forest stock. Households do not respond
to economic scarcity by purchasing more fuelwood from the market.
Market participants may be more price sensitive than non-participants.
The paper joins a relatively small, empirical literature on this topic, one
that is dominated by South Asian cases (see Cooke et al., 2008). In line with
these studies, fuelwood demand among households in Namibia is inelastic.
By contrast, in one of few studies undertaken in Africa, Mekonnen (1998)
found fuelwood consumption in the more arid uplands of Ethiopia to be
relatively less inelastic. Mekonnen also found that fuelwood and dung are
used as energy complements instead of substitutes for cooking.
The paper begins with a presentation of the background to the study
area and data collection along with some results of the resource accounting
exercise, in section 2. A conceptual model for the supply and demand of
fuel is outlined in section 3. In section 4, the method of empirical application
is described, with the results discussed in section 5. Conclusions and policy
implications are presented in section 6.
2. Background
2.1. Background to Namibia’s forests and study area
Situated on the south-west coast of Africa, Namibia’s 7.7 million hectares
of forests, 9 per cent of the country’s land area, are mainly contained in
woodlands and savannas (shrublands). These increase in density from the
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extremely sparse, arid desert environment in the south towards the semi-
arid north-east. Between 1990 and 2005, Namibia’s forest area declined by
1.1 per cent (United Nations, 2007). In common with much of Africa, the
country contains relatively little ‘forest’ in the conventional sense.3 Forest
resources are defined in this paper as all woody plants that occur in the
woodlands and savannas.
Per capita GDP of N$46,000 (US$7,400)4 masks acute income inequality
and widespread poverty. An estimated 90 per cent of the population lives
on less than US$2 per day, with high dependence on natural resources
for livelihoods. Fuelwood is typically gathered from land classified as
‘public forest’. Namibia’s forest resources are, in effect, de facto open access.
Relatively little was known about forest utilization rates and the direct use
values derived by local people, particularly those that are unmarketed or
traded in the informal sector. Namibia’s MET in collaboration with the
IIED designed a survey to assess forest resource utilization, through the
development of asset and flow accounts (Barnes et al., 2005).
The survey focuses on the semi-arid woodlands in the north-central
regions (NCR). While only comprising 4 per cent of Namibia’s land area, it
is densely populated, supporting half of the country’s population of around
two million. Low-value rainfed crop production and livestock grazing along
with forest use dominate the local, infrastructure-poor economy. Forest
cover has declined in recent decades, especially in the densely settled central
area of the NCR (see Erkkila¨, 2001).
2.2. Surveys and data collection
The datasets were established in 2004. Household and focus group surveys
were conducted to obtain data on the use of forest resources (specifically
fuelwood, poles, and non-timber forest products (NTFPs)) among rural
residents. The household questionnaire was aimed at obtaining quantitative
information on volumes of forest products harvested, consumed, and sold,
along with prices and harvesting costs.5
A stratified sample of 182 households from 19 villages in the Ohangwena,
Omusati, Oshana, and Oshikoto sub-regions of NCR was selected. It was
designed to cover residents in all of the biomes6 present in the sub-regions.
Household sampling within biomes was randomized on the basis of forest
dependence for livelihoods (see MacGregor et al., 2007). A comparison with
NCR Census data from 2001 showed that household characteristics are, in
3 Up to 60 per cent of African fuelwood supply originates from non-forest areas
(FAO, 2000).
4 2006 figure (source: www.cia.gov). Exchange rate used is US$1.00: N$6.30.
5 Following two pilot surveys, six trained enumerators were deployed to interview
household heads. A complementary sample of 25 forest product traders in the
NCR was interviewed for information on forest products.
6 The political regions are not differentiated according to ecology or biome, although
the latter is more informative with respect to forest resource availability. The
predominant biomes include western Kalahari, mopane shrubland, and mopane
woodland. The physical data were collected according to political region alone,
which typically incorporates estimates across different biomes.
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general, representative of the entire population of the NCR. Furthermore,
the NCR shares a number of characteristics (climate, flora, fauna, etc.) with
other regions in northern Namibia. Thus, findings in this paper have policy
implications beyond the NCR.
2.3. Descriptive statistics and Namibian resource accounts
Rural life in the NCR is largely based on subsistence, with 83 per cent
of respondents classifying themselves either as subsistence farmers or
unemployed. Compared to the national average, average incomes are low
at around N$2,000, derived mostly from paid employment, local informal
economic activity, and pensions. Access to a car is limited to less than
10 per cent of households, distributed evenly among political and ecological
regions. At 7.5 people, average household sizes are large.
The NCR account for 10 per cent of Namibia’s forest area, 29 per cent
of forest biomass, and 27 per cent of physically suitable yield for fuelwood
and poles (Nhuleipo et al., 2005). The area also accounts for an estimated
half of all Namibia’s fuelwood demand and two-thirds of that for poles.
Excluding the use of forests for grazing, Namibia’s standing forests had
a total asset value of almost N$600 million in 2004, with fuelwood alone
accounting for over half of this estimate (Barnes et al., 2005). Poles and
fuelwood in the NCR account for around a third of the total asset value for
the whole country. By contrast, Namibia’s official forest sector contributed
N$430 million to GDP in 2004, or 1.1 per cent of total GDP.
There is a high, local dependence on forest resources for cooking, heating,
and building materials. On average, a household uses almost 12,000 kg of
wood for energy and shelter annually, split between fuelwood and poles.
The average per capita consumption of fuelwood is 913 kg, ranging from 144
kg in Oshana to 1,202 kg in Ohangwena. With annual harvests in fuelwood
and poles exceeding the physically suitable annual yield, forests appear to
be over-harvested in Oshana (see Nhuleipo et al., 2005; MacGregor et al.,
2007). The other sub-regions are characterized by relative forest resource
abundance rather than scarcity with current rates of use below sustainable
yields. Over half of the sample is unaware of official restrictions about the
utilization of public forest resources.
There is seasonal variation in fuelwood collection with stockpiling
occurring between September and December. This is to ensure enough
fuelwood in the household during the rainy season (see Nhuleipo et al.,
2005). Although data were not collected, field observations revealed that
much fuelwood was gathered by women and children,7 with collection
linked to other activities, particularly livestock grazing.
Limited but active local markets exist for fuelwood and for other forest
products such as NTFPs, as is typical for rural subsistence households
(Hyde and Ko¨hlin, 2000). There are 30 fuelwood-purchasing households,
comprising 16 per cent of the sample. Of these, 22 buyers collect fuelwood
as well. Fuelwood is typically bought from traders at open markets in the
7 Earlier studies, e.g. Williams (1983), have shown that fuelwood collection in Africa
is dominated by women and children, while more recent ones have found that
both men and women collect, e.g. Mekonnen (1998).
698 Charles Palmer and James MacGregor
local town or by the side of the road. Purchased and collected fuelwood are
sourced from similar areas. For the sample as a whole, fuelwood purchases
account for 9 per cent of total annual consumption, and 39 per cent of
annual consumption for the buying sub-sample. Only three households in
the sample sell fuelwood, one of which also buys fuelwood. Thus, buyers
easily outnumber sellers in the Namibian household sample.
In addition to fuelwood and poles, the main forest resources used by
households are NTFPs, e.g. for food, medicine, and cosmetics. Almost
80 per cent of sampled households received some income from NTFPs,
while an average of 19 per cent of declared household incomes across
the sample were derived from NTFP sales (MacGregor et al., 2007). Forest
resources are also used for grazing and shelter of livestock. There are
substantial tracts of open-access grazing land throughout the NCR, and
ownership of livestock (cattle, goats, donkeys) is widespread. Respondents
do not purchase fodder for their livestock.
3. Household model
The model captures a rural subsistence household engaged in agricultural
production, off-farm work, and energy collection. Namibian households
are located in an environment characterized by market failures for some of
their inputs, e.g. to agricultural production, and products. A market may
fail for a particular household when it faces ‘wide’ price margins between
the low price at which it could sell a commodity or factor and the high price
at which it could buy that product or factor (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995).8
Faced with such a margin, the household may choose self-sufficiency in
the good or factor if its shadow price falls inside the margin. Given the
relatively small numbers of buyers and (in particular) sellers, the Namibian
dataset provides limited evidence for a fuelwood price band: average sales
and purchase prices are N$0.33 and N$0.41 per kg, respectively.9
As most rural domestic fuels are not traded but produced and
consumed by the household itself, the model used is non-separable
(or non-recursive).10 When markets fail, there are direct interrelations
between production and consumption decisions. In the context of energy
collection, this implies that household resource allocation (including
energy supply, energy demand, and farm and off-farm labour supply) is
decided simultaneously. Each household determines energy production
and consumption by maximizing its utility subject to a shadow price
of energy which is unobserved and unknown except to the household
itself. Such a model was originally developed by Amacher et al. (1999)
8 The size of the price band may rise due to one or a combination of transactions
costs, shallow local markets, price risks, and risk aversion (Sadoulet and de Janvry,
1995).
9 To place these figures in perspective, if households were to purchase all their
fuelwood from the market, an average fuelwood consumption of 5,572 kg per
year (from table 1) would imply annual expenditure of over N$2,200, easily in
excess of average annual incomes.
10 The full household model was originally developed by Barnum and Squire (1979),
and further elaborated in Singh et al. (1986).
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and Heltberg et al. (2000), focusing on the substitution of forest and non-
forest fuels in Nepal and India, respectively. Closely following Heltberg
et al. (2000), our model focuses on the choice of energy sources for heating
and cooking, among fuelwood gathered from the forest, producing energy
using cow dung and fuelwood purchases. The hypothesis to be tested is that
fuelwood, dung, and marketed energy sources are substitutes in domestic
energy consumption. First, the household maximizes utility defined as
MaxU
CFW ,CM,qFW ,qAG ,qD,lFW ,lAG ,lOFF
= U(cE , cM, cL ; zHC ), (1)
where cE denotes consumption of household goods and services such
as cooked food and heating that require energy inputs; cM are other
consumption goods and services; and cL is leisure for all working household
members. No distinction is made between time allocation for male and
female household members due to a lack of data. zHC is a vector of household
characteristics relating to consumption such as wealth and household size.
In the Namibian context, household goods and services, including
cooking and heating, are mainly produced with energy inputs from
fuelwood and dung
cE = (cFW , cD). (2)
Consumption of fuelwood collected from de facto open access forest areas,11
as undertaken by 86 per cent of sampled households, is denoted cFW.
Consumption of dung, by 13 per cent of sampled households, is denoted cD.
No stove technology or similar is used by any of the sampled households.
As described in the previous section, there are 30 households, comprising
16 per cent of the sample that bought fuelwood during the study period.
Only three households sold fuelwood. The net marketed quantity of
fuelwood is thus qFW − cFW , where qFW denotes household fuelwood
production. If no fuelwood is bought or sold by the household, this quantity
is equal to zero, i.e. supply is equal to consumption. To simplify the model
and the empirical analysis in the following section, we focus on fuelwood
buyers and non-buyers, hence excluding sellers. The net, non-negative
amount of fuelwood used in the household can be written as
cFW − qFW ≥ 0. (3)
Fuelwood production is assumed to be a concave function of household
labour time spent collecting fuelwood, lFW, and household fixed factors of
production (e.g. harvesting equipment such as hand-held parangs), aFW
qFW = gFW(lFW , aFW ; zV), (4)
where zV is a vector of exogenous characteristics describing forest stock
and access conditions. These include population density, management
institutions, and distance from the household to the forest.
11 Namibian households do not tend to have private forest resources that other
households cannot access.
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Households produce agricultural goods using the following production
function
qAG = gAG(lAG, dAG; zK ), (5)
where lAG is household farm labour, dAG denotes the use of animal dung
as an agricultural input, and zK is a vector of household agricultural
endowments such as land and livestock. Labour was not hired in by any
of the sampled households. As in Heltberg et al. (2000), the total amount
of dung available is modelled as a fixed proportion of agricultural output
αqAG. To capture the trade-off in using dung as a farm input or as a source
of energy, dung energy supply is given as net of dung not used as inputs
qD = αqAG − dAG, (6)
where qD denotes the amount of dung collected by the household from
cattle left to graze in fields and forest. Dung is not traded, i.e. consumption
of dung equals production, qD = cD. The household budget constraint is
given by the income from agricultural production, off-farm employment,
and other sources such as savings
pAGqAG + wlOFF + e = pMcM + pFW(cFW − qFW), (7)
where pFW, pAG, and pM refer to the exogenous, market prices of fuelwood,
agricultural goods, and other goods, respectively; w is the exogenous wage
rate; lOFF is household labour time in off-farm work; and e is other household
income.
Households have a labour endowment, T, which is allocated over
fuelwood collection and on- and off-farm employment. Thus, total
household leisure, cL, is
cL = T − lAG − lOFF − lFW. (8)
Additional to (3), the following non-negative constraints apply to the
model
qi ≥ 0; c j ≥ 0; lK ≥ 0
i = F W, AG, D;
j = L , F W, D, M, E ;
k = F W, AG, OFF
(9)
By inserting (2)–(8) into (1), the Lagrangian for an internal solution to the
problem can be formulated
 = U [cM,  (cFW , qD) , T − lAG − lOFF − lFW ; zc]
− λ [pMcM + pFW(cFW − qFW) − pAGq AG − wlOFF − e]
− η [qAG − gAG (lAG, αqAG − qD; zK )]
−ψ [qFW − gFW (lFW , aFW ; zV)]− μ [qFW − cFW]
The first-order conditions for this problem are
∂
∂cFW
= ∂U
∂
∂
∂cFW
− λpFW − μ = 0
Environment and Development Economics 701
∂
∂cM
= ∂U
∂cM
− λpM = 0
∂
∂qFW
= λpFW − ψ + μ = 0
∂
∂qAG
= λpAG + η
[
α
∂gAG
∂dAG
− 1
]
= 0
∂
∂qD
= ∂U
∂
∂
∂qD
− η ∂gAG
∂dAG
= 0
∂
∂lFW
= ψ ∂gFW
∂lFW
− ∂U
∂cL
= 0
∂
∂lAG
= η ∂gAG
∂lAG
− ∂U
∂cL
= 0
∂
∂lOFF
= λw − ∂U
∂cL
= 0
μ > 0, if cFW − qFW > 0; μ(cFW − qFW) = 0 otherwise, where qFW = cFW.
(10)
The conditions in (10) can be rearranged to give
∂U
∂cL
= η ∂gAG
∂lAG
= ψ ∂gFW
∂lFW
= λw. (11)
Equation (11) shows how the household allocates its time among leisure,
fuelwood collection, and agricultural activities. More precisely, households
collect fuelwood until the marginal utility of leisure, i.e. the opportunity
cost of household labour, is equal to the marginal product of household
labour in agriculture, which in turn is equal to the marginal product of
household labour in fuelwood collection. It is also equal to the off-farm
labour wage.
While only limited fuelwood markets exist, it can be seen from the
first and third conditions in (10) that the marginal utility of fuelwood
consumption for all households is equal to the shadow cost of collecting
it, ψ . For the majority of sampled households, the reservation price of
fuelwood is lower than the purchase price and higher than its sale price
implying that they prefer to consume whatever they collect, i.e. are self-
sufficient.12 For buyers, the reservation price exceeds the market buying
price, N$0.41 per kg, at the upper-end of the price band. Thus, the
market price determines fuelwood production and consumption levels for
fuelwood buyers.
Dung is used for energy production and as an input to agriculture. From
the fifth condition in (10), dung is used as a source of energy until the
marginal utility of energy is equal to the marginal product of dung as an
12 For fuelwood sellers, the market selling price can be said to exceed their reservation
price for fuelwood.
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agricultural input. Thus, dung use is determined by the opportunity cost
of dung as an input to agriculture.
In summary, fuelwood collection is determined by the households’
opportunity costs of time, which are mainly determined by agricultural
activities. Dung use is determined by the opportunity costs of using dung
as an input to agriculture. The opportunity costs of household time are
driven by the wage. An increase in the wage draws labour away from
agriculture, and also from fuelwood collection.13
4. Empirical application
To test for the determinants of energy sources among rural households
in Namibia, the model presented in section 3 is applied empirically to
the dataset presented in section 2. Missing markets for fuelwood and
labour across the sample and the non-separable property of the model
imply that household fuelwood demand and supply decisions have to be
considered together. From the first-order conditions in (10), four reduced-
form equations are derived, showing amount of fuelwood collected, amount
of time spent collecting, amount of dung produced, and amount of
fuelwood consumed as functions of all the exogenous variables14
qFW
lFW
qD
cFW
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭ = f (pFW , pAG, pM, w, z
H , zV , zC , T) (12)
These equations are used to investigate the household demand for energy
in Namibia.
The household sample consists of 29 buyers, two sellers, one buyer
and seller, and 150 households that neither bought nor sold fuelwood.
The presence of numerous sub-groups complicates the empirical analysis,
although the very small sizes of the seller and buyer/seller sub-samples
preclude these from further meaningful consideration. Divided between
buyers and non-buyers, the sample is reduced to 179 households; the
buyer sub-sample can be further divided into 22 buyer-collectors and seven
buyers. Following Acharya and Barbier’s (2002) study of groundwater
valuation in Nigeria, fuelwood demand in Namibia is estimated by
considering first, the demand for collected fuelwood using ‘collect-only’
and ‘collect-and-purchase’ households only, followed by the demand
for purchased fuelwood using ‘purchase-only’ and ‘collect-and-purchase’
households.
13 Where there may be direct links between fuelwood collection and deforestation,
an increase in off-farm wages may reduce pressures on forests (see Kaimowitz
and Angelsen (1998) for a review).
14 An inability to separate consumption and production decisions in the household
means that there are no restrictions on functional form and parameters, at least
when considering the reduced form in (12). Consequently, price, wage, income,
and resource variables must all remain as explanatory variables in all equations,
i.e. the model is identically specified for each equation (Amacher et al., 1996).
Environment and Development Economics 703
As noted in the previous section, purchase-only (PO) households
face fuelwood market prices, while collect-only (CO) households are
influenced by unobservable shadow prices. Collect-and-purchase (CAP)
households face both market and shadow prices for fuelwood, which may
be different for some households (see Amacher et al., 1996). The presence
of different price regimes among households cannot be accommodated by
dividing the sample and conducting separate ordinary least squares (OLS)
regressions. Since households are distributed non-randomly, this would
lead to inconsistent parameter estimates and selectivity bias. The method
used to address this problem and estimate the parameters of the model
is Heckman’s (1976, 1979) two-step estimator, in which a prediction from
the first model is used as a covariate in a second model.15 For estimating
collected-fuelwood demand, the binary indicator variable is whether or not
households buy fuelwood; for purchased-fuelwood demand, the binary
variable is whether or not households collect fuelwood. Chow tests of
structural change are applied to examine whether or not there are any
behavioural differences between the sub-groups in the sample.
The independent variables used for estimation are listed and summarized
in table 1, along with their summary statistics. Given the original focus of the
fieldwork on constructing forest resource accounts, these data are limited
in their application to this analysis, e.g. there is no variable that can usefully
proxy for household labour endowment, T.
Cow dung is not traded and, hence, its price is not included among the
independent variables. Since dung is used as an energy input, its relative
scarcity is assessed through head of cattle owned. This is expected to have
a positive impact on dung consumption because households with larger
herds have easy access to dung. Cattle owned also proxies for household
capital, zK, since these tend to be the household’s most valuable form of
capital.16 Moreover, households with more cattle tend to have other forms
of capital, which were not captured in the survey. For a given labour input,
greater capital may have a positive impact on agricultural production and
household incomes. Income and cattle owned are not collinear. In turn,
this may induce a greater consumption of leisure in addition to goods
and services requiring energy inputs. The expected effect on fuelwood
consumption is positive, while those for fuelwood collection and labour
input to fuelwood collection are unclear.
Regarding other household characteristics, zHC, household size is
expected to influence fuelwood collection positively, both because of
increased energy demand (e.g. for cooking) and because of increased labour
supply. The expected impact of household size on dung consumption
is unclear because more household labour means increased demand for
energy, but also greater scope for substituting fuelwood, which is relatively
15 See also Murphy and Topel (1985). As recommended by Puhani (2000), exploratory
work is undertaken to reduce collinearity problems among the independent
variables in order to justify the use of Heckman’s two-step estimator.
16 A separate variable for total numbers of livestock owned is not possible due to
collinearity with head of cattle. Since cattle are more valuable compared to other
livestock, these alone act as a reasonable proxy for household capital in our sample.
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labour intensive, for dung. There are data on exogenous market incomes
for almost all households. Wealthier households may collect less of their
own fuelwood and rely more on market purchases with an indeterminate
overall effect on fuelwood consumption.
Collection time (per kg of fuelwood collected) captures the shadow price
of gathering fuelwood. Potential endogeneity is tested by undertaking the
Durbin–Wu–Hausman test.17 With the exceptions of amounts of fuelwood
collected and consumed, the coefficient of the residuals for collection time
is found to be insignificant (including at the 0.10 level) when considering
each of the dependent variables. For estimating fuelwood collection and
consumption, a three-stage model is adapted from Mroz (1987) to control
for sample selection bias and endogeneity. Stages one and three are similar
to the usual two-step estimator, while stage two is similar to the first step
of a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation. An instrumental variable
(IV) in the form of gender of household head is fitted to collection time
in stage two.18 Increasing shadow prices are expected to have a negative
effect on fuelwood collection. Labour allocated to collection is also expected
to rise with increasing shadow price. The estimation of demand for
collected fuelwood combines the CO and CAP households, which totals
172 households, i.e. excluding PO households.
For CAP households, the decision to buy fuelwood occurs when its
market price, pFW, is either smaller than or equal to its shadow price. Rising
shadow prices may be expected to increase fuelwood purchases, although
a decline in collection means that the overall effect on consumption is
unclear. Given missing markets, market prices are unlikely to be completely
exogenous. Potential endogeneity is again tested using the Durbin–Wu–
Hausman test, with market prices not found to be endogenous. Holding
all else equal, we expect rising market prices to increase the amount
collected. PO and CAP households are combined to estimate the demand
for purchased fuelwood. Since this sub-sample only totals 29 households,
its small size implies that we treat the results with caution.
Cross-price elasticities of demand for fuelwood and dung are used to
assess the extent to which households substitute among energy sources.
Substitution between dung and fuelwood can be evaluated through the
impact of price on dung consumption and through the effect cattle herd size
has on dung collection. Increasing prices are expected to have a positive
impact on use of dung. A number of household dung collectors neither
collect nor buy fuelwood. Other households only buy but do not collect
fuelwood. Missing price observations for these 28 non-fuelwood collecting
17 First, collection time is regressed on the other independent variables selected in
this section and then the residuals of collection time are included as independent
variables with the other variables in an augmented regression for each equation.
18 Stage one is a selection equation (probit) while stage two is a reduced-form
regression in which the endogenous variable, collection time, is estimated using
the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) from stage one, the IV (gender of household head),
and a number of control variables. In stage three, the structural equation is
estimated using the predicted value of collection time (from stage two), the IMR
from stage one along with a set of control variables.
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households are proxied by upper-bound collection time data collected
for other households sampled in their villages and respective ecological
regions. In light of potential biases in the regression results, a sensitivity
analysis is undertaken in the next section using the lower-bound collection
time estimates.
Data for agricultural output prices, pAG, and those for other goods,
pM, were not collected. However, fieldwork observations confirm the
assumption that these vary relatively little across households. Also, data
for off-farm wage rates, w, are unavailable. Instead, a continuous variable
measuring the number of years the household head had spent in education
is included to account for unobserved labour market opportunities.
Greater labour market opportunities are expected to effect less input
to fuelwood collection, less fuelwood and dung collection, and more
fuelwood purchases. Another proxy for labour market opportunities is age
of household head; a relatively young household head may have the skills,
strength, and ambition to realize an off-farm labour opportunity compared
to an older one. However, age is collinear with a number of other variables
thus excluding it from the model.
Collected fuelwood can have high opportunity costs, which varies
according to the density, distance, and accessibility of forest resources (zV).
Forest stock availability is measured as a ratio of population per cubic
metre of forest biomass in each political region. These stocks are assumed
to be contained within public forests. With higher population relative to
forest stock, it is expected that more households will substitute fuelwood
for dung. Access to forest for fuelwood could be given by distance from the
household, although this is collinear with collection time. While improved
access to forest resources or to the market could be measured through access
to motorized transport, the data are limited to private ownership and no
information is available on access to public forms of transport. Awareness
of state restrictions on harvesting open access forest resources is included as
a dummy variable. Increased awareness is expected to lead to less fuelwood
collection, more dung use, and more fuelwood purchases.
5. Empirical results and discussion
Chow F-test results, shown in tables 2 and 3, demonstrate that the pooling
of CAB and CO households in a single sample is not rejected by the data, i.e.
there appears to be few behavioural differences between buyers and non-
buyers. Due to small sample size, the validity of data pooling is not tested for
PO and CAB households. All regressions are estimated using the Heckman
two-step estimator in which a predictor from the first, probit model is
used as a covariate in a second, linear regression model. For fuelwood
collection and consumption, an extra stage is introduced in order to control
for endogenous shadow prices. In the probit model, variable values are
only recognized when the household is identified as a fuelwood buyer
(collector) in estimating the demand for fuelwood collected (purchased). In
the final stage, the predictors are regressed on buyer-dependent (collector-
dependent) variable values. Results for collected- and purchased-fuelwood
demand are reported separately for each equation, i.e. using shadow and
Environment and Development Economics 707
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market prices, respectively.19 Despite its consistency, the relative inefficiency
of the Heckman estimator suggests using the maximum likelihood estimate
(MLE) of the same model (see Puhani, 2000).
The final stage MLE results from the selection model regressions of
fuelwood collection and consumption, labour allocation to collection, and
dung consumption are presented in tables 2 and 3. Due to the presence
of heteroscedasticity in the income variable, a third-degree polynomial
in household income variable is included in all four equations. The
model generally conforms to prior expectations. With collinearity problems
minimized, the MLE gives interesting results that are robust to minor
changes in specification.
The prediction success rate is high at around 90 per cent for the probit
equation in all equations. Although the probit results are not shown in the
tables, relatively insignificant effects are recorded for all variables on the
probability of being a fuelwood purchaser (or collector).
As shown in tables 2 and 3, respectively, fuelwood collection time has a
negative effect on the amount of fuelwood collected (with instrumentation)
and a positive effect on labour input to fuelwood collection. Both effects are
significant. As forest resources become increasingly scarce, CO and CAP
households react by reducing the amount collected. A 1 per cent increase
in time to collect one kg of fuelwood results in a 0.05 per cent decline in the
amount of fuelwood collected, thus revealing price inelasticity. A similar
effect was found for consumption, which suggests that households are not
responding to economic scarcity by purchasing more fuelwood from the
market. This estimate is lower than those observed by Amacher et al. (1993)
and Heltberg et al. (2000).20 Mekonnen (1999), using demand shadow price
rather than collection time, obtained a less inelastic result in the more arid
uplands of Ethiopia. A 1 per cent increase in collection time also leads to
0.04 per cent increase in labour input to fuelwood collection, a result that is
consistent with those found, for example, by Kumar and Hotchkiss (1988)
and Cooke (1998a,b). Thus, households respond to economic scarcity, as
measured by collection time, by reducing energy consumption just slightly
more than by increasing labour input to collection and, hence, household
expenditures.21 In general, CO and CAP households appear to be less
responsive to changes in shadow prices than to changes in other variables
such as household size or the availability of forest stock.
On the basis of a limited sample of PO and CAP households, i.e. with
relatively few degrees of freedom, increasing market prices seems to have
positive though insignificant impacts on the amount of fuelwood collected
(table 2), labour input to collection and dung collection (table 3). As market
19 Since CAP households are included in both demand estimates, this could lead
to error correlation across equations. Seemingly, unrelated regression estimation
(SUR) techniques could be applied to resolve this problem (see Greene, 1993).
20 Our results are also consistent with other Asian estimates, e.g. Lind-Rahr (2003)
and Pattanayak et al. (2004).
21 Without instrumentation, households respond to economic scarcity by increasing
labour input to fuelwood collection more than by reducing energy consumption.
However, the difference is also negligible. Demand remains comparably inelastic.
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prices rise, however, households seem to respond by reducing overall
fuelwood consumption more than by increasing fuelwood collection. These
directions of effect for market prices on fuelwood demand are consistent
with those found by Acharya and Barbier (2002) in their study of water
demand in Nigeria. Similar to households in Nepal (Amacher et al., 1996),
fuelwood market participants may be more price responsive than non-
participants.
With respect to dung consumption, in table 3 the effect of collection time
is positive but insignificant. This suggests that households do not respond
to scarcity by switching directly from fuelwood to dung collection. These
results are consistent with those obtained by Kumar and Hotchkiss (1988),
Amacher et al. (1993), and Heltberg et al. (2000). Our elasticity estimate, 0.02,
is smaller than that of Heltberg et al. (2000), a result they also found to be
insignificant.22
Cattle ownership is found to significantly increase dung collection for
CO and CAP households. As expected, owning cows leads to the increased
availability of dung both for energy and as an agricultural input. Evidence
for dung being used as an energy source can be seen with the negative
and significant impact of cattle ownership both on fuelwood collection and
consumption in table 2. Cattle ownership appears to be a better proxy of
dung price than of household capital at least when considering the CO
and CAP households. This result, while very inelastic, seems to imply
that dung is used to a limited extent as an energy substitute for fuelwood
instead of as an input to agriculture. Data on agricultural inputs would be
required to substantiate this, however. Cattle ownership has a positive albeit
insignificant impact on labour input to fuelwood collection. Households
with larger herds may spend more time in grazing areas, which often
doubles-up as time for collecting fuelwood as well.
Availability of forest stock, measured as the ratio of population to forest
biomass, is found to have a positive and significant effect on dung collection,
while having a negative and significant effect on labour input to fuelwood
collection (for CO and CAP households). In other words, the greater
(smaller) the number of people relative to available biomass, the more
(less) dung that is collected and the smaller (greater) the labour input to
fuelwood collection (see table 3). Thus, a 1 per cent increase in the ratio
of people to forest stock leads to a 0.82 per cent increase in dung collected
(equal to approximately 80 kg) and a 0.23 per cent decline in labour input
to fuelwood collection (equal to 40 hours). These estimates, while having
similar signs, are inelastic compared to those observed in Heltberg et al.
(2000). Moreover, Mekonnen (1999) finds that Ethiopian households do not
use less dung when forest biomass is more available due to complementarity
between dung and fuelwood for cooking particular local dishes. Similar to
Heltberg et al. (2000), the effects of forest stock availability on fuelwood
collection are also significant for CO and CAP households, i.e. the greater
the ratio of people to available biomass, the less fuelwood that is collected.
22 Note that this result is for the consumption of all private fuels (crop residues,
dung, etc.), and not just for dung alone.
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Overall consumption also seems to decline with declining availability of
forest stock.
Taken together, these results provide limited evidence for substitution
between dung and fuelwood. With increasing scarcity, poor rural house-
holds usually have relatively few alternatives available to them (Cooke et al.,
2008). Rearing cattle may require substantial investment, suitable grazing
areas, as well as specialized knowledge. For poorer households residing in
densely populated areas with relatively little pastoral knowledge, substitut-
ing between fuelwood and dung may not be a feasible option. Households
in arid areas such as Oshana, where a pastoralist culture is long established
and where forest stocks have long been low, increasing dung collection
would be a rational response to physical scarcity. Note, however, that cattle
grazing also leads to the degradation of forest resources and, hence, physical
scarcity, which in turn may affect the household response to scarcity.
Size of household has a positive and significant impact both on fuelwood
collection and consumption. A weaker though still positive effect is
observed for dung collection when considering CO and CAP households.
These results show that larger households have higher energy demands.
Household size has a positive though insignificant effect on labour input
to fuelwood collection, in contrast to Heltberg et al. (2000) who found a
significant result.
The other independent variables listed in tables 2 and 3 generally have
weaker effects on the dependent variables. In particular, household incomes
and years of education (a proxy for off-farm labour opportunities) appear to
have little impact on household behaviour. The exception is that increasing
income in PO and CAP households has a negative and highly elastic impact
on dung consumption. The directions of effect are as anticipated for dung
collection and labour input to fuelwood collection. Small negative income
effects on fuelwood production should be contrasted with positive effects
on overall consumption, which suggests that fuelwood purchases may be
making up the difference as incomes rise. Mekonnen (1999) found a similar
albeit significant result for income effects on consumption in Ethiopia.
Awareness of state restrictions on the utilization of forest resources also
has little effect on fuelwood consumption or collection, although not all
the signs on the coefficients are as expected. One explanation may be that
most households know that they can harvest fuelwood with impunity in
areas where the government’s capacity to enforce its own rules may be very
weak.
In section 4, missing shadow price observations for the 28 non-fuelwood
collecting households in the sample were approximated to upper-bound
collection time data collected for other households residing in the same
villages and ecological regions.23 A sensitivity analysis is undertaken to
23 Note that there are wide disparities between the upper- and lower-price bounds
even among households in the same village. Forest resources in villages in Oshana
tend to be particularly scarce, compared to the sample as a whole. The justification
for using the upper rather than lower estimates is that the lower ones are almost
all derived from the relatively few households that have access to a private vehicle
and can travel long distances to find and gather fuelwood. As a result, collection
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test the upper-bound assumption. Data for the lower-bound estimates are
entered into the four equations. The results show that the independent
variables remained consistent in their effects on the dependent variables.
One exception is a weakening of the effect of collection time on fuelwood
collection. This is perhaps to be expected given that use of lower-bound
price estimates decreases the measure of economic scarcity.
6. Conclusions and policy implications
A household model for domestic energy supply and demand is estimated
using primary data originally collected in the NCR of Namibia for the
development of its forest resource accounts. As described in section 2,
the population of the NCR relies on forests for its energy needs and
shelter as well as providing shelter and grazing for livestock. Our findings
for northern Namibia are also relevant for people residing on semi-arid,
communal lands throughout southern Africa where fuelwood demand
continues to rise (FAO, 2007).
Despite the limitations of the survey data, the results of the empirical
analysis presented in section 5 broadly support the predictions made in
sections 3 and 4. In line with previous studies, including those undertaken in
South Asia, many of the key estimated elasticities are very low. As fuelwood
is a basic necessity, perhaps only the poorest households should be expected
to be particularly responsive to fuelwood (economic) scarcity (Hyde and
Ko¨hlin, 2000). We find that Namibian households respond to increasing
economic scarcity by reducing fuelwood consumption just slightly more
than by increasing labour input to collection, although the difference is
negligible. The inelasticity of fuelwood demand, however, suggests limited
scope for demand-side policy interventions (Cooke et al., 2008).
The response to economic scarcity in our sample is underlined by the
relative abundance of forest resources in three out of four sub-regions, as
revealed by the resource accounts. Nevertheless, increasing ratios of people
to biomass, i.e. decreasing availability of forest resources, in these areas
negatively impacts on the amounts of fuelwood collected and consumed,
and labour input to collection. Thus, rising populations may impact on
fuelwood demand even in areas where current rates of extraction are far
below physically suitable annual yields. Given relative forest abundance in
many areas, policies to encourage population dispersal may improve forest
stock availability for fuelwood-dependent households without necessarily
leading to over-harvesting.
There is limited evidence for substitution between fuelwood and dung.
The inelasticity of fuelwood demand suggests that there are few genuinely
close substitutes available. Using cattle dung as an energy source instead of
fuelwood only appears to be a serious option where cattle herding is already
a way of life, which can be passed on from generation to generation, and
where there is acute physical forest scarcity, i.e. in Oshana. Adoption of
times for these households are among the lowest in the entire sample and, hence,
are not representative of most households. It is for this reason that the fuelwood
prices for non-collecting households have been approximated to the upper bound
estimates.
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cattle herding by households on a wider scale is likely to be very difficult
given costs and a lack of grazing lands in densely populated areas.
Policy intervention could also focus on purchased fuelwood markets.
Our analysis shows that making a distinction between collecting and
purchasing households is important. Small sample size means that we
should, however, interpret our results with caution. Should these hold
in a larger sample of market participants, we may find that households
are generally more price responsive than non-participating households.
This in turn might give more leeway with regards to demand-side policy
interventions. Improving market participation, for example, by reducing
transaction costs or supporting prices and regulating local markets may
enable better control of the local commons while improving welfare in
households with higher opportunity costs.
Given the importance of the role of women and children in collecting
fuelwood in many parts of Africa, one key weakness of our study is the lack
of distinction among household members and how fuelwood collection is
allocated. We would certainly expect some differences in opportunity cost of
time among men, women, and children. A follow-up survey would benefit
from making such a distinction, along with data collected on local resource
management, market access, and household landholdings.
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Economic Efficiency and Incentives for Change
within Namibia’s Community Wildlife Use Initiatives
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Summary. — Five community wildlife conservation and utilization initiatives, or conservancies,
on communal land in Namibia were appraised to determine economic and financial worth.
Conservancies are economically efficient and able to contribute positively to national income and
the development process. They also provide a channel for the capture of international donor grants
(wildlife non-use values) as income, and generate attractive financial returns for communities.
Donor grants are very important catalysts in promoting land use change in conservancies. Ability
to generate income from tourism is important. Flexibility and adaptability in design are key factors,
ensuring effective rural development and conservation.  2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights
reserved.
Key words — Africa, Namibia, community, wildlife, economics, incentives
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, five community wildlife con-
servation and utilization initiatives, on com-
munal land in Namibia, have been analyzed to
determine their financial profitability, and their
economic efficiency. The degree to which these
community projects can contribute positively
to the national income, and thereby to the
economic development process, is central to the
study. Also investigated was the degree to which
the initiatives provide private returns to project
investment, as well as to investments made by
communities.
Namibia has adopted policy and legislation
to allow community-based natural resource
management (CBNRM) 1 on communal land.
Much of the initial focus of CBNRM has been
on wildlife, which is threatened with displace-
ment by growing rural human populations and
illegal use. The approach devolves rights over
wildlife to local communities and aims to make
wildlife conservation part of the rural devel-
opment process. In this context, CBNRM ini-
tiatives must be financially attractive for the
community, economically efficient for the
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country, and reasonably financially viable for
donors and the government. Without these
incentives, they will not be sustainable, and will
not result in development or conservation.
(a) The setting
Namibia is a large country (830,000 km2)
straddling the Tropic of Capricorn on the west
coast of southern Africa. It is very dry, and
climate ranges from semi arid in the northeast
to extremely arid on the west coast. Vegetation
ranges from savanna woodland in the north-
east, through savanna to desert in the west and
south. Rain-fed crop production is limited to
very small parts of the north and northeast.
Most land in the country is only suitable for
extensive grazing by livestock or wildlife, and
rangeland carrying capacities are low. Perma-
nent surface water is restricted to a few rivers
on the northern, north eastern and southern
borders.
The human population of the country, at 1.7
million, is small, with 30% living in urban
centers. The rural economy has two different
tenure systems. Forty-three percent of the
country, mostly in the drier parts, contains
private, medium scale, commercial ranches.
Forty-five percent, mostly in the less dry
north, is communal land. Communal land is
state-owned, but occupied by rural tribal
communities—most of the country’s popula-
tion. Communities practice traditional systems
of pastoralism in the south and west, and agro-
pastoralism in the north and northeast, but
their access to markets and infrastructure is
poor. In the northeast, among San communi-
ties, some sedentary hunting and gathering is
practiced.
Wildlife resources of high importance for
tourism occur in less densely settled north
western and north eastern communal lands.
Elephant (Loxodonta africana), buffalo
(Syncerus caffer), hippopotamus (Hippopota-
mus amphibius), sable (Hippotragus niger), roan
(Hippotragus equinus), lechwe (Kobus leche),
sitatunga (Tragelaphus spekei), lion (Panthera
leo), leopard (Panthera pardus) and wild dog
(Lycaeon pictus) are of conservation impor-
tance in the northeast. In the northwest, desert-
adapted wildlife species such as elephant, black
rhinoceros (Diceros bicornis), mountain zebra
(Equus zebra), springbok (Antidorcas marsupi-
alis), kudu (Tragelphus strepsiseros), and oryx
(Oryx gazella) occur. Attractive scenery, en-
hancing tourism value, exists in both places.
Communities were historically not permitted
to use these wildlife resources, and were effec-
tively alienated from them. The tendency was
for expanding traditional land uses to displace
wildlife, and poaching was fairly common. In
the 1980s, local nongovernment organizations
(NGOs) initiated donor-funded community
game guard programs, giving some communi-
ties a sense of ‘‘ownership’’ over their wildlife.
(b) CBNRM in Namibia
In the late 1960s, Namibia granted private
landholders custodial rights to manage and use
wildlife on their land (Joubert, 1974). The in-
centives associated with this have resulted in
increased wildlife stocks on this land (Barnes &
de Jager, 1996). In 1996, a legislative amend-
ment granted similar custodial rights over wild-
life to communities on communal land (Corbett
& Jones, 2000; Jones, 1995; Jones & Murphree,
2001). This change, part of a national CBNRM
program, made it possible for communities to
form ‘‘conservancies,’’ register these, and thus
acquire, from the state, partial rights to com-
mon property management and use of wild-
life in defined areas. By 2001, 14 conservancies
had been registered, and some 20 more were
in the process of being developed. About five
conservancies had drawn up plans for the use
and management of their natural resources,
mainly wildlife.
The CBNRM program is loosely coordinated
from within government and local NGOs, by
the Namibia Association of CBNRM Support
Organizations (NACSO). Communities are as-
sisted by the local NGOs, donor-funded pro-
jects, and a government-backed policy and
legislative framework. Funding for this assis-
tance comes mainly from international donors.
It takes the form of grants to pay for technical
assistance, local NGO facilitation and training
activities, and some conservancy recurrent and
capital requirements. Since the 1980s commu-
nities interested in CBNRM have benefited to
varying degrees from donor funds, initially,
mainly to employ community members in
wildlife protection (community game guards),
but also to provide facilitation and training, as
well as, lately, capital investments. One aim of
CBNRM is for donor inputs to conservancies
to be gradually replaced by income from nat-
ural resource use, leaving communities self-
sufficient. To some extent this has happened,
but so far no conservancies are entirely self-
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sufficient financially, and many receive a sig-
nificant proportion of their income from do-
nors.
The potential for income generation from
natural resources in conservancies is dominated
by nonconsumptive tourism (Barnes, 1995a,b),
partly through community-owned and run ac-
tivities (mostly campsites), and partly through
joint ventures between communities and pri-
vate sector investors (lodges and camps). A
second important source of income is safari
hunting tourism, also involving joint-venture
arrangements. Other, less significant and more
localized income sources include thatch-grass
harvesting, fishing, pole and fuel-wood har-
vesting, cultural services (traditional villages
and shows), crafts production, game meat har-
vesting and live game sale. Communities bear
costs associated with wildlife in the form of
damage to crops in agro-pastoral areas and to
water points in the drier pastoral areas. Such
costs, as estimated from limited empirical re-
search, are documented by Barnes (1995b).
They generally amount to less than 5% of wild-
life use values. This is a relatively low value, in
the broader African context, and it appears to
be due to the low productivity of the land for
agriculture and livestock, as well as the rela-
tively low human population densities.
CBNRM (or ICDP or CWM) interventions
are based on the contention that if communities
are allowed to benefit directly from the use of
natural resources, then they will have an in-
centive to invest in and conserve these resources
(Barbier, 1992; Callihan & Stuart-Hill, 2000;
Child, 1993; Emerton, 2001; Lewis, Kaweche,
& Mwenya, 1990; Roe, 2001). Many conser-
vation programs in developing countries now
include CBNRM strategies, and they are widely
seen as essential for wildlife conservation, par-
ticularly outside protected areas. Some work-
ers, such as Gibson and Marks (1995), Barrett
and Arcese (1995), Sullivan (1998), and Infield
(2001), consider that CBNRM, as practiced in
Africa, is inadequate as a conservation and/or
development strategy. Problems listed include
inappropriate incentive structures, inappropri-
ate distribution of benefits, lack of suitably
democratic institutions, intracommunity con-
flicts, excessive reliance on consumptive wildlife
use, excessive reliance on financial benefits from
natural resource use, and others. In the case of
Namibia’s CBNRM program, most of these
problems appear to be applicable only excep-
tionally, or not at all. Design of CBNRM in
Namibia has involved care to try and ensure
that scale, institutional structures, combina-
tions of resource uses involved, and combina-
tions of economic values captured, are flexible
and appropriate to the specific setting.
One unresolved question, however, is a
common assertion or suspicion that material
benefits, resulting from tourism and con-
sumptive wildlife use in CBNRM, are inade-
quate to compensate communities for all the
costs of investing in wildlife (Barrett & Arcese,
1995; Infield, 2001). Apart from a few studies
(Barnes, 1995c; Barnes, Cannon, & Morrison,
2000; Bond, 2001; Jansen, 1990), no rigorous
analysis has been done of the financial and/or
economic merits of CBNRM as a development
strategy. Most discussion about this has had to
be conjectural. Our study directly addresses this
question, in the context of Namibia.
2. METHODS
Five conservancies were selected as being
well enough established, and having well
enough developed management plans to allow
financial and economic appraisal to be carried
out. These were examined as investments, in
terms of their value to the community, to the
project proponents (financial analysis), and
in terms of their value to Namibian society
(economic analysis). The analyses are thus
primarily appraisals of conservancy develop-
ment plans and projected incomes, rather than
ex post evaluations of past conservancy perfor-
mance. But, most of the five conservancies
studied have been in the process of develop-
ment for several years, and the models devel-
oped, reflect actual events for these early years.
The analysis needs to be seen in the context
of ‘‘total economic value’’ of the wildlife and
natural resources, as described by Pearce and
Turner (1990) and Emerton (2001). Total eco-
nomic value embraces direct use, indirect use,
and non-use (option, bequest and existence)
values associated with natural resources. Direct
use values are derived from actual utilization of
the resource. They contribute tangible value in
the form of income, and make up the main
component of formal economic growth, which
is the focus of national development efforts.
Indirect use values are derived from ecologi-
cal or social function (such as erosion pro-
tection, waste assimilation, political stability,
etc.). Option values reflect the values perceived
in retaining the option to use the resource
in the future. Bequest values reflect the value
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perceived in preserving or retaining the re-
source for others in the future, and existence
values reflect the value perceived in retaining
the mere existence of the resource.
The focus of this analysis was on direct use
values and here we measured the income de-
rived from actual use of natural resources in
Namibia. No significant indirect use values
were identified and they were not specifically
considered. Non-use values were considered,
but only as manifested in donor contributions
aimed at conserving wildlife in conservancies,
as they benefit communities. An example of
non-use value would be the income derived
through conservancy game guard wages, where
these are funded from donors.
As pointed out by Emerton (2001), Adams
and Infield (2001), Hulme and Infield (2001),
costs associated with wildlife include invest-
ments in protection, costs of damage caused by
wildlife, and land use opportunity costs. Our
analysis focuses on the value of the conservancy
as an investment. We developed individual
models where the project boundary embraced
only the specific conservancy, and the costs and
benefits directly associated with it. We did not
include land opportunity costs, central govern-
ment investment costs, or benefits associated
with forward and backward linkages. These
would all be part of broader analyses, for ex-
ample, of a national CBNRM program, or a
national wildlife investment program. But the
broader context is discussed in relation to some
findings from elsewhere, in Botswana and Na-
mibia. The latter findings suggest that, in most
Namibian conservancies, the economic oppor-
tunity costs associated with land are low.
(a) Financial and economic models
Detailed static and dynamic, budget and
cost–benefit spreadsheet models were devel-
oped for specific resource use activities within
conservancies, and then, making use of these
results, for each conservancy as a whole. The
benefits of natural resource use were measured,
in a cost–benefit framework, against the costs
of investing in and undertaking the activity.
The project boundary in the conservancy ana-
lysis embraced community activities and in-
vestment. Thus, where joint ventures between
communities and the private sector were in-
volved, only the net benefits accruing to the
community from the venture were included in
the model.
The models were based on empirical data,
gleaned through interviews with wildlife use
enterprises and conservancies, through exam-
ination of financial data from conservancy
operations, and from management plans for
conservancies. The data were collected during
1998–2000, and financial values in models were
inflated to 2000 prices. The wildlife use and
conservancy models measured financial profit-
ability (annual net income, financial rate of
return, financial net present value) from the
point of view of the user or investor. They also
measured economic efficiency (annual contri-
bution to gross and net national income, eco-
nomic rate of return, economic net present
value), all in economic (or shadow) prices, from
the point of view of Namibian society. The
conservancy models measured financial profit-
ability from both the community and project
perspectives.
Static budget models measured annual fi-
nancial returns at full production after deduc-
tion of all capital and recurrent financial costs
including interest and amortization. The dy-
namic cost–benefit models measured financial
and economic returns over five- and 10-year
investment periods. Here, interest and inflation
were excluded from all calculations. Cost and
benefit flows were in constant prices and dis-
counted over time to reflect the time value of
money. A real discount rate of 8% was used for
both financial and economic models. All capital
expenditures were included and depreciation
(or appreciation) was accounted for in the re-
sidual value of assets in the final year of ana-
lysis.
Important economic measures from the static
budget models are gross and net national in-
come (GNI and NNI), as defined by Gittinger
(1982). These are the returns in gross and net
value added to factors of production owned by
Namibian nationals. NNI is GNI minus annual
capital asset depreciation. In economic analysis
the economic cost, or benefit, to society, of
using or producing a resource is taken to be
its opportunity cost (the value of its best al-
ternative use). The data are based on finan-
cial transactions, but where financial prices
differ significantly from opportunity cost, then
shadow pricing is applied. Our GNI and NNI
measures thus gauge economic efficiency, unlike
the statistical measures of national income,
presented in national accounts.
Shadow pricing, aimed at ensuring that values
applied to inputs and outputs reflect their op-
portunity cost or real scarcity in society (rather
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than simply market prices), was applied in the
economic analyses. Standard criteria for sha-
dow pricing in Namibia are not available, so pre-
liminary ones, developed by Barnes (1994),
were used. These were largely modified from
standardized ones used in the past in Botswana
(Matambo, 1988; Ministry of Finance & Deve-
lopment Planning, 1986), South Africa (CEAS,
1989), and the World Bank (Gittinger, 1982).
Namibia’s economy has been relatively open
in recent years, with few price distortions, and
in many cases market prices fairly reflect
opportunity cost. Shadow pricing adjustments
were limited to the following. Domestic trans-
fers such as taxes, and subsidies, were elimi-
nated as costs or benefits. Taxes included sales
tax, license and permit fees. Subsidies included
those from government for live game stocking.
All conservancies benefited from grants to as-
sist with capital and recurrent inputs, provided
by donors from outside the country. These
grants, however, were considered convertible
to other applications outside conservancies,
within Namibia, and to thus have opportunity
costs. They were treated not as subsidies but as
costs in the economic analysis.
The models included a detailed stock pro-
jection over the investment period, depict-
ing the anticipated growth, or not, of wildlife
stocks by species. This incorporated the initial
wildlife populations determined from aerial
census, the natural growth potential of each
species, any purchase/acquisition of stock, any
natural immigration of stock, and off-takes.
Natural growth potential for each species was
calculated using the method of Craig and
Lawson (1990) and Spinage (FGU-Kronberg,
1987). This was based on the formula 0:4rm,
where rm is the intrinsic rate of increase of the
population, and a function of the body weight
of the species concerned. Wildlife bio-mass was
measured as large stock unit equivalents (LSU),
the metabolic equivalent of a 450 kg ox, using
the conversion ratios of Meissner (1982). Apart
from the financial value of some purchases
(subsidized), and some natural immigration
from neighboring Botswana (no cost), the value
of the stock was made at opportunity cost. In
the economic model and the project financial
models, the residual value of wildlife stocks in
the conservancy, was included within residual
assets. In the case of community financial
analysis these stocks were not included in re-
sidual value (as communities would not be able
to recover this stock value at the end of the
period).
A general shadow price for unskilled and
semi-skilled labor of 0.35 of the market price
was applied in the economic models to reflect
general unemployment and social pressure for
higher wages. A foreign exchange premium of
6% was added to the prices of all tradable
items in the economic models, to account for
general excess demand for traded and tradable
goods and services. In the economic models,
inflows from, and outflows to, non-nationals
were treated as benefits and costs, respectively.
This ensured measurement of national income.
All economic models included an opportunity
cost of capital of 8%, but, as explained above,
land opportunity costs were excluded. This al-
lowed direct comparison between model re-
sults regarding returns to land. Economic
models also did not include national expendi-
tures made by central government in the wild-
life or agricultural sectors. Excluded were
benefits accruing to private joint-venture part-
ners in the conservancy, or to service providers
or producers outside the conservancy. Cost of
damage caused by wildlife was included, mainly
through inclusion of the costs of mitigating
damage. Mitigation costs are used as proxy for
damage costs, and thus represent damage costs
averted.
All models were tested through sensitivity
analysis, by varying key assumptions to deter-
mine how robust they were, and the strength of
conclusions that can be drawn from the results.
The extent to which financial returns differed
from the economic ones was used to provide a
measure of the influence of policy and/or mar-
ket imperfections, as described by Jansen,
Bond, and Child (1992).
Where values are given in this paper they are
in Namibia dollars (N$). At the time of the
analysis, in 2000, N$1.00 was equal to US$0.14.
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
(a) Conservancy profiles
Table 1 shows some of the features of the
five conservancies analyzed. They range from
near desert conditions in the northwest (Torra,
¼ /Khoadi //Ho^as), via the northern Kalahari
(Nyae Nyae), to semi-arid woodlands/flood-
plain habitats in the northeast (Mayuni, Sal-
ambala). They vary greatly in extent from
almost a million hectares in Nyae Nyae, where
nonwildlife land uses are relatively unimportant
to 28 000 ha in Mayuni 2 where half the land
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is used for fairly intensive agro-pastoralism.
Some conservancies possess naturally intact
wildlife resources combined with attractive
scenery, on at least part of their land (Torra,
Mayuni), while in others wildlife resources are
depleted and require restocking or investment
(Salambala, Nyae Nyae).
In the northwest (Torra, ¼ /Khoadi //Ho^as,
occupied by Damara communities) the tradi-
tional land use is pastoralism, that in the
northern Kalahari (Nyae Nyae, occupied by
San communities) is hunting and gathering
with low-intensity pastoralism, and that in
northeast (Mayuni, Salambala, occupied by
Mafwe and Masubia communities) is agro-
pastoralism. Mayuni is unusual among the
five in that it embraces part of a protected area.
¼ /Khoadi //Ho^as is unusual in being permit-
ted, by the veterinary authorities, to capture
and sell live game animals. The number of
households associated with conservancies vary
from 120 in Torra to 1200 in Salambala.
(b) Financial and economic values
The results of the conservancy valuation are
summarized in Table 2. These values give
comparisons of the project investment, project
income, community income, and the economic
value of the conservancy investment. The eco-
nomic values tell us whether the initiative con-
tributes positively to national development or
not. In all cases the conservancies do, with
positive annual contributions to gross and
net national income, positive net present
values, and favorable internal rates of return
(all significantly higher than the 8% cut-off
rate). For comparative purposes it is useful to
separate the conservancies ecologically into
those in semi-desert sites (Torra and ¼ /Khoadi
//Ho^as), those in the mesic northeast (Mayuni
and Salambala), and that in an intermedi-
ate setting (Nyae Nyae). Land use is gener-
ally much less intensive in the semi-desert of
the northwest, and relatively more intensive
in the woodlands and floodplains of the north-
east.
The Torra and Mayuni conservancies stand
out as having the most favorable returns, both
within their own ecological setting and overall.
It is notable that Mayuni, which has access to a
dry-season wildlife concentration area with
prime tourism potential, has particularly high
net benefits per unit of land. The Nyae Nyae
and Salambala conservancies are relatively in-
efficient economically, with lower rates of re-
turn and lower net contributions per unit of
land. The ¼ /Khoadi //Ho^as, conservancy is
intermediate in terms of economic value. The
differences tend to reflect the balance between
the annual net benefits and the capital gains
generated by the conservancy. Torra and
Mayuni show relatively high annual contribu-
tions to national income as well as some overall
gains in wildlife stocks. Nyae Nyae and Sal-
ambala have low annual net contributions to
income, and rely more on net gains in wildlife
Table 1. Comparative physical characteristics of the five Namibian conservancies in 2000
Characteristics Conservancy
Torra ¼ /Khoadi
//Ho^as
Nyae
Nyae
Mayuni Salambala
Land area (ha) 352,200 386,000 900,095 28,400 93,000
Corea wildlife area (ha) 108,586 177,650 900,095 13,300 11,000
Households (no.) 120 700 700 450 1,200
Mean annual rainfall (mm) 90 150 450 600 650
Rangeland carrying capacity (ha Per LSU equivalent) 30 25 15 12 12
Starting wildlife densityb (ha Per LSU equivalent) 427 160 464 43 3,875
Expected wildlife densityb in year 10 (ha Per LSU
equivalent)
257 119 251 29 85
Non-consumptive tourism potential High Mod high Mod low High Mod low
Safari hunting tourism potential Mod high Mod Mod high Low Mod
Consumptive wildlife use potential Low Low Low Low Low
Other natural resource use potential Low Low Mod low Mod Mod
Livestock keeping potential Very low Very low Mod Mod Mod
aCore areas, allocated primarily to wildlife (rest of land shared between wildlife and livestock).
bDensity calculated for the total land area.
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stocks. Both these two conservancies also re-
quired significant capital investments in devel-
opment of these stocks.
The community financial values tell us to
what extent the communities have an incentive
to invest in the initiative. In all cases the com-
munities can derive very favorable returns on
their investments (Table 2). The Torra and
Mayuni conservancies are able to earn the most
cash income and dividends per household,
while the Mayuni, ¼ /Khoadi //Ho^as and Torra
conservancies, all show very high financial rates
of return. The Nyae Nyae and Salambala con-
servancies provide the least attractive returns
for communities. The dominant feature of the
community analysis is the fact that donors, and
not the communities, bear many of the initial
capital and recurrent input costs. All conser-
vancies benefit from donor assistance in this
way. Another feature of the community ana-
lysis is that it does not incorporate the accu-
mulation of wealth in conservancy wildlife
stocks.
The project financial values reflect the returns
to the project investor, i.e., the donors, gov-
ernment and community, viewed as one en-
tity. They provide an indication of the broader
financial viability of the initiative. Here, all
donor contributions are costs, and so are
household dividend payments, but increase
in the value of wildlife stocks is included as a
benefit. Project investors do not, themselves,
require large positive returns but seek only to
ensure that they do not incur losses, which
would require subsidization. As seen in Table 2,
the project returns are moderate but generally
positive and acceptable.
(c) Sensitivity analysis
The degree to which the values measured in
the financial and economic analyses are robust
Table 2. Base case financial and economic values for the five Namibian conservancies in 2000 (N$)
Value Conservancy
Torra ¼ /Khoadi //Ho^as Nyae Nyae Mayuni Salambala
Project financial values
Initial capital investment 1,190,432 868,586 3,522,521 770,778 1,418,610
Capital investment per ha 3.4 2.3 3.9 27 15
Capital investment per household 9,920 1,241 5,032 1,713 1,182
Annual net cash income 95,300 69,400 )267,100 333,100 133,800
Financial rate of return 16% 19% 15% 8% 8%
Financial net present valuea 860,800 1,428,500 2,377,400 0 0
Community financial values
Annual community cash incomeb 406,544 418,556 204,673 732,704 426,058
Cash income per household 3,388 598 292 1,628 355
Cash income per ha 1.2 1.1 0.2 26 4.6
Financial rate of return 133% 205% 23% 220% 40%
Financial net present valuea 2,133,200 3,350,000 1,364,400 3,696,300 1,347,900
Annual community dividendsc 228,000 207,900 114,400 225,000 168,700
Dividends per household 1,900 297 163 500 141
Economic values
Annual gross value addedd 557,600 503,800 501,600 860,200 525,800
Annual net value addede 487,611 459,551 278,621 820,816 455,368
Net value added per ha 1.4 1.2 0.3 29 4.9
Economic rate of return 131% 66% 22% 126% 31%
Economic net present valuea 3,662,300 4,010,100 4,114,900 4,059,000 2,587,800
Number of jobs createdf 8 12 26 22 12
Economic capital cost per job 138,394 67,257 177,955 32,025 127,285
aMeasured over 10 years at 8% discount.
b Includes salaries and wages for conservancy employment, net cash income, and dividends.
cAnnual surplus extracted for distribution to households.
dGross value added to national income at opportunity cost (economic prices).
eGross value added minus asset depreciation.
f Permanent formal employment opportunities from conservancy operations, excluding jobs created within revenue
sharing and joint-venture tourism operations.
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in the face of changes in model parameters was
tested using sensitivity analysis. This provides
an indication of the validity of the conclusions
drawn from the results, as well as more infor-
mation on the characteristics of the invest-
ments.
Table 3 provides some results of sensitivity
analysis of the Nyae Nyae conservancy model.
Variation in capital expenditure, tourism de-
velopment, wildlife stock densities and stock
off-take rates were tested, as well as the in-
clusion or not of live game sales and stock
purchase/acquisition. The economic viability is
only weakly affected by significant changes in
capital investments. It is also only moderately
affected by the changes in wildlife densities
and tourism investments, the two of which are
closely linked. Replacement of subsistence
hunting with live game sale (assuming relax-
ation of veterinary restrictions) would only
slightly enhance the economic value. But, an
increase in wildlife off-take intensity, to that
approaching the maximum sustainable level,
would halt herd growth, reduce the potential
for tourism development, and reduce the eco-
nomic value of the investment. This finding
confirms the need for enhancement of wildlife
stocks in the conservancy, but enhancement of
these stocks through acquisition from within
Namibia reduces the economic viability of the
Table 3. The effects of change in some base case parameters on internal rates of return in the Nyae Nyae conservancy
financial and economic model in Namibia, 2000
Internal rate of return
Economic (%) Financial (project) (%) Financial (community) (%)
Capital expenditure
50% of base case 36 25 51
75% of base case 27 19 33
Base case 22 15 23
125% of base case 18 12 16
150% of base case 15 10 11
Tourism developmenta
No lodges, 2 campsites 11 8 0
1 lodge, 2 campsites 16 11 12
2 lodges, 3 campsites (base case) 22 15 23
3 lodges, 4 campsites 28 19 32
4 lodges, 5 campsites 36 24 40
Wildlife densities
50% of base case 12 6 14
75% of base case 17 11 18
Base case (251 ha/LSU) 22 15 23
125% of base case 26 19 27
150% of base case 30 22 30
Live game sale
None (base case) 22 15 23
25% of meat off-takeb 22 16 24
50% of meat off-take 23 16 25
75% of meat off-take 24 17 26
Stock acquisitionc
Base case (447 LSU) 22 15 23
Halved 29 15 22
None 36 15 22
Stock off-take intensity
Half growth potential (base case) 22 15 23
Maximum-reduced tourismd 13 7 14
aDifferent scenarios of tourism development.
b Live game capture and sale replaces 25% of subsistence hunting off-take.
c Purchase of wildlife stock for release in conservancy.
d Initial wildlife stock densities maintained through maximum off-take (tourism growth reduced).
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conservancy. These acquisitions carry oppor-
tunity costs, which are not sufficiently offset by
increased tourism and stock enhancement
benefits. The benefits of restocking efforts are
likely to have wider and longer term impacts,
outside the framework of the specific conser-
vancy analysis and will be reflected through
stock enhancement in the neighboring pro-
tected and communal areas.
The effect of sensitivity analysis on project
financial returns shows patterns similar to those
for the economic returns. One difference con-
cerns stock acquisition, which does not reduce
the project or community financial values, as it
did with the economic value. This is because
stock acquisition is generally heavily subsi-
dized. The findings in Table 3 show that com-
munity incentives (community rates of return)
are moderately affected by variation in capital
expenditure. Community incentives are also
moderately affected by loss of income earning
possibilities caused by low wildlife densities and
resultant loss of tourism potential.
Tables 4–6 show some sensitivity analysis
results for all the five conservancies. The effects,
on economic net value added and community
income, of changes in capital costs, and tourism
income, as well as inclusion, or not, of con-
sumptive wildlife uses, are shown. Table 4 de-
picts results for Torra and ¼ /Khoadi //Ho^as.
Both measures, in both conservancies, are
weakly sensitive to changes in capital expendi-
tures. Changes in income from both non-con-
sumptive and consumptive tourism, have a
moderate effect on the economic and commu-
nity values, with the Torra model being a lit-
tle more sensitive than the ¼ /Khoadi //Ho^as
one. The ¼ /Khoadi //Ho^as values are highly
sensitive to the elimination of consumptive
wildlife uses, while those of Torra are almost
Table 4. The effects of change in some base case parameters on net value added and community income in the financial
and economic models for the Torra and ¼ /Khoadi //Ho^as conservancies in Namibia, 2000
Torra
Tourism incomea (variation) 50% 75% Base case 125% 150%
Net value added per ha 0.41 0.90 1.38 1.87 2.36
Community cash income per ha 0.35 0.75 1.15 1.56 1.96
Capital costs (variation) 50% 75% Base case 125% 150%
Net value added per ha 1.63 1.51 1.38 1.26 1.14
Community cash income per ha 1.36 1.26 1.15 1.05 0.95
Meat and live gameb (inclusion) Yesd No
Net value added per ha 1.38 1.06
Community cash income per ha 1.15 0.88
Consumptive wildlife usec (inclusion) Yesd No
Net value added per ha 1.38 0.83
Community cash income per ha 1.15 0.69
¼ /Khoadi //Ho^as
Tourism incomea (variation) 50% 75% Base case 125% 150%
Net value added per ha 0.78 0.89 1.19 1.49 1.79
Community cash income per ha 0.74 0.83 1.08 1.83 1.58
Capital costs (variation) 50% 75% Base case 125% 150%
Net value added per ha 1.34 1.27 1.19 1.11 1.04
Community cash income per ha 1.22 1.15 1.08 1.02 0.95
Meat and live gameb (inclusion) Yesd No
Net value added per ha 1.19 0.44
Community cash income per ha 1.08 0.46
Consumptive wildlife usec (inclusion) Yesd No
Net value added per ha 1.19 0.14
Community cash income per ha 1.08 0.21
a Tourism here, embraces both non-consumptive tourism and safari hunting.
b Embraces all consumptive use of wildlife by communities, but excludes safari hunting.
c Embraces all consumptive use of wildlife, including safari hunting.
d Base case.
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Table 6. The effects of change in some base case parameters on net value added and community income in the financial
and economic models for the Mayuni and Salambala conservancies in Namibia, 2000
Mayuni
Tourism incomea (variation) 50% 75% Base case 125% 150%
Net value added per ha 14.43 21.66 28.90 36.13 43.37
Community cash income per ha 12.17 18.99 25.80 32.62 39.43
Capital costs (variation) 50% 75% Base case 125% 150%
Net value added per ha 30.69 29.80 28.90 28.00 27.10
Community cash income per ha 27.33 26.56 25.80 25.03 24.27
Meat and live gameb (inclusion) Yesc No
Net value added per ha 28.90 27.69
Community cash income per ha 25.80 24.66
Consumptive wildlife usec (inclusion) Yesd No
Net value added per ha 28.90 27.69
Community cash income per ha 25.80 24.66
Salambala
Tourism incomea (variation) 50% 75% Base case 125% 150%
Net value added per ha 1.27 3.08 4.90 6.71 8.52
Community cash income per ha 1.58 3.08 4.58 6.08 7.59
Capital costs (variation) 50% 75% Base case 125% 150%
Net value added per ha 5.83 5.37 4.90 4.43 3.96
Community cash income per ha 5.37 4.98 4.58 4.18 3.79
Meat and live gameb (inclusion) Yesd No
Net value added per ha 4.90 4.79
Community cash income per ha 4.58 4.49
Consumptive wildlife usec (inclusion) Yesd No
Net value added per ha 4.90 3.69
Community cash income per ha 4.58 3.58
a Tourism here, embraces both non-consumptive tourism and safari hunting.
b Embraces all consumptive use of wildlife by communities, but excludes safari hunting.
c Embraces all consumptive use of wildlife, including safari hunting.
d Base case.
Table 5. The effects of change in some base case parameters on net value added and community income in the financial
and economic models for the Nyae Nyae conservancy in Namibia, 2000
Nyae Nyae
Tourism incomea (variation) 50% 75% Base case 125% 150%
Net value added per ha )0.23 0.04 0.31 0.58 0.85
Community cash income per ha )0.28 0.03 0.23 0.48 0.74
Capital costs (variation) 50% 75% Base case 125% 150%
Net value added per ha 0.61 0.46 0.31 0.16 0.01
Community cash income per ha 0.62 0.42 0.23 0.03 )0.16
Meat and live gameb (inclusion) Yesd No
Net value added per ha 0.31 )0.19
Community cash income per ha 0.23 )0.24
Consumptive wildlife usec (inclusion) Yesd No
Net value added per ha 0.31 )0.54
Community cash income per ha 0.23 )0.58
a Tourism here, embraces both non-consumptive tourism and safari hunting.
b Embraces all consumptive use of wildlife by communities, but excludes safari hunting.
c Embraces all consumptive use of wildlife, including safari hunting.
d Base case.
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not at all. Generally these sensitivity analyses
confirm the findings in Table 2, that the Torra
investment is economically very efficient and
that of ¼ /Khoadi //Ho^as, being slightly more
vulnerable, is moderately so.
Table 5 shows results for Nyae Nyae and
here, it is clear that the economic and com-
munity returns are sensitive to capital expen-
diture changes, highly sensitive to changes in
tourism income and extremely sensitive to the
exclusion of consumptive wildlife uses. The
relative vulnerability of the returns is a reflec-
tion of the somewhat weak economic efficiency
and financial profitability noted for this con-
servancy in Table 2. Table 6 shows results for
Mayuni and Salambala. Here, the Salambala
investment shows itself to be somewhat sensi-
tive to changes in tourism income, and only
moderately sensitive to changes in capital ex-
penditures or loss of consumptive wildlife uses.
The Mayuni investment is only moderately
sensitive to changes in tourism income and very
insensitive to changes in capital costs and loss
of consumptive wildlife uses. The results con-
firm the finding in Table 2, that Mayuni is a
very attractive investment for Namibian society
and the community, while that for Salambala is
somewhat less so.
(d) Discussion
Our study has shown that conservancy in-
vestments in Namibia are economically efficient
and contribute positively to national economic
well-being. This conforms to the findings of
Barnes (1995c) and Barnes et al. (2000) for
community wildlife use initiatives in Botswana.
It refutes the speculative assertion, made by
Barrett and Arcese (1995) that wildlife use ini-
tiatives are likely to be economically unsound.
Our analysis of economic efficiency measures
only the return in national income, which re-
flects direct use value and it does not include
international donor grant contributions (which
it treats as having opportunity costs within
Namibia). This is a reflection of the fact that
the project boundary for the economic analysis
is around the individual conservancy. Without
the specific conservancy, the international do-
nor contributions would almost certainly be
spent on wildlife conservation somewhere else
in the country, and thus in the national context
they can be seen as wildlife non-use values. In
the national context, therefore, the economic
value of CBNRM initiatives is enhanced by the
inclusion of these non-use values.
Also excluded from our conservancy eco-
nomic models are the contributions to national
income made by the private component of the
joint-venture tourism operations within con-
servancies. It is debatable whether these should
be included within the conservancy project
boundary, but if so, they are significant and
would enhance the economic efficiency mea-
sures.
Our study has also shown that the financial
returns for communities from wildlife use ini-
tiatives exceed their investments. This similarly
refutes the general arguments made by Barrett
and Arcese (1995) and Infield (2001), among
others, which suggest they may not. But, the
generally highly positive returns enjoyed by
communities in Namibian conservancies come
from two sources. On one hand, they come
from utilization of wildlife in the conservancies
(mainly through joint-venture agreements in
tourism activities) and, on the other, they come
via the grants from donors, investing in the
CBNRM program. The former, are direct use
values (net benefits of wildlife use), and the
latter (as discussed above) are effectively man-
ifestations of non-use values (willingness to pay
for conservation of the wildlife resources). In as
much as both reflect true economic value, and
both flow into conservancies as a result of
conservancy development, they are both legiti-
mate forms of income for the communities.
Table 7 shows the effects of removal of donor
grants would have on the community financial
rate of return. These effects are shown with and
without the inclusion of the residual value of
wildlife stocks, which because they cannot ac-
tually realize it, is an intangible benefit for
communities. The findings suggest that receipt,
by conservancies, of donor grants significantly
enhances community returns, but that only in
the weakly viable conservancies would their
removal jeopardize community financial in-
centives to participate. In at least three or four
of the five conservancies, direct use values alone
should be sufficient to attract community in-
vestment.
The availability of donor grants, itself, pro-
vides an incentive for communities to increase
conservancy investment costs. This is happen-
ing to some extent in Namibia and the rela-
tively weak viability of conservancies, such as
Nyae Nyae, is partly due to the inclusion of
nonessential expenditures. Avoidance of these
would enhance conservancy economic and fi-
nancial viability, and should be part of the
planning process.
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As Infield (2001) points out, CBNRM pro-
grams have become important in international
aid, and this is true for southern Africa. It
might be suggested that this partial dependence
on donor contributions makes the initiatives
unsustainable, but we would argue that for
three reasons this is unlikely. First, as shown in
Table 7, loss of the donor income does not
necessarily eliminate community financial in-
centives, but only reduces them. Further, as
shown below, intangible benefits, such as em-
powerment, training and improved livelihood
security, also provide significant motivation.
Second, the donor inputs to conservancies are
concentrated in the initial capital, and are fo-
cused on building wildlife stocks, institutions
and skills, thus establishing the base for a
change in land use. Later, further investments
by conservancies, based on these sunk costs will
have higher returns and will most likely not
need enhancement by donors. Third, the donor
contributions, in as much as they reflect non-use
values perceived in developed countries, are
likely to persist. Experience over 15 years in
southern Africa suggests that the flow of do-
nor funds to CBNRM programs has been
enduring. Conservancies designed to capture
both use and non-use values, are likely to be
sustainable.
Instability in markets for wildlife use activi-
ties can affect conservancy sustainability. For
example, recent political events in southern
Africa have severely affected growth in non-
consumptive tourism in parts of Namibia.
Tourism income was sharply reduced in some
of the conservancies under study. These con-
ditions are likely to be temporary, but the
sensitivity analyses presented in Tables 3–6 in-
dicate that conservancy economic and financial
efficiency is moderately resilient in the face of
them. Safari hunting, and other consumptive
wildlife uses, might be severely affected by
pressure from animal rights organizations. The
sensitivity analyses in Tables 4–6, show that the
viability of three conservancies would be resil-
ient, while that of two would be vulnerable, in
the face of a ban on consumptive wildlife use.
The most successful conservancies are those
with several different uses, dominated by non-
consumptive tourism.
Ashley (1998) investigated CBNRM initia-
tives in Namibia, including all of the conser-
vancies analyzed here, for the importance of
intangible or non-financial benefits, as these
accrue to communities, the natural resource
base and Namibian society. She found these to
be substantial. The communities benefit from
capacity building and empowerment, cultural
and aesthetic values associated with wildlife
and local traditions, and more secure liveli-
hoods. The latter are linked to the financial
benefits described in this paper, but go further
in that cash injections from wildlife initiatives
fill a critical gap within household coping
strategies, and thereby enhance livelihood secu-
rity (Ashley & LaFranchi, 1997). This comple-
mentary role reduces the likelihood of earnings
from wildlife being invested in agriculture
which could undermine the sustainability of
conservancies. Namibia’s CBNRM program
appears able to capture the potential benefits
from including cultural values in community
conservation initiatives, as recommended by
Infield (2001).
The economic viability as demonstrated in
this paper, and the financial incentives available
for communities in conservancy development
fit in the broader framework of rural or na-
Table 7. The effect of donor grants (non-use values) on the financial rate of return to communities in the five Namibian
conservancies in 2000
Community financial rate of return Conservancy
Torra
(%)
¼ /Khoadi
//Ho^as (%)
Nyae Nyae
(%)
Mayuni
(%)
Salambala
(%)
With donor grants without stocka 133 205 23 220 40
Without donor grants with stockb 44 39 18 24 17
Without donor grants without stockc 39 28 1 20 11
a Includes income to the conservancy from donor grants, but excludes residual value of wildlife stock appreciation (an
intangible value for communities) in benefits.
b Excludes income to the conservancy from donor grants, but includes residual value of wildlife stock appreciation
(an intangible value for communities) in benefits.
c Excludes income to the conservancy from donor grants, and excludes residual value of wildlife stock appreciation
(an intangible value for communities) in benefits.
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tional development. We have not measured the
economic efficiency of the CBNRM program as
whole, or the wildlife sector as a whole, but
evidence from Botswana, where this has been
done (Barnes, 2001; Barnes et al., 2000), sug-
gests that the economic viability of individual
conservancies extends to the broader context.
Conditions in Namibia are very similar to those
in Botswana, and thus, allocation of conser-
vancy land to wildlife, and not to other uses, is
likely to be economically sound. This is the case
largely because both low human population
densities and high tourism potential occur to-
gether. The situation in countries where wildlife
lands have high potential for intensive arable
production will tend to be different. Here, if
investment in wildlife can be justified at all,
more reliance on the appropriate capture of
wildlife non-use values would be needed. In any
case, more research on the economics of land
use allocation is needed.
Namibia’s CBNRM program appears to
have avoided most of the design flaws and
problems which have been highlighted by
Barrett and Arcese (1995), Gibson and Marks
(1995), Infield (2001), Wells (1995) and Bond
(2001). A key feature has been flexibility in
design (Jones & Mosimane, 2000). This allows
conservancies to adopt the locally appropriate
scale, institutional design, combinations of
resource uses, and to capture appropriate
combinations of resource values (both use and
non-use). Conservancies in Namibia appear
able to deliver positive financial incentives to
communities, contribute positively to national
development, conserve wildlife, and be at least
as sustainable as other rural development ini-
tiatives. Ex post evaluation, using our measures
of efficiency and profitability in future years,
will confirm whether this is truly so or not.
4. CONCLUSION
(a) Conservancies in Namibia, as consti-
tuted and planned, are economically efficient.
They are able to contribute positively to na-
tional income and the development process.
The likelihood of their being sustainable is
high. Their receipt of donor funding, as part
of the national CBNRM program, means
that they also provide a channel for the
capture of wildlife non-use values, as income.
(b) Conservancies also provide very attrac-
tive financial returns for communities. These
returns are made up of income from wildlife
use (direct wildlife use values) as well as do-
nor grants (reflecting international non-use
values). The latter considerably enhance the
attractiveness of conservancy investment
for communities, but direct use values alone,
can generate positive financial returns. Do-
nor grants perform a very important cata-
lytic role in initiating and speeding up
land use change. From the donors’ perspec-
tive, conservancies also tend to be financially
viable.
(c) Tourism (primarily nonconsumptive tour-
ism but also safari-hunting tourism) is a par-
ticularly important income generator for all
conservancies. In the development of tour-
ism, joint ventures between private investors,
with skills and access to markets, and com-
munities are very important. Other con-
sumptive wildlife and natural resource uses
are less important, but they serve usefully
to spread risk.
(d) The existence of natural wildlife popula-
tions on conservancies (reducing the need
for investments in stock) is a very signifi-
cant factor affecting the economic efficiency
and financial viability of conservancies. Ac-
quisition of stock for restocking is not eco-
nomically efficient at the conservancy level,
unless there are no opportunity costs in-
volved. It can, however, have wider, longer
term economic benefits.
(e) Flexibility and adaptability in design
has allowed Namibia’s conservancy initia-
tives to embrace an apparently sound rural
development framework, which includes
significant intangible values and benefits as
well as financial income for communities,
derived from both use and non-use. The
conservancies appear able to deliver posi-
tive financial incentives to communities,
contribute positively to national develop-
ment, conserve wildlife, and be at least as
sustainable as other rural development ini-
tiatives.
NOTES
1. CBNRM projects/programs are sometimes referred
to as integrated conservation-development projects/pro-
grams (ICDPs) or community-based wildlife manage-
ment (CWM) projects/programs.
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2. For the purpose of this paper, the Mayuni conser-
vancy has been accorded a size of 28,400 ha, which is
composed of 15,100 ha in the proper Mayuni conser-
vancy, and 13,300 ha within which the conservancy has
tourism rights, in an adjacent protected area.
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Microcredit schemes have become a popular means of improving small-
holders’ access to credit and making long term investment possible.
However, it remains to be explored whether the current microcredit
schemes are more successful than earlier formal small scale lending
in identifying successful borrowers. We studied shrimp farming in a rural
region in Bangladesh where formal microlending is well established, but
where more expensive informal microlending coexists with the formal
schemes. Farmers – both those who exclusively use formal loans and those
who also use informal loans – remain credit-constrained; both types
overutilize labour in order to reduce the need for working capital.
However, the credit constraint is actually milder for the informal
borrowers: the implicit shadow price of working capital is substantially
higher in the group that only takes formal loans than in the group that also
uses informal loans. These results suggest that informal lenders – with their
closer ties to the individual farmers – remain more successful in identifying
those smallholder farmers that are most likely to use the borrowed funds
successfully. Informal lenders have an information advantage that formal
microlenders lack: the latter need to find routes to access this information
in order for formal microcredit schemes to succeed.
I. Introduction
In this article, we studied credit markets for small-
holder shrimp farmers in Bangladesh. Specifically,
we studied whether the increasingly popular small-
scale formal credits – microcredits – are reaching
those who are most likely to use the borrowed funds
successfully. Our findings suggest that this may not
be the case. We compared farmers who only bor-
rowed formally with those who also used informal
loans and found that, on average, when people only
borrowed formally, it was because they were per-
ceived as worse credit risks and were shut off from
informal loans, rather than because the formal loans
were sufficient to cover their credit needs.
It has long been noted that limited access to credit
is an important constraint on rural development
in many developing countries, and that there are
information problems, selection problems and other
problems inherent in the credit allocation process
*Corresponding author. E-mail: jesper.stage@economics.gu.se
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(Hoff and Stiglitz, 1993; Hermes and Lensink, 2007).
The outcome of these problems, discussed in detail
in Section II, is frequently that larger farmers have
access to cheap formal credit, whereas smaller farm-
ers are forced to resort to costly informal loans.
Because of these problems, many attempts at provid-
ing cheap credit to smallholder farmers have failed
in the past.
One solution that is gaining popularity is the use
of so-called microcredit financing, where various
innovative means such as peer monitoring are used
to secure loans. The most well-known microcredit
organization, the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh,
was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 2006 jointly
with its founder, Muhammad Yunus. Grameen Bank
has been in operation since the 1970s. It started
in Bangladesh and spread to several other Asian
countries, inspiring similar schemes in many develop-
ing countries as well. Microcredit schemes have also
had a considerable impact on the international devel-
opment debate. Thus, the United Nations declared
2005 the ‘International Year of Microcredit’, giving
some indication of how important this issue is now
considered to be for development.
We studied the selection of borrowers by formal
microcredit schemes in comparison with traditional
informal credit sources in a rural shrimp farming
district in Bangladesh. We estimate the shadow prices
that farmers are willing to pay for additional credit,
an approach which has not been previously used to
compare these two forms of credit. Our results
indicate that the borrowers who only take formal
loans have higher shadow prices for additional credit,
and are perceived as worse credit risks, than the
farmers who also borrow informally. This suggests
that the farmers who only borrow formally are a
worse group of borrowers, on average, than the
informal borrowers.
The article is structured as follows. Section II
provides a theoretical background on the issues
surrounding rural microlending, and discusses expe-
riences from the earlier schemes. Section III explains
the methodology used in the study. Section IV
describes the data set used and provides some
descriptive statistics. Section V describes how the
analysis was carried out in practice. Section VI
presents the results, and the final section discusses
the policy implications of these results for rural
upliftment strategies.
II. Formal and Informal Credit
Historically, the lack of access to credit has been
an important constraint to rural development in
developing countries. Microfinance is not the first
attempt to address this problem: many developing
countries provided cheap, small-scale credit to small-
holder farmers in the 1970s. However, these govern-
ment-run credit schemes were rarely financially
viable, and when governments were forced to
reduce subsidies in the 1980s, many rural credit
schemes collapsed.
To some extent, the problems encountered by such
government credit schemes were not surprising. There
are a number of reasons why credit markets tend
to be more problematic than many other markets,
especially in developing countries, and policy inter-
ventions that do not take this into account are likely
to fail. The main reason why credit markets are more
problematic than others is that lenders and borrowers
have different information about the quality of the
borrower’s project, both with respect to the expected
outcome and the variance of the outcome.
Lenders face an adverse selection problem. They
can discourage borrowers who have projects with
low expected returns by charging high interest rates.
However, the borrowers who accept loans with high
interest rates are most likely the ones whose projects
not only have high risk but also potentially high
returns – for the borrower, that is. This means a
higher interest rate will increase the share of risky
projects in the lender’s loan portfolio and will, at
sufficiently high interest rates, reduce the overall
return on the loan portfolio (Akerlof, 1970; Stiglitz
and Weiss, 1981). Therefore, lenders will normally
try to ration credit through other means as well,
especially in settings – such as those in many
developing countries – where the scope for collecting
debt from defaulters is limited, due to weak
institutions.
An important alternative way of rationing credit is
that lenders can pose high collateral requirements in
order to ensure that borrowers will be able to repay
loans even if their projects fail. However, high
collateral requirements will, of course, tend to make
it difficult for smallholders to borrow. Alternatively,
lenders can rely on screening procedures by collecting
information in order to identify those borrowers who
are likely to succeed. However, such information
gathering is costly for a bank, and the cost will have
to be recouped through increasing the cost of the
loan. Since the cost of gathering information is likely
to be high – even for the small loans that smallholder
farmers might be interested in, the costs of such loans
become prohibitively high for small-scale farmers.
On the other hand, informal lenders who pursue
lending as a side activity, and who are based within
the communities where they lend, can observe indi-
vidual farmers’ production activities and can more
4204 C. Andersson et al.
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easily identify those who are likely to succeed in their
projects. Therefore, such informal lenders have a
natural advantage over formal banks. Furthermore,
since they have a far smaller adverse selection
problem than the formal banks do, and frequently
face little competition, they can charge high interest
rates on the loans that they provide. Thus, informal
credit is characterized by considerably higher interest
rates than those seen in formal credit markets, but
repayment rates are comparable to those for formal
credit.
Attempts to provide cheap credit to farmers
through government credit schemes might, in
theory, avoid some of the problems encountered by
other formal lenders since it is easier for the govern-
ment than for private lenders to, for example,
confiscate land from farmers who do not repay
their loans; in practice, however, these advantages
have rarely been used. Governments have been
reluctant to enforce loan repayments from defaulting
farmers. This, in turn, has meant that government
credit schemes need subsidies in order to function,
and since default rates have frequently increased over
time – when other farmers observe that defaulters
have not been penalized – most schemes have
collapsed at some point (Adams and von Pischke,
1992; Braverman and Guasch, 1993; Armenda´riz
and Morduch, 2005).
Formal microcredit schemes are an attempt to use
social pressure to encourage borrowers to repay their
loans. A common setup is that a group of borrowers
in the same village or region are made jointly
responsible for each other’s projects. This moves
part of the cost of defaults from the bank to the
borrowers. It also reduces the need for screening loan
applicants, because neighbours will monitor each
others’ loan performance and there will be consider-
able social pressure on individual borrowers to repay
loans. By reducing the costs related to small-scale
loans, such arrangements enable formal lenders to
make cheap loans available to smallholder farmers.
The intent is that these loans will enable farmers
to make investments and production decisions that
would not be profitable at the high interest rates
charged by informal lenders, but that become prof-
itable at lower interest rates.
Foreign donors currently show great interest in
microfinance. As a result, many microfinance
schemes can easily access additional funds and
expand their lending. This means that loan recipients
who face temporary or long-term problems in repay-
ing their loans can, in many cases, bridge old loans
by taking new ones. In other cases, because of the
social pressure associated with repaying the loans,
loan recipients have settled the amounts they owe by
selling some of their property (see, e.g. Copestake
et al., 2001). Thus, the high repayment rates that
currently characterize many microcredit schemes
cannot, in themselves, be seen as indicators of how
successful such schemes will be in the longer term, as
long-term problems may be masked by short-term
increases in available funds or by short-term mea-
sures taken by individual borrowers. In addition,
in the recent years, many microcredit institutions
have increasingly shifted from group lending
towards individual lending. For instance, in 2001,
Grameen Bank moved to a ‘Grameen II’ scheme for
individual loans. Such institutions have, therefore,
become increasingly similar to the older small-scale
credit schemes – and presumably risk facing the same
problems as their older counterparts.
Given the adverse selection issues which have
troubled small-scale formal credit schemes in the
past, there should be some attempt to target those
farmers who are most likely to use the invested funds
successfully. If this is not done, repayment rates
are likely to decline in the longer term. Findings from
randomized experiments indicate that borrowers
selected by microcredit schemes use the funds more
successfully than borrowers selected at random
(see, e.g. Tedeschi, 2008), which can be seen as a
minimum requirement for successful microfinance.
However, this finding does not tell us whether formal
lenders are as successful in selecting borrowers as
informal lenders are. Indeed, the low profitability
in many microfinance institutions suggests that they
may not be (Cull et al., 2007; Scha¨fer et al., 2010).
The conventional view (Boucher and Guirkinger,
2007) is that formal lending displaces informal
lending by making cheaper credit available to farmers
who could have borrowed informally in any case.
The remaining market for informal lending could
then be explained either by the greater flexibility
with which unregulated lenders operate, and/or by
additional credit needs on the side of borrowers
who also borrow formally (Pal, 2002; Hartarska and
Nadolnyak, 2007; Barslund and Tarp, 2008).
However, an alternative and more problematic out-
come could be that there is adverse selection in formal
lending, with the result that formal lending reaches
farmers who cannot borrow from informal lenders
because they are seen as worse credit risks.
Following a theoretical framework originally
developed by Bell (1990) and Bell et al. (1997),
we can visualize the potential outcomes of making
cheap credit available to an individual farmer
(Fig. 1). We assume that the farmer has a demand
for working capital, determined by the profitability
of the marginal unit of working capital, and that
the farmer can borrow the amount xf formally at the
A case study of shrimp farmers in Bangladesh 4205
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interest rate rf to finance part (or all) of his working
capital requirements. If the formal credit is suffi-
ciently large compared with the farmer’s demand
for working capital, the farmer will make all the
investments that are profitable at the interest rate rf,
will not wish to borrow the full amount of formal
credit available, and will not borrow informally.
This outcome corresponds to the farmer choosing
some level of credit along the part of the credit supply
curve denoted by A in Fig. 1. The farmer’s shadow
price of working capital will be equal to the formal
interest rate.
If the formal credit is not sufficiently large to
achieve this outcome, the farmer will perceive a credit
constraint, in that he would prefer to borrow more at
the formal rate, and will face a shadow price of
working capital that is higher than the formal interest
rate. Thus, the farmer will wish to borrow additional
funds informally and would be willing, if necessary,
to pay a higher interest rate for these additional
funds.
Assuming that there is also a market for informal
credit in the area, informal lenders will be willing
to lend to the farmer, provided that their expected
profit from doing so is at least as great as that
expected from lending the money to other borrowers.
The informal lender’s iso-expected profit curve with
respect to the size of the loan will be convex: it
declines initially with the size of the loan because
of the fixed costs associated with gathering informa-
tion on the borrower, but it increases with further
increases in loan size because of the increased risk
of default associated with larger loans.
This means that an individual farmer will face an
upward-sloping supply curve of informal credit,
specific to that particular farmer, and determined
by the informal lenders’ perception of him/her.
Bell (1990) shows that, depending on how competi-
tive the informal market is, there is likely to be a
credit constraint in the informal market as well,
such that the farmer cannot borrow additional funds
above some credit ceiling xi.
We observe that there are several possible out-
comes. If, after borrowing the full formal amount
available, the farmer’s shadow price of working
capital is lower than the informal interest rate
facing that specific farmer, he will still not borrow
informally. This outcome corresponds to a level of
credit along the part of the credit supply curve
denoted by B in Fig. 1. The shadow price of working
capital will be higher than the formal interest rate,
but lower than the informal interest rate available
to that farmer.
If the demand for working capital is sufficiently
high, the farmer will also borrow informally. If the
amount of informal credit made available is large
enough to cover his working capital needs at the
informal interest rate, the farmer will perceive a
shadow price of working capital that is equal to the
informal interest rate that he is paying. This outcome
corresponds to a level of credit along the part of
the credit supply curve denoted by C in Fig. 1. The
farmer borrows xf formally and combines this with
additional informal funds.
When the informal credit constraint is also binding,
the farmer borrows the total working capital xfþ xi.
However, even at the higher informal interest rate ri
0,
the farmer would prefer to borrow more than this
amount. He, therefore, perceives a shadow price
of working capital which is higher than the informal
interest rate. This corresponds to section D of the
credit supply curve shown in Fig. 1.
In all the four cases, cheap formal credit generates
a welfare improvement for the farmer because his
overall borrowing costs are reduced. However, it is
only in case A that the farmer’s investment decision
will be directly determined at the margin by the
formal interest rate. In all the other cases, the
farmer’s marginal investment decision will be deter-
mined by the relationship between his shadow price
of working capital and the interest rate that informal
lenders offer. Since this informal rate will vary from
farmer to farmer, it means the farmer’s shadow price
of capital and, hence, the related marginal investment
decision will be determined by how the farmer is
perceived as a credit risk by informal lenders.
If a farmer faces a constraint on formal credit, but
nonetheless chooses not to borrow informally, this is
because his shadow price of working capital is lower
than the informal rate that he is offered. We should
note that the informal rate offered to this farmer is
determined by the informal lenders’ expected profit
Interest
rate, r
ri'
ri
rf
xf xf + xi
A
B
Working 
capital, x
C
D
Fig. 1. The supply of working capital available to an
individual farmer
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from lending to him rather than to other farmers.
Thus, if the farmer’s shadow price is higher than the
average informal interest rate, this indicates that the
farmer is perceived as a poor credit risk by informal
lenders. He would be prepared to borrow at the
informal interest rates offered to other farmers, but is
not offered the latter because the informal lenders’
expected profit from doing so is less than the expected
profit from lending to other borrowers at that rate.
In this case, the farmer does not borrow informally
because informal lenders are reluctant to lend to him/
her, and the formal lender has made a poor choice
when lending to this borrower rather than to others.
On the other hand, if the farmer’s shadow price
of working capital is lower than the informal interest
rates offered to other farmers, the farmer’s main
reason for not borrowing informally is that the
formal credit takes care of most of his working
capital needs. In this case, the farmer could (presum-
ably) borrow informally at rates comparable to those
offered to other farmers, but chooses not to do so
because it would not be profitable.
Thus, we can study the adverse selection issue
in formal lending by looking at whether farmers who
only borrow formally have higher or lower shadow
prices of working capital (and, hence, are perceived as
worse or better credit risks) than the farmers who also
take informal loans. If farmers who only borrow
formally have an average shadow price of credit
which is lower than the average informal interest rate,
this means that formal credit has displaced informal
lending and that the formal borrowers’ main reason
for not borrowing informally is that their credit needs
have been met by formal loans. On the other hand,
if formal borrowers have an average shadow price of
credit which is higher than the informal interest rate,
this means that they are unable to borrow because
they are perceived as worse than average credit risks.
In order to analyse these issues, we studied the
shadow prices for working capital among shrimp
farmers in a rural region in Bangladesh where formal
and informal small-scale credit schemes coexist.
Some farmers in the study only used small-scale
formal loans, a few used only informal loans and
some used both types of loans. Investigating whether
there are systematic differences in shadow prices
between borrowers who use only formal loans and
those who also (or only) use informal loans, indicates
how successful formal schemes have been in identi-
fying farmers who are perceived as good credit risks.
If there are indeed differences in behaviour between
the two groups of farmers, one potential explanation
might be that there are differences in the technologies
that they use.1 If this is the case, there might be
different ways of looking at this from a policy
perspective. On the one hand, it might be desirable
for formal microlenders to target farmers who use the
most appropriate technology (because they are most
likely to use the funds successfully). On the other
hand, it could also be argued that the formal
microcredit schemes should target those farmers
who use less appropriate technologies in order to
provide them with funds that can enable them to
upgrade to better technologies. Because differences
in technology between the two groups can be inter-
preted in different ways, such differences need to be
disentangled from the issue of shadow prices for
credit, which is the focus of this study. Thus, we need
to examine technological differences separately.
III. Shadow Prices
In order to estimate the shadow price of capital,
we apply a shadow price approach originally devel-
oped by Lau and Yotopoulos (1971) for use in
efficiency measurement. The basic assumption behind
this approach is that firms optimize with respect to
shadow prices rather than observed market prices.
These shadow prices are normally interpreted as
measuring allocative inefficiencies due to poor input
choices. The approach also allows farmers to be
technically inefficient, i.e. they may not all use the
best possible technology. However, in a situation
such as that studied here, where most or all farmers
are constrained in their use of one or several inputs,
farmers will in fact optimize with respect to shadow
prices rather than market prices even when they are
allocatively efficient. If one assumes that there are no
inefficiencies other than those caused by the input
constraints, the estimated shadow prices can then be
seen as measuring the actual shadow prices facing the
individual farmer, rather than as measuring how
inefficient the farmers are in their input use.
We assume that, apart from credit markets, the
environment for shrimp farmers in rural Bangladesh
can be characterized by competitive markets.
Output is assumed to be demand-driven, with the
result that input prices and output can be considered
as exogenous. This makes the cost function an
1Balcombe et al. (2008) studied technical efficiency among rice farmers in Bangladesh and found that, on average, farmers
who had no access to credit at all were less technically efficient than farmers who had access to credit. However, the authors
did not separate farmers with credit access by the type of credit used, making comparison between formal and informal
borrowers impossible.
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appropriate behavioural function. In order to exam-
ine whether there are systematic differences in the
technology farmers employ, we used an input-
oriented measure of technical efficiency, defined as
the ability to minimize the input use for producing
a given output. The underlying production function
can then be specified as
y ¼ f ðx;Þ expfvg ð1Þ
where y is the farmer’s scalar output, x the input
vector, f ðx; Þ the deterministic part of the produc-
tion function,  a vector of parameters in the
production function, v a symmetrically distributed
stochastic error term with mean zero and constant
variance, and 0    1 a measure of technical
efficiency that can cause the cost function to shift
(Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000).
As the farmers are assumed to minimize cost with
respect to shadow prices rather than observed market
prices, the first-order condition relates the marginal
rate of transformation to the relative shadow price,
expressed as
@f ðx,Þ=@x2
@f ðx,Þ=@x1 ¼ 21
w2
w1
ð2Þ
where wi is the observed market price of factor i, 21
a measure of the shadow price adjustment to the
relative market price of factor 2 in terms of factor 1
and 21w2=w1 the relative shadow price of factor 2
in terms of factor 1. If 21¼ 1, the farmer optimizes
with respect to the observed relative market price.
If 2151, it means that the farmer optimizes with
respect to a relative shadow price of factor 2 which is
lower than the observed relative market price of that
factor. The opposite is true if 2141. In the following,
the price of the first input (labour) is set as a
numeraire.
IV. Data
This study uses data from a survey of credit sources
used by shrimp farmers in the Khulna District in
Bangladesh. The survey was carried out in late 2004,
and included questions on the farm’s production of
shrimp and other outputs as well as on the prices paid
for these outputs. A number of questions addressed
the farm households’ demand and supply of inputs to
production: the use of labour (own and hired) in farm
production, wages paid to hired labour, the supply
of labour for paid work elsewhere by the household
and wages received for the latter; and the use of land
(own and leased), payment for leased land, leasing
out of land and payment for the latter. The survey
also included questions about household characteris-
tics such as household size and education (if any).
Finally, the survey asked about formal and informal
loans taken, the purpose of the loans, the interest
paid on each loan and whether households were
credit-constrained in the sense that they would have
liked to borrow more.
For the subdivision between formal and informal
loans, we follow the standard practice of defining
formal lenders as institutional lenders such as banks
and microcredit schemes, which mainly finance loans
through deposits from others. Informal lenders are
defined as private lenders such as middlemen in the
shrimp sector, rich villagers or relatives of the farmer,
who mainly finance loans out of their own equity.
In practice, this subdivision was straightforward
to make.
In all the villages surveyed, there were functioning
labour markets, land rental markets and credit
markets for working capital. All households were
assumed to be price takers in the sense that, although
different households faced different input prices
(depending, for example, on whether they were net
buyers or sellers of the input), it is assumed that none
of them were able to affect the input prices that they
paid or received for the marginal unit purchased or
sold. Thus, although many of the households had
access to favourable prices on, for example, family
labour from close relatives, it was assumed that the
highest input price paid reflected the marginal input
cost facing each household, and that this price was
unaffected by the household’s demand for the input.
Similarly, it was assumed that, for those house-
holds that rented out labour or leased out land,
the marginal value of such labour or land in own
production was the price paid for it (because,
presumably, the household would have used more
of the labour or land in its own production if it had
been more profitable to do so). If these price-taking
assumptions hold, farm production decisions will be
based solely on the prices of the marginal unit of
each input. Thus, although the farm household is
likely to make consumption, work and production
decisions jointly in practice, production decisions can
nonetheless be analysed separately from the house-
hold’s other decisions (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995).
Since the purpose of this study was to compare
informal and formal loans for use in production,
farmers who had borrowed for consumption purposes
or who had not borrowed at all – approximately half
the surveyed farmers – were removed from the sample.
Descriptive statistics over borrowed capital, labour
use, land use and agricultural production for the
farmers remaining in the data set are given in
Table 1. All farmers perceived themselves as
4208 C. Andersson et al.
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credit-constrained: they all stated that they would
have liked to borrow more money at the prevailing
interest rate. This means that they can all be assumed
to have borrowed the full amount that they were able
to. This simplifies the analysis considerably (see, e.g.
Feder et al., 1990 or Dutta and Magableh, 2006, for
discussions of the additional complexities involved in
estimation when this is not the case). Furthermore,
with the framework used in Section II, this also implies
that all the farmers belong either to Category B
(credit-constrained, and financing all working capital
requirements with formal loans) or Category D
(credit-constrained, and financing at least some work-
ing capital requirements with informal loans). The fact
that even farmers who borrow informally are credit-
constrained indicates (following the reasoning in Bell,
1990) that competition among informal lenders is
limited.
Some 61% of the studied farmers took only formal
loans, 9% took only informal loans and the remain-
ing group (30%) took both formal and informal
loans. Since the crucial distinction in our analysis is
that between farmers who do not borrow informally
and those who do, the two groups of farmers
who borrow informally (whether they also borrow
formally or not) are equivalent for the purposes of
our study and are aggregated in the analysis.
The average rate of interest paid by the farmers
taking only formal loans was 13.6%. If one looks
at the interest paid by each borrower on the last taka2
of formal loans (the marginal factor cost for formal
loans), the marginal cost of capital was, on average,
14.3%, i.e. almost the same. On the other hand, for
farmers who also used informal loans, the differences
in interest rates between the two types of loans meant
that the marginal rate of interest on the last taka
borrowed was substantially higher than the average
rate of interest paid. The average rate of interest
paid by these farmers was 24%, but the marginal
rate of interest on the last taka borrowed was, on
average, 35%.3
The two categories show largely similar patterns
in terms of labour use. Both groups mainly use own
labour, but both groups have farmers who, to some
extent, supplement this with hired labour. Many
households also supply labour outside of agricultural
production, either by doing own off-farm production
as a side activity or by working for pay elsewhere.
The average farmer in both groups is a net supplier
of labour, in that own labour supply is slightly larger
than on-farm labour use, but there is considerable
variation within both groups. Average labour costs
are difficult to calculate, since unpaid family labour
(and low-paid labour from relatives) plays an impor-
tant role on most farms. For the last labour hour used
on each farm, the informal borrowers faced some-
what higher labour costs on average. There is also
considerable variation in the marginal labour costs
faced within both groups.
Land rental markets are well developed and both
groups include farmers who rent land to or from
others. On average, the surveyed farmers rent more
land from than to others, but again the variation is
considerable in both groups.
Shrimp farming was the main farming activity on
all the farms surveyed, although it was not necessarily
the main economic activity of the household. Many
farms supplemented shrimp production with other
agricultural production during other parts of the
year. The main side activity was rice production,
but many farmers also devoted time and resources to
fish breeding, vegetable production or both. It may
be noted that although both groups display consid-
erable variation, the average shrimp production is
lower among farmers who cover at least some of their
working capital requirements through informal loans,
and that the variation is smaller in this group than
among the formal borrowers.
V. Econometric Specification
In order to measure the shadow prices of working
capital facing each group of farmers, a number
of methods could potentially have been used. In
principle, the farmers in our sample carry out a multi-
input, multi-output farming activity. However, the
standard methods normally used in efficiency mea-
surement for such activities were unsuitable for our
purpose. Distance functions, such as those discussed
in Fa¨re and Primont (1995) or Ferna´ndez et al.
(2005), do not permit direct measurement of shadow
prices, which was the main topic of interest for our
study. These methods have primarily been developed
to measure technical, rather than allocative, effi-
ciency. Profit efficiency measurement would, in
principle, have permitted the estimation of shadow
prices (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000), but given the
situation in the region studied, these methods would
have been problematic in practice. They would have
entailed valuing all inputs and outputs at market
prices. However, as noted, farmers supply most of
2 Bangladeshi currency; 1 taka 0.015 US dollars.
3 The lowest interest rates were in fact also found among the informal borrowers: a few farmers had borrowed informally from
relatives at low rates.
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their inputs of labour and land themselves, at lower-
than-market prices. Many of them would be recorded
as making net operating losses if all inputs and
outputs were valued at market prices, making the
standard econometric specifications used in profit
function approaches problematic.
In this article, therefore, we assume a Cobb–
Douglas cost function. In the absence of shadow
price adjustments, this cost function can be written as
cð y,w; Þ ¼ 0y1=r
Y
n
wnn ð3Þ
where c is the production cost, y agricultural
production,4 wi the input prices (w1 is the hourly
wage rate, w2 the interest rate on borrowed working
capital and w3 the land rent) and r indicates the
degree of homogeneity in the underlying production
function. The restriction that
P
n n ¼ 1 is imposed to
satisfy the assumption of homogeneity of the cost
function with respect to input prices.
Following Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), the
possibility of differences in technical efficiency is
introduced into the model by replacing the intercept
of the cost function by 0 expðDDÞ, where D is a
dummy variable set to 1 if the farmer belongs to a
particular group and 0 otherwise. Thus, exp ðDÞ is
the relative technical efficiency of this group com-
pared to the other group. Furthermore, farmers are
assumed to minimize costs with respect to shadow
prices rather than market prices. The input demand
equations are then given by
ln x1 ¼ ln 0  DDþ ln 1 þ 1
r
ln y
þ 2 ln 21 w2
w1
  
þ 3 ln 31 w3
w1
  
¼ ln 0  DDþ ln 1 2  3ð Þ þ 1
r
ln y
þ 2 ln 21 w2
w1
  
þ 3 ln 31 w3
w1
  
ln x2 ¼ ln 0  DDþ ln 2 þ 1
r
ln y
þ ð2  1Þ ln 21 w2
w1
  
þ 3 ln 31 w3
w1
  
ln x3 ¼ ln 0  DDþ ln 3 þ 1
r
ln yþ 2 ln 21 w2
w1
  
þ ð3  1Þ ln 31 w3
w1
  
ð4Þ
where xi are the quantities of inputs; x1 total number
of labour hours per year, x2 the total amount of
borrowed working capital and x3 the land used in
production, measured in bighas.5 In the first of these
equations, the lnð1 2  3Þ term is highly nonlinear
and a fourth-order Taylor expansion was used
instead.
In order to see if there was a difference in shadow
prices between farmers who only took formal loans
and those farmers who took either only informal
loans or used both types of loans, we follow Stefanou
and Saxena (1988), Kumbhakar and Bhattacharyya
(1992), Bhattacharyya et al. (1994) and Wang et al.
(1996), and model the shadow prices and the techni-
cal efficiency parameter as functions of firm specific
variables, as follows:
DD ¼   informal ð5Þ
n1 ¼ expðn þ inf ,n informalÞ n ¼ 2, 3
11 ¼ 1
ð6Þ
where informal is a dummy variable which is set to 1
if the farmer has taken any type of informal loans,
and 0 if only formal credits have been used.
VI. Results
Since the demand equations in the equation system
(Equation 4) have correlated disturbances and cross-
equation restrictions, the system was estimated using
a nonlinear, seemingly unrelated regression technique
(Zellner, 1962). The motivation for using this method
is that it makes better use of the information than if
the equations had been estimated separately. Table 2
gives the parameter estimates.
From Table 2, the R2 measures for the individual
equations range from 0.51 to 0.82. There is no
indication of any difference in technical efficiency
between the two groups, which simplifies the analysis
of the remaining results. The results indicate that
there are substantial economies of scale; thus, being
able to access additional inputs should increase
profitability considerably.
The results indicate that both groups optimize with
respect to shadow prices rather than with observed
market prices. The results also indicate that there is a
significant difference in the relative shadow prices
used by those farmers who only rely on loans from
4For the reasons discussed previously, we chose not to use a multi-output framework. Instead, for each farmer, the market
prices facing that specific farmer were used to recalculate the production of rice, fish and vegetables into the number of
kilograms of shrimp that would yield the same revenue. Essentially, this means that we use an output variable y where the unit
of measurement is kilograms of shrimp equivalents.
5 A standard unit of area used in Bangladesh. A bigha is defined as one-third of an acre, i.e. approximately 1350m2.
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formal lenders, and the prices used by those farmers
who take at least some loans from informal lenders.
The estimated values of 21 and 31 are larger than
unity for both groups, suggesting that the farmers
overutilize labour in relation to both land and
working capital.
From the parameter estimates, it can be seen that
the over-allocation of labour in relation to working
capital is significantly smaller in the group using
informal credit. The shadow price of working capital
is substantially higher in the group that only takes
formal loans (154% on average) than in the group
that also uses informal loans (103% on average), even
though the market interest rate (as given in Table 1)
is considerably lower for the formal loans.
VII. Conclusions
This study has analysed differences in the shadow
price of working capital between shrimp farmers who
rely on formal credit for all their working capital
needs and farmers who also borrow informally.
The sample was small, and the results may not be
representative for the overall formal and informal
markets for small-scale credit schemes. However,
some results from the study nonetheless deserve some
attention.
All the farmers in our sample perceived themselves
to be credit-constrained; this was true for those who
financed all their working capital through formal
borrowing as well as for those who also borrowed
informally. This is supported by the finding that both
groups act as though the shadow price of working
capital is substantially higher than the price they
actually pay. Thus, improved access to working
capital credit remains an important issue for rural
smallholders, even in Bangladesh, where formal
microcredit schemes have been in operation for a
considerable length of time.
The farmers who borrow informally faced lower
shadow prices for working capital than those who
only borrowed formally. This indicates that, when
farmers only borrow formally, it is not because the
formal credit is sufficient to meet their credit needs
and reduce their shadow prices of credit to levels
lower than the prevailing informal interest rates;
rather, it is because they are perceived as worse credit
risks than the informal borrowers, and can only
borrow informally at interest rates higher than those
facing other farmers. Thus, at least in this part of
Bangladesh, the formal credit schemes currently
available to smallholder farmers have not been
successful in selecting the farmers who are most
likely to use the borrowed funds successfully.
Formal microcredit schemes are an important
improvement compared with previous attempts at
providing formal credit to small-scale rural farmers,
in that repayment rates are far better. This means
that, unlike previous formal credit schemes aimed at
smallholder farmers, microcredit schemes are likely to
remain financially viable and, hence, continue to be
available as a source of credit for the foreseeable
future. As noted in Section II, the availability of
cheap working capital through formal microcredit
schemes represents a welfare improvement for farm-
ers, even when the cheap working capital is not large
enough to have a direct impact on their production
decisions. It is also likely that the competition from
formal microcredit schemes leads to lower interest
rates in the informal credit market, with additional
effects on welfare and investments among farmers.
In addition to this, formal credit may be reaching
borrowers who are excluded from the informal credit
market because of discrimination rather than because
they are perceived as poor credit risks.
Nonetheless, the indication from our study is that
work still remains to be done in identifying the most
suitable borrowers, and to make sure that they have
access to the amount of credit that they need. The
informal lenders have better information on individ-
ual borrowers, and therefore remain more successful
than the formal credit sources in assessing what
borrowers are likely to make the best use of
additional funds. Finding ways of making this
information available to formal lenders remains an
important issue.
Acknowledgements
Financial support from the Swedish International
Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) through its
Table 2. Results
Parameter Coefficient
ln 0 2.64** (0.84)
ln 2 2.43** (1.05)
ln 3 0.64** (0.18)
1 0.091 (0.15)
1=r 0.66** (0.048)
2 2.38** (1.18)
inf 2 1.29** (0.33)
3 1.57** (0.37)
inf 3 0.35 (0.28)
R2 labour 0.57
R2 capital 0.51
R2 land 0.82
Notes: SEs are reported in parentheses.
** Denotes significance at the 5% level.
4212 C. Andersson et al.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 G
oth
en
bu
rg
] a
t 1
1:4
4 1
0 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
4 
Environment for Development programme, from the
Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation, and
the La¨nsfo¨rsa¨kringar Foundation is gratefully
acknowledged. The authors thank Karl-Gustaf
Lo¨fgren and Per-Olov Marklund of Umea˚
University, Arup Daripa of the Birkbeck, University
of London, Mark P. Taylor, editor of Applied
Economics and an anonymous reviewer for construc-
tive comments on earlier drafts of this article. Finally,
we are indebted to the shrimp farmers in the Khulna
District who participated in the survey. The usual
disclaimers apply.
References
Adams, D. W. and von Pischke, J. D. (1992)
Microenterprise credit programs: de´ja` vu, World
Development, 20, 1463–70.
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) The market for ‘lemons’: quality
uncertainty and the market mechanism, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 84, 488–500.
Armenda´riz, B. and Morduch, J. (2005) The Economics of
Microfinance, MIT Press, Cambridge.
Balcombe, K., Fraser, I., Latruffe, L., Rahman, M. and
Smith, L. (2008) An application of the DEA double
bootstrap to examine sources of efficiency in
Bangladesh rice farming, Applied Economics, 40,
1919–25.
Barslund, M. and Tarp, F. (2008) Formal and informal
rural credit in four provinces of Vietnam, Journal of
Development Studies, 44, 485–503.
Bell, C. (1990) Interactions between institutional and
informal credit agencies in rural India, World Bank
Economic Review, 4, 297–327.
Bell, C., Srinivasan, T. N. and Udry, C. (1997) Rationing,
spillover, and interlinking in credit markets: the
case of rural Punjab, Oxford Economic Papers, 49,
557–85.
Bhattacharyya, A., Parker, E. and Raffiee, K. (1994) An
examination of the effect of ownership on the relative
efficiency of public and private water utilities, Land
Economics, 70, 197–209.
Boucher, S. and Guirkinger, C. (2007) Risk, wealth, and
sectoral choice in rural credit markets, American
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 89, 991–1004.
Braverman, A. and Guasch, J. L. (1993) Administrative
failures in rural credit programs, in The Economics of
Rural Organization: Theory, Practice, and Policy (Eds)
K. Hoff, A. Braverman and J. E. Stiglitz, Oxford
University Press, New York, pp. 53–69.
Copestake, J., Bhalotra, S. and Johnson, S. (2001)
Assessing the impact of microcredit: a Zambian case
study, Journal of Development Studies, 37, 81–100.
Cull, R., Demirgu¨c-Kunt, A. and Morduch, J. (2007)
Financial performance and outreach: a global analysis
of leading microbanks, Economic Journal, 117,
F107–33.
Dutta, D. and Magableh, I. (2006) A socio-economic study
of the borrowing process: the case of microentrepre-
neurs in Jordan, Applied Economics, 38, 1627–40.
Fa¨re, R. and Primont, D. (1995) Multi-output Production
and Duality: Theory and Applications, Kluwer, Boston.
Feder, G., Lau, L., Lin, J. and Luo, X. (1990) The
relationship between credit and productivity in
Chinese agriculture: a microeconomic model of
disequilibrium, American Journal of Agricultural
Economics, 72, 1151–7.
Ferna´ndez, C., Koop, G. and Steel, M. F. J. (2005)
Alternative efficiency measures for multiple-output
production, Journal of Econometrics, 126, 411–44.
Hartarska, V. and Nadolnyak, D. (2007) Do regulated
microfinance institutions achieve better sustainability
and outreach? Cross-country evidence, Applied
Economics, 39, 1207–22.
Hermes, N. and Lensink, R. (2007) The empirics of
microfinance: what do we know?, Economic Journal,
117, F1–10.
Hoff, K. and Stiglitz, J. E. (1993) Imperfect information
and rural credit markets: puzzles and policy perspec-
tives, in The Economics of Rural Organization: Theory,
Practice, and Policy (Eds) K. Hoff, A. Braverman and
J. E. Stiglitz, Oxford University Press, New York,
pp. 33–52.
Kumbhakar, S. and Bhattacharyya, A. (1992) Price
distortions and resource-use efficiency in Indian
agriculture: a restricted profit function approach,
Review of Economics and Statistics, 74, 231–9.
Kumbhakar, S. and Lovell, C. A. K. (2000) Stochastic
Frontier Analysis, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
Lau, L. J. and Yotopoulos, P. A. (1971) A test for relative
efficiency and application to Indian agriculture,
American Economic Review, 61, 94–109.
Pal, S. (2002) Household sectoral choice and effective
demand for rural credit in India, Applied Economics,
34, 1743–55.
Sadoulet, E. and de Janvry, A. (1995) Quantitative
Development Policy Analysis, Johns Hopkins
University Press, Baltimore.
Scha¨fer, D., Siliverstovs, B. and Terberger, E. (2010)
Banking competition, good or bad? The case of
promoting micro and small enterprise finance in
Kazakhstan, Applied Economics, 42, 701–16.
Stefanou, E. S. and Saxena, S. (1988) Education, experience
and allocative efficiency: a dual approach, American
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 70, 338–45.
Stiglitz, J. E. and Weiss, A. (1981) Credit rationing in
markets with asymmetric information, American
Economic Review, 71, 393–410.
Tedeschi, G. A. (2008) Overcoming selection bias in
microcredit impact assessments: a case study in Peru,
Journal of Development Studies, 44, 504–18.
Wang, J., Wailes, E. J. and Cramer, G. L. (1996) A shadow-
price measurement of profit efficiency in Chinese
agriculture, American Journal of Agricultural
Economics, 78, 146–56.
Zellner, A. (1962) An efficient method of estimating
seemingly unrelated regressions and tests for aggrega-
tion bias, Journal of the American Statistical
Association, 63, 502–22.
A case study of shrimp farmers in Bangladesh 4213
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 G
oth
en
bu
rg
] a
t 1
1:4
4 1
0 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
4 

Studies in Environmental Management and Economics is a separate series of PhD theses 
at the Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg. The theses in this series are 
written at the Department of Economics but are interdisciplinary in nature and focus on 
environmental and resource issues. 
  
1. Wråke, Markus (2009), European Energy Policy in Transition: Critical Aspects 
of Emissions Trading 
2. Uwera, Claudine (2013), Water Demand and Financing in Rwanda: An Empirical 
Analysis 
3. Slunge, Daniel (2017), Essays on Environmental Management and Economics:  
Public Health, Risk and Strategic Environmental Assessment 
4. MacGregor, James (2017), Sustainable policy for energy, land and natural 
resources 
 
